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Gruter, C. C. (2004). Conflict and postconflict behaviour in captive black-and-white snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus bieti). Primates, 45(3), 197–200.
Abstract: Black-and-white snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus bieti) have almost never been the subject of any behavioural observations in captivity. This study was aimed at providing preliminary information about agonistic and reconciliation behaviour in a group kept at the Kunming Institute of Zoology in China. Established procedures were used for this investigation (i.e., the postconflict/matched-control method and the time-rule method). Intra-group aggression rates were quite low. Postconflict affiliation as well as selective attraction of former opponents to each other following conflicts was demonstrated. Former opponents contacted each other earlier in postconflict periods than in matched-control periods. The average conciliatory tendency of all focal individuals combined was 54.5%. After an agonistic interaction, the first affiliative contact between former aggressors usually took place within the first minute. The behaviours most often shown as first affiliations after a conflict were body contact, mount, touch, and “hold-lumbar”, of which the latter is an explicit reconciliatory gesture. Furthermore, the adult male intervened non-aggressively in 84% of all conflicts (n=25) among the adult females. Overall, the patterns of aggression and reconciliation observed in R. bieti bear many of the traits that characterise tolerant primate species.
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Fuentes, A., Malone, N., Sanz, C., Matheson, M., & Vaughan, L. (2002). Conflict and post-conflict behavior in a small group of chimpanzees. Primates, 43(3), 223–235.
Abstract: Chimpanzee research plays a central role in the discussions of conflict negotiation. Reconciliation, or the attraction and affiliation of former opponents following conflict, has been proposed as a central element of conflict negotiation in chimpanzees and various other taxa. In an attempt to expand the database of chimpanzee conflict resolution, conflict and post-conflict behavior were recorded for a small group of socially housed chimpanzees at the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute, at Central Washington University. Data were collected over six 6-week periods between 1997 and 2000, for a total of 840 hours of observation, resulting in a substantial post-conflict (PC) and matched control (MC) data set. The data demonstrate this group's tendencies to maintain visual contact and closer proximity after conflicts. Dyadic corrected conciliatory tendencies ranged between 0 – 37.5% and averaged 17.25% across all dyads. Individual corrected conciliatory tendencies ranged between 5.8 and 32%. The results of this study combined with recent publications on captive and free-ranging chimpanzee post-conflict behavior suggest that variation in post-conflict behavior may be important to our understanding of chimpanzee conflict negotiation, and may also have implications for the design and management of captive chimpanzee enclosures and social groups, respectively.
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Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Krakauer, D. C. (2005). Social structure, robustness, and policing cost in a cognitively sophisticated species. Am Nat, 165(5), E126–139.
Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.
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de Waal, F. B. (2000). Primates--A natural heritage of conflict resolution. Science, 289(5479), 586–590.
Abstract: The traditional notion of aggression as an antisocial instinct is being replaced by a framework that considers it a tool of competition and negotiation. When survival depends on mutual assistance, the expression of aggression is constrained by the need to maintain beneficial relationships. Moreover, evolution has produced ways of countering its disruptive consequences. For example, chimpanzees kiss and embrace after fights, and other nonhuman primates engage in similar “reconciliations.” Theoretical developments in this field carry implications for human aggression research. From families to high schools, aggressive conflict is subject to the same constraints known of cooperative animal societies. It is only when social relationships are valued that one can expect the full complement of natural checks and balances.
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Flack, J. C., Girvan, M., de Waal, F. B. M., & Krakauer, D. C. (2006). Policing stabilizes construction of social niches in primates. Nature, 439(7075), 426–429.
Abstract: All organisms interact with their environment, and in doing so shape it, modifying resource availability. Termed niche construction, this process has been studied primarily at the ecological level with an emphasis on the consequences of construction across generations. We focus on the behavioural process of construction within a single generation, identifying the role a robustness mechanism--conflict management--has in promoting interactions that build social resource networks or social niches. Using 'knockout' experiments on a large, captive group of pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina), we show that a policing function, performed infrequently by a small subset of individuals, significantly contributes to maintaining stable resource networks in the face of chronic perturbations that arise through conflict. When policing is absent, social niches destabilize, with group members building smaller, less diverse, and less integrated grooming, play, proximity and contact-sitting networks. Instability is quantified in terms of reduced mean degree, increased clustering, reduced reach, and increased assortativity. Policing not only controls conflict, we find it significantly influences the structure of networks that constitute essential social resources in gregarious primate societies. The structure of such networks plays a critical role in infant survivorship, emergence and spread of cooperative behaviour, social learning and cultural traditions.
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Johnstone, R. A. (2001). Eavesdropping and animal conflict. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(16), 9177–9180.
Abstract: Fights between pairs of animals frequently take place within a wider social context. The displays exchanged during conflict, and the outcome of an encounter, are often detectable by individuals who are not immediately involved. In at least some species, such bystanders are known to eavesdrop on contests between others, and to modify their behavior toward the contestants in response to the observed interaction. Here, I extend Maynard Smith's well known model of animal aggression, the Hawk-Dove game, to incorporate the possibility of eavesdroppers. I show that some eavesdropping is favored whenever the cost of losing an escalated fight exceeds the value of the contested resource, and that its equilibrium frequency is greatest when costs are relatively high. Eavesdropping reduces the risk of escalated conflict relative to that expected by chance, given the level of aggression in the population. However, it also promotes increased aggression, because it enhances the value of victory. The net result is that escalated conflicts are predicted to occur more frequently when eavesdropping is possible.
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