Abstract: Associative learning theories presume the existence of a general purpose learning process, the structure of which does not mirror the demands of any particular learning problem. In contrast, learning scientists working within an Evolutionary Biology tradition believe that learning processes have been shaped by ecological demands. One potential means of exploring how ecology may have modified properties of acquisition is to use associative learning theory as a framework within which to analyse a particular learning phenomenon. Recent work has used this approach to examine whether socially transmitted predator avoidance can be conceptualised as a classical conditioning process in which a novel predator stimulus acts as a conditioned stimulus (CS) and acquires control over an avoidance response after it has become associated with alarm signals of social companions, the unconditioned stimulus (US). I review here a series of studies examining the effect of CS/US presentation timing on the likelihood of acquisition. Results suggest that socially acquired predator avoidance may be less sensitive to forward relationships than traditional classical conditioning paradigms. I make the case that socially acquired predator avoidance is an exciting novel one-trial learning paradigm that could be studied along side fear conditioning. Comparisons between social and non-social learning of danger at both the behavioural and neural level may yield a better understanding of how ecology might shape properties and mechanisms of learning.

Abstract: Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.

Abstract: In many animal groups, certain individuals consistently appear at the forefront of coordinated movements [1-4]. How such leaders emerge is poorly understood [5, 6]. Here, we show that in pairs of sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, leadership arises from individual differences in the way that fish respond to their partner's movements. Having first established that individuals differed in their propensity to leave cover in order to look for food, we randomly paired fish of varying boldness, and we used a Markov Chain model to infer the individual rules underlying their joint behavior. Both fish in a pair responded to each other's movements-each was more likely to leave cover if the other was already out and to return if the other had already returned. However, we found that bolder individuals displayed greater initiative and were less responsive to their partners, whereas shyer individuals displayed less initiative but followed their partners more faithfully; they also, as followers, elicited greater leadership tendencies in their bold partners. We conclude that leadership in this case is reinforced by positive social feedback.

Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.

Abstract: Animal behaviour is often a function of the animal's physiological state. Groups of animals will often contain individuals with a range of physiological states and the grazing behaviour of herbivores is affected by their physiological state. This study compared the grazing decisions of animals in groups of single and mixed physiological states. Using a grazing model that simulated individual herbivore behaviour in relation to environmental distributions of forage resource (grass) and parasites (faeces), we tested the hypothesis that an animal's level of parasite exposure via the faecal-oral route is affected by the composition of physiological states in the group. Four physiological states were considered: parasite-naïve, parasitized, lactating and parasite-immune animals. Baseline parasite exposure levels for each state were generated by simulating single-state groups and were compared to simulations of each of the six two-state combinations. In single-state groups parasitized animals had the least and lactating animals had the greatest levels of parasite exposure. When co-grazing with lactating animals, parasitized, immune and naïve animals increased their parasite exposure, relative to single-state groups. When co-grazing with parasitized animals, lactating, immune and naïve animals reduced their parasite exposure, relative to single-state groups. There was no difference in parasite exposure of the immune or naïve animals co-grazing together when compared to the single-state groups. These results highlight the need to recognize the impact of the individual when studying group-living animals.