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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1988). Do monkeys understand their realtions? In R. Byrne, & A. Whiten (Eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Milton, K. (1988). Foraging behaviour and the evolution of primate intelligence. In R. Byrne, & A. Whiten (Eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 285–409). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Dukas, R. (Ed.). (1988). Cognitive Ecology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Luttrell, L. M. (1988). Mechanisms of social reciprocity in three primate species: Symmetrical relationship characteristics or cognition? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2–4), 101–118.
Abstract: Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in captive groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and stumptail monkeys (M. arctoides). Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing from the data the effects of several symmetrical relationship characteristics, that is, matrillineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted after controlling for these characteristics, the reciprocity was based on cognitive mechanisms. Statistical significance was tested by means of recently developed matrix permutation procedures. All three species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were, however, reciprocal among chimpanzees only. This species showed a “revenge system”, that is, if A often intervened against B, B did the same to A. In contrast, both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in their harmful interventions: if A often intervened against B, B rarely intervened against A. Further analysis indicates that the strict hierarchy of macaques prevents them from achieving complete reciprocity. Compared to chimpanzees, macaques rarely intervene against higher ranking group members. The observed contrast can be partially explained on the basis of differences in available space, as indicated by a comparison of indoor and outdoor living conditions for the chimpanzee colony. Yet, even when such spatial factors are taken into account, substantial behavior differences between chimpanzees and macaques remain.
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Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988). Tactical deception in primates. Behav. Brain Sci., 11(02), 233–244.
Abstract: ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition.
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Jerison H. J. (1988). Intelligence and Evolutionary Biology (J. J. Jerison H. J., Ed.).
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Hauser M.D. (1988). Invention and social transmission: new data from wild vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 327–343). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Dasser V. (1988). Mapping social concepts in monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 85–93). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Rogers, A. R. (1988). Does Biology Constrain Culture? Am Anthropol, 90(4), 819–831.
Abstract: Most social scientists would agree that the capacity for human culture was probably fashioned by natural selection, but they disagree about the implications of this supposition. Some believe that natural selection imposes important constraints on the ways in which culture can vary, while others believe that any such constraints must be negligible. This article employs a “thought experiment” to demonstrate that neither of these positions can be justified by appeal to general properties of culture or of evolution. Natural selection can produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are neither adaptive nor consistent with the predictions of acultural evolutionary models (those ignoring cultural evolution). On the other hand, natural selection can also produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are highly consistent with acultural models. Thus, neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other. Natural selection may impose significant constraints on some human behaviors, but negligible constraints on others. Models of simultaneous genetic/cultural evolution will be useful in identifying domains in which acultural evolutionary models are, and are not, likely to be useful.
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