Abstract: The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.

Abstract: In 2 experiments, pigeons were trained on, and then transferred to, delayed simple discriminations in which the initial stimuli signalled reinforcement versus extinction following a retention interval. Experiment 1 showed that discriminative responding on the retention test transferred to novel test stimuli that had appeared in another delayed simple discrimination but not to stimuli having the same reinforcement history off-baseline. By contrast, Experiment 2 showed that performances transferred to novel initial stimuli whether they had been trained on-baseline or off-baseline. These results suggest that the test stimuli in delayed simple discriminations acquire control over responding only in the memory task itself. On the other hand, control by the initial stimuli, if coded as outcome expectancies, does not require such task-specific training.

Abstract: Three avian species, a seed-caching corvid (Clark's nutcrackers; Nucifraga columbiana), a non-seed-caching corvid (jackdaws; Corvus monedula), and a non-seed-caching columbid (pigeons; Columba livia), were tested for ability to learn to find a goal halfway between 2 landmarks when distance between the landmarks varied during training. All 3 species learned, but jackdaws took much longer than either pigeons or nutcrackers. The nutcrackers searched more accurately than either pigeons or jackdaws. Both nutcrackers and pigeons showed good transfer to novel landmark arrays in which interlandmark distances were novel, but inconclusive results were obtained from jackdaws. Species differences in this spatial task appear quantitative rather than qualitative and are associated with differences in natural history rather than phylogeny.

Abstract: Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.

Abstract: Imitation was studied experimentally by allowing chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to observe alternative patterns of actions for opening a specially designed “artificial fruit.” Like problematic foods primates deal with naturally, with the test fruit several defenses had to be removed to gain access to an edible core, but the sequential order and method of defense removal could be systematically varied. Each subject repeatedly observed 1 of 2 alternative techniques for removing each defense and 1 of 2 alternative sequential patterns of defense removal. Imitation of sequential organization emerged after repeated cycles of demonstration and attempts at opening the fruit. Imitation in chimpanzees may thus have some power to produce cultural convergence, counter to the supposition that individual learning processes corrupt copied actions. Imitation of sequential organization was accompanied by imitation of some aspects of the techniques that made up the sequence.