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Sarter, M. (2004). Animal cognition: defining the issues. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 28(7), 645–650.
Abstract: The assessment of cognitive functions in rodents represents a critical experimental variable in many research fields, ranging from the basic cognitive neurosciences to psychopharmacology and neurotoxicology. The increasing use of animal behavioral tests as 'assays' for the assessment of effects on learning and memory has resulted in a considerable heterogeneity of data, particularly in the field of behavioral and psycho pharmacology. The limited predictive validity of changes in behavioral performance observed in standard animal tests of learning and memory indicates that a renewed effort to scrutinize the validity of these tests is warranted. In humans, levels of processing (effortful vs. automatic) and categories of information (procedural vs. episodic/declarative) are important variables of cognitive operations. The design of tasks that assess the recall of 'episodic' or 'declarative' information appears to represent a particular challenge for research using laboratory rodents. For example, the hypothesis that changes in inspection time for a previously encountered place or object are based on the recall of declarative/episodic information requires substantiation. In order to generalize findings on the effects of neuronal or pharmacological manipulations on learning and memory, obtained from one species and one task, to other species and other tasks, the mediating role of important sets of variables which influence learning and memory (e.g. attentional, affective) needs to be determined. Similar to the view that a neuronal manipulation (e.g. a lesion) represents a theory of the condition modeled (e.g. a degenerative disorder), an animal behavioral task represents a theory of the behavioral/cognitive process of interest. Therefore, the test of hypotheses regarding the validity of procedures used to assess cognitive functions in animals is an inherent part of the research process.
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Branchi, I., Bichler, Z., Berger-Sweeney, J., & Ricceri, L. (2003). Animal models of mental retardation: from gene to cognitive function. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 27(1-2), 141–153.
Abstract: About 2-3% of all children are affected by mental retardation, and genetic conditions rank among the leading causes of mental retardation. Alterations in the information encoded by genes that regulate critical steps of brain development can disrupt the normal course of development, and have profound consequences on mental processes. Genetically modified mouse models have helped to elucidate the contribution of specific gene alterations and gene-environment interactions to the phenotype of several forms of mental retardation. Mouse models of several neurodevelopmental pathologies, such as Down and Rett syndromes and X-linked forms of mental retardation, have been developed. Because behavior is the ultimate output of brain, behavioral phenotyping of these models provides functional information that may not be detectable using molecular, cellular or histological evaluations. In particular, the study of ontogeny of behavior is recommended in mouse models of disorders having a developmental onset. Identifying the role of specific genes in neuropathologies provides a framework in which to understand key stages of human brain development, and provides a target for potential therapeutic intervention.
Keywords: Animals; Animals, Genetically Modified/growth & development; Behavior/physiology; Behavior, Animal; Brain/*growth & development; Cognition/*physiology; *Disease Models, Animal; Environment; Genes; Genetic Diseases, Inborn/physiopathology; Humans; Mental Retardation/classification/*genetics/*physiopathology
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Sachs, E. (1967). Dissociation of learning in rats and its similarities to dissociative states in man. Proc Annu Meet Am Psychopathol Assoc, 55, 249–304. |
Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animals know more than we used to think (Vol. 98). |
Cowell, P. E., Fitch, R. H., & Denenberg, V. H. (1999). Laterality in animals: relevance to schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull, 25(1), 41–62.
Abstract: Anomalies in the laterality of numerous neurocognitive dimensions associated with schizophrenia have been documented, but their role in the etiology and early development of the disorder remain unclear. In the study of normative neurobehavioral organization, animal models have shed much light on the mechanisms underlying and the factors affecting adult patterns of both functional and structural asymmetry. Nonhuman species have more recently been used to investigate the environmental, genetic, and neuroendocrine factors associated with developmental language disorders in humans. We propose that the animal models used to study the basis of lateralization in normative development and language disorders such as dyslexia could be modified to investigate lateralized phenomena in schizophrenia.
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Corr, J. A. (2004). Nuns and monkeys: investigating the behavior of our oldest old. Sci Aging Knowledge Environ, 2004(41), pe38.
Abstract: The use of nonhuman primates, particularly rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), as the best model for human physiological and cognitive aging is broadly accepted. Studies employing nonhuman primates to investigate behavioral changes that may occur with increasing age, however, are not common mostly because of the unavailability of appropriate subjects. Recent longitudinal human studies suggest that individual personality might play a large role in aging “successfully” and in the retention of high levels of cognition into old age. As a result of the demographic trend of increasing numbers of aged monkeys and apes in captivity, an opportunity exists to further investigate behavioral aging using the monkey model.
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Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2006). Mirrors of the mind. Sci Am, 295(5), 54–61. |
Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284). |