Abstract: A tool-throwing task was used to test whether capuchin monkeys understand the difference between functionally appropriate and functionally inappropriate tools. A group of monkeys was trained to obtain a sticky treat from a container outside their enclosure using a projectile attached to one end of an anchored line. Subsequently, these monkeys were given choice tests between functional and nonfunctional versions of tools used in training. A different feature of the tool was varied between alternatives in each choice test. The monkeys chose to use functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools in early exposures to each choice test. A second experiment tested whether these subjects, as well as a second group of minimally trained participants, could distinguish between functional and nonfunctional tools that appeared different from those used in training. A new set of design features was varied between tools in these choice tests. All participants continued to choose functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools, regardless of their tool-throwing experience or the novel appearance of the tools. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees studied in similar experiments, are sensitive to a variety of functionally relevant tool features.

Abstract: Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.

Abstract: Planning is an important component of cognition that contributes, for example, to efficient movement through space. In the current study we presented novel two-dimensional alley mazes to four chimpanzees and three capuchin monkeys to identify the nature and efficiency of planning in relation to varying task parameters. All the subjects solved more mazes without error than expected by chance, providing compelling evidence that both species planned their choices in some manner. The probability of making a correct choice on mazes designed to be more demanding and presented later in the testing series was higher than on earlier, simpler mazes (chimpanzees), or unchanged (capuchin monkeys), suggesting microdevelopment of strategic choice. Structural properties of the mazes affected both species' choices. Capuchin monkeys were less likely than chimpanzees to take a correct path that initially led away from the goal but that eventually led to the goal. Chimpanzees were more likely to make an error by passing a correct path than by turning onto a wrong path. Chimpanzees and one capuchin made more errors on choices farther in sequence from the goal. Each species corrected errors before running into the end of an alley in approximately 40% of cases. Together, these findings suggest nascent planning abilities in each species, and the prospect for significant development of strategic planning capabilities on tasks presenting multiple simultaneous or sequential spatial relations. The computerized maze paradigm appears well suited to investigate movement planning and spatial perception in human and nonhuman primates alike.

Abstract: Under the assumption that selection favors minimization of costly errors, erroneous choice may be common when its fitness cost is low. According to an adaptive-choice model, this cost depends on the rate at which an animal encounters the choice: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing a less valuable option. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. A previous experiment supported this prediction: gray jays, Perisoreus canadensis, were more error prone when subjected to shorter delays to access to food rewards. This pattern, though, is also predicted by an attentional-constraints model. Because the subjects were able to inspect the rewards during delays, their improved performance when subjected to longer delays could have been a byproduct of the experimentally prolonged opportunity for information processing. To evaluate this possibility, a follow-up experiment manipulated both delay to access and whether rewards could be inspected during delays. Depriving jays of the opportunity to inspect rewards (using opaque lids) induced only a small, nonsignificant increase in error rate. This effect was independent of length of delay and so the jays' improved performance when subjected to longer delays was not simply a byproduct of prolonged information processing. More definitively, even when the jays were prevented from inspecting rewards during delays, their performance improved when subjected to longer delays. The findings are thus consistent with the adaptive-choice model.

Abstract: Two baboons (Papio papio) successfully learned relational matching-to-sample: They picked the choice display that involved the same relation among 16 pictures (same or different) as the sample display, although the sample display shared no pictures with the choice displays. The baboons generalized relational matching behavior to sample displays created from novel pictures. Further experiments varying the number of sample pictures and the mixture of same and different sample pictures suggested that entropy plays a key role in the baboons' conceptual behavior. Two humans (Homo sapiens) were similarly trained and tested; their behavior was both similar to and different from the baboons' behavior. The results suggest that animals other than humans and chimpanzees can discriminate the relation between relations. They further suggest that entropy detection may underlie same-different conceptualization, but that additional processes may participate in human conceptualization.