Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.

Abstract: Animal societies develop from interactions and relationships that occur among individuals within populations. The fundamental tenet of behavioral ecology is that ecological factors shape behavior and determine the distribution and associations of individuals on landscapes. As a result, different social systems emerge in different habitats and under different environmental conditions. Since characterizing social systems depends on time and motion studies of individual actions and interactions that are often bilateral, such characterizations are often coarse-grained. If social relationships can be characterized using social networks, however, seemingly similar social organizations often reveal informative differences in terms of deep structure. Thus social network theory should be able to provide insights in to the connections between social form and function. This talk will explore how the network structures of horses, zebras and asses can provide novel insights into the functioning of animal societies with respect to the spread of memes, genes and diseases.

Abstract: In animal groups, collective movements emerge from individual interactions. Biologists seek to identify how characteristics of actors in these groups, and their relationships, influence the decision-making process. We distinguished two basic factors determining leadership in group choices: identity and state. We hypothesized that identity is more important to leadership in groups with stable relationships, which permit the development of habitual roles. In groups with fluid membership, particular individuals or subgroups are less likely to emerge as consistent leaders. Instead, we predicted that movement initiation in unstable groups depends on individual state at the time of the decision. We characterized how identity and reproductive state influenced leadership patterns in the movements of plains zebra. As in many other mammals, lactation in this species significantly alters water and energy needs. We investigated leadership in tightly knit harems and loosely bonded herds of multiple harems. Harem females tended to have habitual roles in the initiation of harem movement. In herds, however, we found no consistent leaders among harems. At both levels of social organization, lactation was a key determinant of leadership. In harems, lactating females were more likely to initiate movement than nonlactating females. In turn, harems containing lactating females were more likely to lead herd movements. Thus, we conclude that social relationships and reproductive state together shape the interactions that produce group behaviours. One benefit to lactating females of leading herd movements is preferential access to scarce water. Thus, leadership roles in group decisions may have fitness consequences.