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Barrett, L., Henzi, P., & Dunbar, R. (2003). Primate cognition: from 'what now?' to 'what if?'. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(11), 494–497.
Abstract: The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.
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Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
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Legare, C. H., & Nielsen, M. (). Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural Learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(11), 688–699.
Abstract: Imitation and innovation work in tandem to support cultural learning in children and facilitate our capacity for cumulative culture. Here we propose an integrated theoretical account of how the unique demands of acquiring instrumental skills and cultural conventions provide insight into when children imitate, when they innovate, and to what degree. For instrumental learning, with an increase in experience, high fidelity imitation decreases and innovation increases. By contrast, for conventional learning, imitative fidelity stays high, regardless of experience, and innovation stays low. We synthesize cutting edge research on the development of imitative flexibility and innovation to provide insight into the social learning mechanisms underpinning the uniquely human mind.
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Bolhuis, J. J., & Macphail, E. M. (2001). A critique of the neuroecology of learning and memory. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 5(10), 426–433.
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of neuroecology, the study of the neural mechanisms of behaviour guided by functional and evolutionary principles. This research has been of enormous value for our understanding of the evolution of brain- and species-specific behaviour. However, we question the validity of the neuroecological approach when applied to the analysis of learning and memory, given its arbitrary assumption that different [`]problems' engage different memory mechanisms. Differences in memory-based performance in [`]natural' tasks do not prove differences in memory capacity; similarly, differences in the use of memory in the natural environment do not provide a sound basis for expecting differences in anatomical structures that subserve learning and memory. This critique is illustrated with examples taken from the study of the neurobiology of food storing and song learning in birds.
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Holekamp, K. E. (2006). Questioning the social intelligence hypothesis. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 11(2), 65–69.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis posits that complex cognition and enlarged [`]executive brains' evolved in response to challenges that are associated with social complexity. This hypothesis has been well supported, but some recent data are inconsistent with its predictions. It is becoming increasingly clear that multiple selective agents, and non-selective constraints, must have acted to shape cognitive abilities in humans and other animals. The task now is to develop a larger theoretical framework that takes into account both inter-specific differences and similarities in cognition. This new framework should facilitate consideration of how selection pressures that are associated with sociality interact with those that are imposed by non-social forms of environmental complexity, and how both types of functional demands interact with phylogenetic and developmental constraints.
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Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(4), 157–160.
Abstract: Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states – that is, do they possess a [`]theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends Cognit. Sci., 14(5), 201–207.
Abstract: Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive research has focused on the pinnacles of mental evolution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, linguistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research programs adopting this top-down perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines. Insight into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind. A dramatic change in focus now seems to be under way, however, with increased appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition might be shared across a wide range of species. We argue that this bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with both neuroscience and evolutionary biology.
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Rosati, A. G. (2017). Foraging Cognition: Reviving the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(9), 691–702.
Abstract: What are the origins of intelligent behavior? The demands associated with living in complex social groups have been the favored explanation for the evolution of primate cognition in general and human cognition in particular. However, recent comparative research indicates that ecological variation can also shape cognitive abilities. I synthesize the emerging evidence that ?foraging cognition? ? skills used to exploit food resources, including spatial memory, decision-making, and inhibitory control ? varies adaptively across primates. These findings provide a new framework for the evolution of human cognition, given our species? dependence on costly, high-value food resources. Understanding the origins of the human mind will require an integrative theory accounting for how humans are unique in both our sociality and our ecology.
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Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Varieties of altruism in children and chimpanzees. In Trends in cognitive sciences (Vol. 13, pp. 397–402). Elsevier Science,.
Abstract: Recent empirical research has shed new light on the perennial question of human altruism. A number of recent studies suggest that from very early in ontogeny young children have a biological predisposition to help others achieve their goals, to share resources with others and to inform others of things helpfully. Humans nearest primate relatives, such as chimpanzees, engage in some but not all of these behaviors: they help others instrumentally, but they are not so inclined to share resources altruistically and they do not inform others of things helpfully. The evolutionary roots of human altruism thus appear to be much more complex than previously supposed.
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Markman, E. M., & Abelev, M. (2004). Word learning in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 8(11), 479–81; discussion 481.
Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.
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