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Meunier, H., Leca, J. B., Deneubourg, J. L., & Petit, O. (2006). Group movement decisions in capuchin monkeys: the utility of an experimental study and a mathematical model to explore the relationship between individual and collective behaviours. Behaviour, 143, 1511–1527.
Abstract: In primate groups, collective movements are typically described as processes dependent on leadership mechanisms. However, in some species, decision-making includes negotiations and distributed leadership. These facts suggest that simple underlying processes may explain certain decision mechanisms during collective movements. To study such processes, we have designed experiments on white-faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus) during which we provoked collective movements involving a binary choice. These experiments enabled us to analyse the spatial decisions of individuals in the group. We found that the underlying process includes anonymous mimetism, which means that each individual may influence all members of the group. To support this result, we created a mathematical model issued from our experimental data. A totally anonymous model does not fit perfectly with our experimental distribution. A more individualised model, which takes into account the specific behaviour of social peripheral individuals, revealed the validity of the mimetism hypothesis. Even though white-faced capuchins have complex cognitive abilities, a coexistence of anonymous and social mechanisms appears to influence their choice of direction during collective movements. The present approach may offer vital insights into the relationships between individual behaviours and their emergent collective acts.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Barrett, L., & Henzi, P. (2005). The social nature of primate cognition. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1575), 1865–1875.
Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
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Joffe, T. H., & Dunbar, R. I. (1997). Visual and socio-cognitive information processing in primate brain evolution. Proc Biol Sci, 264(1386), 1303–1307.
Abstract: Social group size has been shown to correlate with neocortex size in primates. Here we use comparative analyses to show that social group size is independently correlated with the size of non-V1 neocortical areas, but not with other more proximate components of the visual system or with brain systems associated with emotional cueing (e.g. the amygdala). We argue that visual brain components serve as a social information 'input device' for socio-visual stimuli such as facial expressions, bodily gestures and visual status markers, while the non-visual neocortex serves as a 'processing device' whereby these social cues are encoded, interpreted and associated with stored information. However, the second appears to have greater overall importance because the size of the V1 visual area appears to reach an asymptotic size beyond which visual acuity and pattern recognition may not improve significantly. This is especially true of the great ape clade (including humans), that is known to use more sophisticated social cognitive strategies.
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Hoff, M. P., Powell, D. M., Lukas, K. E., & Maple, T. L. (1997). Individual and social behavior of lowland gorillas in outdoor exhibits compared with indoor holding areas. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 54(4), 359–370.
Abstract: The behavior of nine lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) living in three social groups at Zoo Atlanta was compared in an indoor holding area versus an outdoor exhibit. Focal animal data were collected for each animal during 15 min observation sessions, alternating between indoors and outdoors. A variety of solitary and social behaviors differed in the two conditions. All individual and social behaviors that showed a difference, except eating, occurred more indoors than outdoors. These included aggressive displays, reclining, self manipulation, and social examination of others. Additionally, the gorillas spent more time closer together in the indoor condition. A variety of other behaviors measured did not change between the two environments. There was a clear effect on behavior of the different housing conditions in which the gorillas were kept. It is suggested that the differences in aggressive behavior may be related to environmental complexity. It is further suggested that zoos should be aware that differences in behavior reported by caretaking staff, researchers and visitors may be a reflection of the differing environmental circumstances in which the animals are observed.
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Reader, S. M., & Laland, K. N. (2002). Social intelligence, innovation, and enhanced brain size in primates. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(7), 4436–4441.
Abstract: Despite considerable current interest in the evolution of intelligence, the intuitively appealing notion that brain volume and “intelligence” are linked remains untested. Here, we use ecologically relevant measures of cognitive ability, the reported incidence of behavioral innovation, social learning, and tool use, to show that brain size and cognitive capacity are indeed correlated. A comparative analysis of 533 instances of innovation, 445 observations of social learning, and 607 episodes of tool use established that social learning, innovation, and tool use frequencies are positively correlated with species' relative and absolute “executive” brain volumes, after controlling for phylogeny and research effort. Moreover, innovation and social learning frequencies covary across species, in conflict with the view that there is an evolutionary tradeoff between reliance on individual experience and social cues. These findings provide an empirical link between behavioral innovation, social learning capacities, and brain size in mammals. The ability to learn from others, invent new behaviors, and use tools may have played pivotal roles in primate brain evolution.
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Janson, C., & Byrne, R. (2007). What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box. Anim. Cogn., 10(3), 357–367.
Abstract: Abstract We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animals ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animals detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates.
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Leighty, K. A., & Fragaszy, D. M. (2003). Primates in cyberspace: using interactive computer tasks to study perception and action in nonhuman animals. Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 137–139.
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Bshary, R., Wickler, W., & Fricke, H. (2002). Fish cognition: a primate's eye view. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 1–13.
Abstract: We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualized groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects.
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Knoll, H., & Horschak, R. (1973). [Ecology of fermentation sarcinas Sarcina ventriculi and Sarcina maxima]. Z Allg Mikrobiol, 13(5), 449–451.
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