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Tanaka, M. (2001). Discrimination and categorization of photographs of natural objects by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 201–211.
Abstract: Two experiments assessed the ability of four adult female chimpanzees to categorize natural objects. Chimpanzees were initially trained to match different color photographs of familiar objects from four possible categories. In training, all the comparison stimuli were from the same category in one condition, and from different categories in another condition. For all subjects, training performance was consistently better for the “different category” than for the “same category” trials. Probe trials were shown after training. In probe trials, the sample and positive comparison stimuli were different items from the same category, and the foils were selected from among the three other test categories. Individual performance was above chance in probe trials, suggesting that categorization by chimpanzees may transcend perceptual resemblance. These results were later replicated with novel stimulus items from the same four categories (experiment 2). Altogether, this research demonstrates that chimpanzees grouped perceptually different exemplars within the same category, and further suggests that these animals formed conceptual representations of the categories.
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Takimoto, A., Kuroshima, H., & Fujita, K. (2010). Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are sensitive to others’ reward: an experimental analysis of food-choice for conspecifics. Anim. Cogn., 13(2), 249–261.
Abstract: Abstract The issue whether non-human primates have other-regarding preference and/or inequity aversion has been under debate. We investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others’ reward in various experimental food sharing settings. Two monkeys faced each other. The operator monkey chose one of two food containers placed between the participants, each containing a food item for him/herself and another for the recipient. The recipient passively received either high- or low-value food depending on the operator’s choice, whereas the operator obtained the same food regardless of his/her choice. The recipients were either the highest- or lowest-ranking member of the group, and the operators were middle-ranking. In Experiment 1, the operators chose the high-value food for the subordinate recipient more frequently than when there was no recipient, whereas they were indifferent in their choice for the dominant. This differentiated behavior could have been because the dominant recipient frequently ate the low-value food. In Experiment 2, we increased the difference in the value of the two food items so that both recipients would reject the low-value food. The results were the same as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we placed an opaque screen in front of the recipient to examine effects of visual contact between the participants. The operators’ food choice generally shifted toward providing the low-value food for the recipient. These results suggest that capuchins are clearly sensitive to others’ reward and that they show other-regarding preference or a form of inequity aversion depending upon the recipients and the presence of visual contact.
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Takeshita, H. (2001). Development of combinatory manipulation in chimpanzee infants (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 335–345.
Abstract: I made systematic observations of three infant chimpanzees aged 2–4 years, who participated in a series of diagnostic tests of combinatory manipulation. The tasks were stacking blocks, seriating nesting cups, and inserting an object into the corresponding hole in a plate or a box. These tasks were originally devised for developmental diagnosis of human infants. The chimpanzee infants displayed combinatory manipulation comparable to that of 1-year-old human infants. Common motor characteristics were observed across the tasks, namely “repetition” of actions, “adjustment” of actions, “reversal” of actions, and “shifts” of attention. Humans and chimpanzees share these actions when manipulating multiple objects to complete a task. Repetition, adjustment, and reversal of actions and shifts of attention underlie higher levels of cognition common to both species.
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Takaoka, A., Maeda, T., Hori, Y., & Fujita, K. (2015). Do dogs follow behavioral cues from an unreliable human? Anim.Cogn., 18(2), 475–483.
Abstract: Dogs are known to consistently follow human pointing gestures. In this study, we asked whether dogs “automatically” do this or whether they flexibly adjust their behavior depending upon the reliability of the pointer, demonstrated in an immediately preceding event. We tested pet dogs in a version of the object choice task in which a piece of food was hidden in one of the two containers. In Experiment 1, Phase 1, an experimenter pointed at the baited container; the second container was empty. In Phase 2, after showing the contents of both containers to the dogs, the experimenter pointed at the empty container. In Phase 3, the procedure was exactly as in Phase 1. We compared the dogs’ responses to the experimenter’s pointing gestures in Phases 1 and 3. Most dogs followed pointing in Phase 1, but many fewer did so in Phase 3. In Experiment 2, dogs followed a new experimenter’s pointing in Phase 3 following replication of procedures of Phases 1 and 2 in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that dogs simply lost motivation to participate in the task in later phases. These results suggest that not only dogs are highly skilled at understanding human pointing gestures, but also they make inferences about the reliability of a human who presents cues and consequently modify their behavior flexibly depending on the inference.
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Sueur, C., & Petit, O. (2010). Signals use by leaders in Macaca tonkeana and Macaca mulatta: group-mate recruitment and behaviour monitoring. Anim. Cogn., 13(2), 239–248.
Abstract: Abstract Animals living in groups have to make consensus decisions and communicate with each other about the time, or the direction, in which to move. In some species, the process relies on the proposition of a single individual, i.e. a first individual suggests a movement and the other group members decide whether or not to join this individual. In Tonkean (Macaca tonkeana) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), it has been observed that this first individual displays specific signals at departure. In this paper, we aimed to explore the function of such behaviours, i.e. if these behaviours were recruitment signals or only cues about the motivation of the first departed individual. We carried out temporal analyses and studied the latencies of the first departed individual’s behaviours and of the joining of other group members. We also assessed whether the social style of a species in terms of dominance and kinship relationships influenced the patterns of signal emissions. We then analyzed how the first departed individual decided to make a pause or to stop it according to the identities of group members that joined the collective movement. Results showed that Tonkean macaques and rhesus macaques seemed to use back-glances to monitor the joining of other group members and pauses to recruit such individuals. This was especially the case for highly socially affiliated individuals in Tonkean macaques and kin-related individuals in rhesus macaques. Moreover, back-glances and pauses disappeared when such individuals joined the first departed individual. From these results, we suggested that such behaviour could be considered intentional. Such findings could not be highlighted without temporal analyses and accurate observations on primate groups in semi-free ranging conditions.
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Suda-King, C. (2007). Do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) know when they do not remember? Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive activities such as memory. Although recent studies have raised an interesting possibility that some species of nonhuman animals might possess such skills, subjects often required a numerous number of training trials to acquire the effective use of metacognitive responses. Here, five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were tested whether they were able to escape spatial memory tests when they did not remember the location of preferred reward in a relatively small number of trials. The apes were presented with two identical cups, under one of which the experimenter hid a preferred reward (e.g., two grapes). The subjects were then presented with a third container, “escape response”, with which they could receive a less preferred but secure reward (e.g., one grape). The orangutans as a group significantly more likely selected the escape response when the baiting of the preferred reward was invisible (as compared to when it was visible) and when the hiding locations of the preferred reward were switched (as compared to when they remained unchanged). Even when the escape response was presented before the final presentation of the memory test, one orangutan successfully avoided the test in which she would likely err. These findings indicate that some orangutans appear to tell when they do not remember correct answers in memory tests.
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Suda, C., & Call, J. (2005). Piagetian conservation of discrete quantities in bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 220–235.
Abstract: This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.
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Subiaul, F., Vonk, J., Okamoto-Barth, S., & Barth, J. (2008). Do chimpanzees learn reputation by observation? Evidence from direct and indirect experience with generous and selfish strangers. Anim. Cogn., 11(4), 611–623.
Abstract: Abstract  Can chimpanzees learn the reputation of strangers indirectly by observation? Or are such stable behavioral attributions made exclusively by first-person interactions? To address this question, we let seven chimpanzees observe unfamiliar humans either consistently give (generous donor) or refuse to give (selfish donor) food to a familiar human recipient (Experiments 1 and 2) and a conspecific (Experiment 3). While chimpanzees did not initially prefer to beg for food from the generous donor (Experiment 1), after continued opportunities to observe the same behavioral exchanges, four chimpanzees developed a preference for gesturing to the generous donor (Experiment 2), and transferred this preference to novel unfamiliar donor pairs, significantly preferring to beg from the novel generous donors on the first opportunity to do so. In Experiment 3, four chimpanzees observed novel selfish and generous acts directed toward other chimpanzees by human experimenters. During the first half of testing, three chimpanzees exhibited a preference for the novel generous donor on the first trial. These results demonstrate that chimpanzees can infer the reputation of strangers by eavesdropping on third-party interactions.
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Subiaul, F., Romansky, K., Cantlon, J. F., Klein, T., & Terrace, H. (2007). Cognitive imitation in 2-year-old children (Homo sapiens): a comparison with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Here we compare the performance of 2-year-old human children with that of adult rhesus macaques on a cognitive imitation task. The task was to respond, in a particular order, to arbitrary sets of photographs that were presented simultaneously on a touch sensitive video monitor. Because the spatial position of list items was varied from trial to trial, subjects could not learn this task as a series of specific motor responses. On some lists, subjects with no knowledge of the ordinal position of the items were given the opportunity to learn the order of those items by observing an expert model. Children, like monkeys, learned new lists more rapidly in a social condition where they had the opportunity to observe an experienced model perform the list in question, than under a baseline condition in which they had to learn new lists entirely by trial and error. No differences were observed between the accuracy of each species' responses to individual items or in the frequencies with which they made different types of errors. These results provide clear evidence that monkeys and humans share the ability to imitate novel cognitive rules (cognitive imitation).
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Sturz, B. R., Bodily, K. D., & Katz, J. S. (2006). Evidence against integration of spatial maps in humans. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 207–217.
Abstract: A dynamic 3-D virtual environment was constructed for humans as an open-field analogue of Blaisdell and Cook's (2005) pigeon foraging task to determine if humans, like pigeons, were capable of integrating separate spatial maps. Participants used keyboard keys and a mouse to search for a hidden goal in a 4x4 grid of raised cups. During Phase 1 training, a goal was consistently located between two landmarks (Map 1: blue T and red L). During Phase 2 training, a goal was consistently located down and left of a single landmark (Map 2: blue T). Transfer trials were then conducted in which participants were required to make choices in the presence of the red L alone. Cup choices during transfer assessed participants' strategies: association (from Map 1), generalization (from Map 2), or integration (combining Map 1 and 2). During transfer, cup choices increased to a location which suggested an integration strategy and was consistent with results obtained with pigeons. However, additional analyses of the human data suggested participants initially used a generalization strategy followed by a progressive shift in search behavior away from the red L. This shift in search behavior during transfer was responsible for the changes in cup choices across transfer trials and was confirmed by a control condition. These new analyses offer an alternative explanation to the spatial integration account proposed for pigeons.
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