Abstract: Three horses (Equus caballus) with a history of performing cognitive tasks including discrimination learning, categorization, and concept use were tested to evaluate their long-term memory (LTM) in three experiments. In addition, use of LCD multi-displays for stimulus presentation was incorporated into cognition testing protocol for the first time with horses. Experiment 1 tested LTM for discrimination learning that originally occurred 6 years earlier. Five sets of stimuli were used and the two horses tested showed no decrement in performance on four of the sets; however, both horses did score below chance on one set. Experiment 2 examined long-term categorization recall 10 years after horses had demonstrated the ability to make stimulus selections based on shared characteristics within a given category. The horse tested for LTM after the decade-long interval immediately and consistently applied the previously learned categorization rule to not only familiar but also novel sets of stimuli. Experiment 3 tested another horse for LTM for a relative size concept. This horse had originally demonstrated concept rule use in order to select stimuli based on their relative size to one another. More than 7 years later and without further training, this horse reliably applied the previously established size concept to both familiar and novel sets of stimuli. These findings are the first reports of long-term categorical and conceptual memory in horses and are consistent with observations of domestic and wild horses, which indicate that behavioral and ecological events may be remembered for long periods of time. These studies also demonstrate the adaptive nature of horses with regard to their ability to generalize over several different testing conditions.

Abstract: Patterned string tasks are a test of perceptual capacity and the understanding of means-end connections. Primates can solve complex forms of this task in laboratories. However, this may not indicate the level of such cognition that is commonly employed in the wild, where decision-making time is often short and distractions such as predator avoidance and competition between conspecifics are often prevalent. The current study tests whether wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) can successfully complete the simplest form of the patterned string task, parallel strings, while in their natural environment. Although 12 out of 13 marmosets could successfully complete the task, in previous laboratory-based studies on primates, the errors at this task by all primate species tested were consistently lower than in the present study. This is probably explained by the added difficulties imposed by the natural setting of the task in the present study, exemplified by a significant increase in observed vigilance behaviour by subject animals prior to attempts at the task that were unsuccessful. The undertaking of such tasks by common marmosets in situ probably provides a more reasonable representation of the levels of cognitive capacity expressed by this species in the wild than do laboratory-based studies of the task.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Abstract: In the USA, each year, up to one billion birds are estimated to die from colliding with windowpanes (Sabo et al. 2016). A further 573,000 are struck down by wind turbines, along with 888,000 bats (Smallwood 2013). Worldwide, unintended capture in fishing devices is recognized as the single most serious global threat to migratory, long-lived marine taxa including turtles, birds, mammals and sharks (Wallace et al. 2013). Estimates put the number of amphibians killed per year on Australian roads at 5 million (Seiler 2003). The likelihood of a green turtle erroneously ingesting plastic debris, often by mistaking them for food, rose from 30% in 1985 to almost 50% in 2012 (Schuyler et al. 2013). Human-induced rapid environmental change (HIREC, sensu Sih et al. 2011) is filling animals’ environments with new threats which bear little or excessive similarity to those they have encountered in their evolutionary history (Dwernychuk and Boag 1972; Patten and Kelley 2010; Witherington 1997). As a consequence, many of the stimuli involved fall outside the adaptive processing space of animals’ evolutionary perceptual, learning, memory and decision-making systems, making individuals particularly vulnerable to their impact.