Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 110(1), 3–14.
Abstract: Observational learning in chimpanzees and young children was investigated using an artificial fruit designed as an analog of natural foraging problems faced by primates. Each of 3 principal components could be removed in 2 alternative ways, demonstration of only one of which was watched by each subject. This permitted subsequent imitation by subjects to be distinguished from stimulus enhancement. Children aged 2-4 years evidenced imitation for 2 components, but also achieved demonstrated outcomes through their own techniques. Chimpanzees relied even more on their own techniques, but they did imitate elements of 1 component of the task. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence of chimpanzee imitation in a functional task designed to simulate foraging behavior hypothesized to be transmitted culturally in the wild.
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Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988). Tactical deception in primates. Behav. Brain Sci., 11(02), 233–244.
Abstract: ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition.
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Whiten, A., & Boesch, C. (2001). The cultures of chimpanzees. Sci Am, 284(1), 60–67.
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Whiten, A. (2005). The second inheritance system of chimpanzees and humans. Nature, 437(7055), 52–55.
Abstract: Half a century of dedicated field research has brought us from ignorance of our closest relatives to the discovery that chimpanzee communities resemble human cultures in possessing suites of local traditions that uniquely identify them. The collaborative effort required to establish this picture parallels the one set up to sequence the chimpanzee genome, and has revealed a complex social inheritance system that complements the genetic picture we are now developing.
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Whiten, A. (1998). Imitation of the sequential structure of actions by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 112(3), 270–281.
Abstract: Imitation was studied experimentally by allowing chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to observe alternative patterns of actions for opening a specially designed “artificial fruit.” Like problematic foods primates deal with naturally, with the test fruit several defenses had to be removed to gain access to an edible core, but the sequential order and method of defense removal could be systematically varied. Each subject repeatedly observed 1 of 2 alternative techniques for removing each defense and 1 of 2 alternative sequential patterns of defense removal. Imitation of sequential organization emerged after repeated cycles of demonstration and attempts at opening the fruit. Imitation in chimpanzees may thus have some power to produce cultural convergence, counter to the supposition that individual learning processes corrupt copied actions. Imitation of sequential organization was accompanied by imitation of some aspects of the techniques that made up the sequence.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Whiten, A. (1998). Imitation of the sequential structure of actions by chimpanzees. J Comp Psychol, 11.
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Whiten A., & Byrne, R. W. (Eds.). (1997). Machiavellian Intelligence II – Extensions and Evaluations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Whitehead, H., & Dufault, S. (1999). Techniques for Analyzing Vertebrate Social Structure Using Identified Individuals: Review and Recommendations. In Charles T. Snowden and Timothy J. Roper J. S. R. Peter J.B. Slater (Ed.), (Vol. Volume 28, pp. 33–74). Academic Press.
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Whitehead, H. (2008). Precision and power in the analysis of social structure using associations. Anim. Behav., 75(3), 1093–1099.
Abstract: I develop guidelines for assessing the precision and power of statistical techniques that are frequently used to study nonhuman social systems using observed dyadic associations. Association indexes estimate the proportion of time that two individuals are associated. Binomial approximation and nonparametric bootstrap methods produce similar estimates of the precision of association indexes. For a mid-range (0.4-0.9) association index to have a standard error of less than 0.1 requires about 15 observations of the pair associated, and for it to be less than 0.05, this rises to 50 observations. The coefficient of variation among dyads of the proportion of time that pairs of individuals are actually associated describes social differentiation (S), and this may be estimated from association data using maximum likelihood. With a poorly differentiated population (S~0.2), a data set needs about five observed associations per dyad to achieve a correlation between true and estimated association indexes of r=~0.4. It requires about 10 times as much data to achieve a representation with r=~0.8. Permutation tests usually reject the null hypothesis that individuals have no preferred associates when S2H>5, where H is the mean number of observed associations per individual. Thus most situations require substantial numbers of observations of associations to give useful portrayals of social systems, and sparse association data inform only when social differentiation is high.
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