Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Krakauer, D. C. (2005). Social structure, robustness, and policing cost in a cognitively sophisticated species. Am Nat, 165(5), E126–139.
Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.
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Dindo, M., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2007). Partner effects on food consumption in brown capuchin monkeys. Am. J. Primatol., 69(4), 448–456.
Abstract: It has been claimed that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) show inequity aversion in relation to food rewards for a simple exchange task. However, other factors may affect the willingness of a monkey to consume foods of high or low value in the presence of a conspecific. In this study, pairs of monkeys were presented with unequally valued foods, but without any task-performance: they simply received the food under four experimental conditions. By looking at the rate of collection and consumption of low-valued cucumber slices we expected to see variation dependent on whether the partner either had 1) cucumber (equity), 2) grape (inequity), 3) inaccessible cucumber or 4) inaccessible grape. Testing 12 adult capuchin monkeys, our findings differed from those of other authors in that the monkeys failed to show negative reactions to inequity, but rather responded with scramble competition (i.e., fast food collection) in the presence of a conspecific without access to food. They also showed facilitated consumption in the presence of a conspecific consuming high-valued food. Possibly, (in)equity plays a different role if food serves as a reward for a task rather than if it is simply made available for consumption. Am. J. Primatol. 69:1-9, 2007. (c) 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Luttrell, L. M. (1988). Mechanisms of social reciprocity in three primate species: Symmetrical relationship characteristics or cognition? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2–4), 101–118.
Abstract: Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in captive groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and stumptail monkeys (M. arctoides). Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing from the data the effects of several symmetrical relationship characteristics, that is, matrillineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted after controlling for these characteristics, the reciprocity was based on cognitive mechanisms. Statistical significance was tested by means of recently developed matrix permutation procedures. All three species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were, however, reciprocal among chimpanzees only. This species showed a “revenge system”, that is, if A often intervened against B, B did the same to A. In contrast, both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in their harmful interventions: if A often intervened against B, B rarely intervened against A. Further analysis indicates that the strict hierarchy of macaques prevents them from achieving complete reciprocity. Compared to chimpanzees, macaques rarely intervene against higher ranking group members. The observed contrast can be partially explained on the basis of differences in available space, as indicated by a comparison of indoor and outdoor living conditions for the chimpanzee colony. Yet, even when such spatial factors are taken into account, substantial behavior differences between chimpanzees and macaques remain.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends Cognit. Sci., 14(5), 201–207.
Abstract: Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive research has focused on the pinnacles of mental evolution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, linguistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research programs adopting this top-down perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines. Insight into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind. A dramatic change in focus now seems to be under way, however, with increased appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition might be shared across a wide range of species. We argue that this bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with both neuroscience and evolutionary biology.
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de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Aureli, F. (1996). Consolation, reconciliation, and a possible cognitive difference between macaque and chimpanzee. In A. E. Russon, K. A. Bard, & S. T. Parker (Eds.), Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes (pp. 80–110.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: Russon,A.E.; Bard, K.A.; Parker, S.T.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). A century of getting to know the chimpanzee. Nature, 437(7055), 56–59.
Abstract: A century of research on chimpanzees, both in their natural habitat and in captivity, has brought these apes socially, emotionally and mentally much closer to us. Parallels and homologues between chimpanzee and human behaviour range from tool-technology and cultural learning to power politics and intercommunity warfare. Few behavioural domains have remained untouched by this increased knowledge, which has dramatically challenged the way we view ourselves. The sequencing of the chimpanzee genome will no doubt bring more surprises and insights. Humans do occupy a special place among the primates, but this place increasingly has to be defined against a backdrop of substantial similarity.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). How animals do business. Sci Am, 292(4), 54–61.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Peace lessons from an unlikely source. PLoS. Biol., 2(4), E101.
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