Abstract: Abstract  Animals living in groups have to make consensus decisions and communicate with each other about the time, or the direction, in which to move. In some species, the process relies on the proposition of a single individual, i.e. a first individual suggests a movement and the other group members decide whether or not to join this individual. In Tonkean (Macaca tonkeana) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), it has been observed that this first individual displays specific signals at departure. In this paper, we aimed to explore the function of such behaviours, i.e. if these behaviours were recruitment signals or only cues about the motivation of the first departed individual. We carried out temporal analyses and studied the latencies of the first departed individual’s behaviours and of the joining of other group members. We also assessed whether the social style of a species in terms of dominance and kinship relationships influenced the patterns of signal emissions. We then analyzed how the first departed individual decided to make a pause or to stop it according to the identities of group members that joined the collective movement. Results showed that Tonkean macaques and rhesus macaques seemed to use back-glances to monitor the joining of other group members and pauses to recruit such individuals. This was especially the case for highly socially affiliated individuals in Tonkean macaques and kin-related individuals in rhesus macaques. Moreover, back-glances and pauses disappeared when such individuals joined the first departed individual. From these results, we suggested that such behaviour could be considered intentional. Such findings could not be highlighted without temporal analyses and accurate observations on primate groups in semi-free ranging conditions.

Abstract: Members of a social group have to make collective decisions in order to synchronise their activities. In a shared consensus decision, all group members can take part in the decision whereas in an unshared consensus decision, one individual, usually a dominant member of the group, takes the decision for the rest of the group. It has been suggested that the type of decision-making of a species could be influenced by its social style. To investigate this further, we studied collective movements in two species with opposed social systems, the Tonkean macaque (Macaca tonkeana) and the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). From our results, it appears that the decision to move is the result of the choices and actions of several individuals in both groups. However, this consensus decision involved nearly all group members in Tonkean macaques whereas dominant and old individuals took a prominent role in rhesus macaques. Thus, we suggest that Tonkean macaques display equally shared consensus decisions to move, whereas in the same context rhesus macaque exhibit partially shared consensus decisions. Such a difference in making a collective decision might be linked to the different social systems of the two studied species.

Abstract: <p>Relationships we have with our friends, family, or colleagues influence our personal decisions, as well as decisions we make together with others. As in human beings, despotism and egalitarian societies seem to also exist in animals. While studies have shown that social networks constrain many phenomena from amoebae to primates, we still do not know how consensus emerges from the properties of social networks in many biological systems. We created artificial social networks that represent the continuum from centralized to decentralized organization and used an agent-based model to make predictions about the patterns of consensus and collective movements we observed according to the social network. These theoretical results showed that different social networks and especially contrasted ones – star network vs. equal network – led to totally different patterns. Our model showed that, by moving from a centralized network to a decentralized one, the central individual seemed to lose its leadership in the collective movement's decisions. We, therefore, showed a link between the type of social network and the resulting consensus. By comparing our theoretical data with data on five groups of primates, we confirmed that this relationship between social network and consensus also appears to exist in animal societies.</p>

Abstract: Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive activities such as memory. Although recent studies have raised an interesting possibility that some species of nonhuman animals might possess such skills, subjects often required a numerous number of training trials to acquire the effective use of metacognitive responses. Here, five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were tested whether they were able to escape spatial memory tests when they did not remember the location of preferred reward in a relatively small number of trials. The apes were presented with two identical cups, under one of which the experimenter hid a preferred reward (e.g., two grapes). The subjects were then presented with a third container, “escape response”, with which they could receive a less preferred but secure reward (e.g., one grape). The orangutans as a group significantly more likely selected the escape response when the baiting of the preferred reward was invisible (as compared to when it was visible) and when the hiding locations of the preferred reward were switched (as compared to when they remained unchanged). Even when the escape response was presented before the final presentation of the memory test, one orangutan successfully avoided the test in which she would likely err. These findings indicate that some orangutans appear to tell when they do not remember correct answers in memory tests.