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Pickens, C. L., & Holland, P. C. (2004). Conditioning and cognition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 28(7), 651–661.
Abstract: Animals' abilities to use internal representations of absent objects to guide adaptive behavior and acquire new information, and to represent multiple spatial, temporal, and object properties of complex events and event sequences, may underlie many aspects of human perception, memory, and symbolic thought. In this review, two classes of simple associative learning tasks that address these core cognitive capacities are discussed. The first set, including reinforcer revaluation and mediated learning procedures, address the power of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli to gain access, through learning, to representations of upcoming events. The second set of investigations concern the construction of complex stimulus representations, as illustrated in studies of contextual learning, the conjunction of explicit stimulus elements in configural learning procedures, and recent studies of episodic-like memory. The importance of identifying both cognitive process and brain system bases of performance in animal models is emphasized.
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Pick, D. K., B., & Steciuch, C. (2015). The Familiarity Heuristic in the Horse (Equus caballus). In , & K. Krueger (Ed.), Proceedings of the 3. International Equine Science Meeting. Wald: Xenophon Publishing.
Abstract: This study replicated an unreported finding observed in a color perception experiment (Pick, Lovell, Brown, & Dail, 1994) where, after using the method of successive approximations to train a blue-gray discrimination, red-gray trials were initiated without further training. Although a gray choice had never been reinforced, the subject chose gray on the first 20 trials (p < .000001). In the study reported here, a horse was trained to approach a red feed bucket and not a green feed bucket. After the subject mastered the discrimination, a blue bucket was substituted for the previously reinforced red bucket. With double-blind controls in place, the subject chose the unreinforced green bucket on 15 out of the first 20 blue-green trials yielding a binomial p = 0.0148 that this outcome could be due to chance alone. These results are contrary to all behavioristic psychological learning theories, but consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory predicts that given a choice between two previously unreinforced stimuli, one familiar and the other novel, humans will choose the familiar. It is argued that the bias toward the familiar is the basis to a heuristic that has a genetic origin and should exist in other animals on the phylogenetic scale. The results of this study indicate that the heuristic is available at least as far down the scale as the horse. Conceptual replications using shape stimuli and sound stimuli are in progress.
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Petruso, E. J., Fuchs, T., & Bingman, V. P. (2007). Time-space learning in homing pigeons (Columba livia): orientation to an artificial light source. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 181–188.
Abstract: Time-space learning reflects an ability to represent in memory event-stimulus properties together with the place and time of the event; a capacity well developed in birds. Homing pigeons were trained in an indoor octagonal arena to locate one food goal in the morning and a different food goal in the late afternoon. The goals differed with respect to their angular/directional relationship to an artificial light source located outside the arena. Further, the angular difference in reward position approximated the displacement of the sun's azimuth that would occur during the same time period. The experimental birds quickly learned the task, demonstrating the apparent ease with which birds can adopt an artificial light source to discriminate among alternative spatial responses at different times of the day. However, a novel midday probe session following successful learning revealed that the light source was interpreted as a stable landmark and not as a surrogate sun that would support compass orientation. Probe sessions following a phase shift of the light-dark cycle revealed that the mechanism employed to make the temporal discrimination was prevailingly based on an endogenous circadian rhythm and not an interval timing mechanism.
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Petherick, J. C., Waddington, D., & Duncan, I. J. H. (1991). Learning to gain access to a foraging and dustbathing substrate by domestic fowl: is `out of sight out of mind'? Behav. Process., 22(3), 213–226.
Abstract: Domestic fowl were deprived of the opportunity to perform litter-related behaviour for three or four days and were tested in a Y-maze (which they had previously been trained to run) for their ability to associate a coloured cue with gaining access to peat. When the goal boxes were within sight of the choice point, most birds chose peat. However, when the birds had to rely solely on the coloured cue only one bird from 12 showed learning. However, the birds seemed to have some expectation of a reward, as they ran faster if, on the previous trial, they had chosen peat. The inability of the birds to learn the association may have been an artefact of the schedule of deprivation and testing, for when they were hungry and tested in the same way they were again unable to learn an association between the same coloured cue and food reward. The experiment with peat was repeated using “massed” trials (several trials in immediate succession) during training and testing and six from 15 birds showed learning. These results suggest that the initial failure to learn was probably due to the training and testing schedule, that access to peat appears to be rewarding and that hens can learn an association between an abstract cue and a rewarding consequence. This is consistent with the possibility that domestic fowls may have some cognitive representation of peat when it is out of sight.
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Petherick, J. C., Seawright, E., & Waddington, D. (1993). Influence of motivational state on choice of food or a dustbathing/foraging substrate by domestic hens. Behav. Process., 28(3), 209–220.
Abstract: Domestic hens were trained to run a Y-maze and make an association between differently coloured doorways and access to food pellets or sand. The hens were tested for their choice of doorway when the goals were not visible from the choice point and when they were food or sand deprived. Hens made the choice appropriate to their deprivation state (correct choice) significantly more often for food than sand and were faster at choosing and entering the goal box when food deprived. In a follow up experiment, the goals were visible from the choice point. Again the hens chose correctly significantly more often when food than sand deprived and made the choice and entered the goal box faster when food deprived. Thus, failure to choose sand in the first experiment was not due to an inability to learn the association, but appears to result from a strong motivation to feed in the Y-maze, even when not food deprived, and a weak motivation to dustbathe or forage, even when sand deprived.
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Pepperberg, I. M., & Brezinsky, M. V. (1991). Acquisition of a relative class concept by an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus): discriminations based on relative size. J Comp Psychol, 105(3), 286–294.
Abstract: We report that an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus), Alex, responds to stimuli on a relative basis. Previous laboratory studies with artificial stimuli (such as pure tones) suggest that birds make relational responses as a secondary strategy, only after they have acquired information about the absolute values of the stimuli. Alex, however, after learning to respond to a small set of exemplars on the basis of relative size, transferred this behavior to novel situations that did not provide specific information about the absolute values of the stimuli. He responded to vocal questions about which was the larger or smaller exemplar by vocally labeling its color or material, and he responded “none” if the exemplars did not differ in size. His overall accuracy was 78.7%.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2004). “Insightful” string-pulling in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) is affected by vocal competence. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 263–266.
Abstract: Four Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) were tested on their ability to obtain an item suspended from a string such that mutiple, repeated, coordinated beak-foot actions were required for success (e.g., Heinrich 1995). Those birds with little training in referential English requests (e.g. “I want X”) succeeded, whereas birds who could request the suspended item failed to obtain the object but engaged in repeated requesting.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative cognitive studies. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 177–182.
Abstract: Although the Piagetian framework has been used by numerous researchers to compare cognitive abilities of diverse species, the system is often criticized as implemented. I examine the various criticisms, suggest ways in which the system can be improved, and argue for the need for descriptive systems such as the Piagetian framework to complement programs that look for cellular and molecular bases or mathematical models to explain behavior.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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