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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Dubois, F., Giraldeau, L. - A., Hamilton, I. M., Grant, J. W. A., & Lefebvre, L. (2004). Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model. Am Nat, 164(2), E32–45.
Abstract: Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.
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Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Imitation of conditional discriminations in pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 116(3), 277–285.
Abstract: In the present experiments, the 2-action method was used to determine whether pigeons could learn to imitate a conditional discrimination. Demonstrator pigeons (Columba livia) stepped on a treadle in the presence of 1 light and pecked at the treadle in the presence of another light. Demonstration did not seem to affect acquisition of the conditional discrimination (Experiment 1) but did facilitate its reversal of the conditional discrimination (Experiments 2 and 3). The results suggest that pigeons are not only able to learn a specific behavior by observing another pigeon, but they can also learn under which circumstances to perform that behavior. The results have implications for proposed mechanisms of imitation in animals.
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DiGian, K. A., Friedrich, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (2004). Discriminative stimuli that follow a delay have added value for pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 11(5), 889–895.
Abstract: Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (2000) reported that pigeons prefer discriminative stimuli that require greater effort (more pecks) to obtain over those that require less effort. In the present experiment, we examined two variables associated with this phenomenon. First, we asked whether delay of reinforcement, presumably a relatively aversive event similar to effort, would produce similar effects. Second, we asked whether the stimulus preference produced by a prior relatively aversive event depends on its anticipation. Anticipation of delay was accomplished by signaling its occurrence. Results indicated that delays can produce preferences similar to those produced by increased effort, but only if the delays are signaled.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Choice based on exclusion in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(4), 959–964.
Abstract: When humans acquire a conditional discrimination and are given a novel-sample-comparison choice, they often reject a comparison known to be associated with a different sample and choose the alternative comparison by default (or by exclusion). In Experiment 1, we found that if, following matching training, we replaced both of the samples, acquisition took five times longer than if we replaced only one of the samples. Apparently, the opportunity to reject one of the comparisons facilitated the association of the other sample with the remaining comparison. In Experiment 2, we first trained pigeons to treat two samples differently (to associate Sample A with Comparison 1 and Sample B with Comparison 2) and then trained them to associate one of those samples with a new comparison (e.g., Sample A with Comparison 3) and to associate a novel sample (Sample C) with a different, new comparison (Comparison 4). When Sample B then replaced Sample C, the pigeons showed a significant tendency to choose Comparison 4 over Comparison 3. Thus, when given the opportunity, pigeons will choose by exclusion.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Second-order contrast based on the expectation of effort and reinforcement. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 64–74.
Abstract: Pigeons prefer signals for reinforcement that require greater effort (or time) to obtain over those that require less effort to obtain (T. S. Clement, J. Feltus, D. H. Kaiser, & T. R. Zentall, 2000). Preference was attributed to contrast (or to the relatively greater improvement in conditions) produced by the appearance of the signal when it was preceded by greater effort. In Experiment 1, the authors of the present study demonstrated that the expectation of greater effort was sufficient to produce such a preference (a second-order contrast effect). In Experiments 2 and 3, low versus high probability of reinforcement was substituted for high versus low effort, respectively, with similar results. In Experiment 3, the authors found that the stimulus preference could be attributed to positive contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented an improvement in the probability of reinforcement) and perhaps also negative contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented reduction in the probability of reinforcement).
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2000). Development of a single-code/default coding strategy in pigeons. Psychol Sci, 11(3), 261–264.
Abstract: We tested the hypothesis that pigeons could use a cognitively efficient coding strategy by training them on a conditional discrimination (delayed symbolic matching) in which one alternative was correct following the presentation of one sample (one-to-one), whereas the other alternative was correct following the presentation of any one of four other samples (many-to-one). When retention intervals of different durations were inserted between the offset of the sample and the onset of the choice stimuli, divergent retention functions were found. With increasing retention interval, matching accuracy on trials involving any of the many-to-one samples was increasingly better than matching accuracy on trials involving the one-to-one sample. Furthermore, following this test, pigeons treated a novel sample as if it had been one of the many-to-one samples. The data suggest that rather than learning each of the five sample-comparison associations independently, the pigeons developed a cognitively efficient single-code/default coding strategy.
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Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., Sherburne, L. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Simultaneous discrimination learning in pigeons: value of S- affects the relative value of its associated S+. Q J Exp Psychol B, 51(4), 363–378.
Abstract: In a simple simultaneous discrimination involving a positive stimulus (S+) and a negative stimulus (S-), it has been hypothesized that positive value can transfer from the S+ to the S- (thus increasing the relative value of the S-) and also that negative value can transfer from the S- to the S+ (thus diminishing the relative value of the S+; Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991). Evidence for positive value transfer has been reported in pigeons (e.g. Zentall & Sherburne, 1994). The purpose of the present experiments was to determine, in a simultaneous discrimination, whether the S- diminishes the value of the S+ or the S- is contrasted with the S+ (thus enhancing the value of the S+). In two experiments, we found evidence for contrast, rather than value transfer, attributable to simultaneous discrimination training. Thus, not only does the S+ appear to enhance the value of the S-, but the S- appears to enhance rather than reduce the value of the S+.
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Clement, T. S., Feltus, J. R., Kaiser, D. H., & Zentall, T. R. (2000). “Work ethic” in pigeons: reward value is directly related to the effort or time required to obtain the reward. Psychon Bull Rev, 7(1), 100–106.
Abstract: Stimuli associated with less effort or with shorter delays to reinforcement are generally preferred over those associated with greater effort or longer delays to reinforcement. However, the opposite appears to be true of stimuli that follow greater effort or longer delays. In training, a simple simultaneous discrimination followed a single peck to an initial stimulus (S+FR1 S-FR1) and a different simple simultaneous discrimination followed 20 pecks to the initial stimulus (S+FR20 S-FR20). On test trials, pigeons preferred S+FR20 over S+FR1 and S-FR20 over S-FR1. These data support the view that the state of the animal immediately prior to presentation of the discrimination affects the value of the reinforcement that follows it. This contrast effect is analogous to effects that when they occur in humans have been attributed to more complex cognitive and social factors.
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Cerutti, D. T., & Staddon, J. E. R. (2004). Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(1), 45–57.
Abstract: In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment.
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