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Reid, P. J., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1992). Detection of cryptic prey: search image or search rate? J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 18(3), 273–286.
Abstract: Animals' improvement in capturing cryptic prey with experience has long been attributed to a perceptual mechanism, the specific search image. Detection could also be improved by adjusting rate of search. In a series of studies using both naturalistic and operant search tasks, pigeons searched for wheat, dyed to produce 1 conspicuous and 2 equally cryptic prey types. Contrary to the predictions of the search-rate hypothesis, pigeons given a choice between the 2 cryptic types took the type experienced most recently. However, experience with 1 cryptic type improved accuracy on the other cryptic type, a result inconsistent with a search image specific to 1 prey type. Search image may better be thought of as priming of attention to those features of the prey type that best distinguish the prey from the background.
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Petruso, E. J., Fuchs, T., & Bingman, V. P. (2007). Time-space learning in homing pigeons (Columba livia): orientation to an artificial light source. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 181–188.
Abstract: Time-space learning reflects an ability to represent in memory event-stimulus properties together with the place and time of the event; a capacity well developed in birds. Homing pigeons were trained in an indoor octagonal arena to locate one food goal in the morning and a different food goal in the late afternoon. The goals differed with respect to their angular/directional relationship to an artificial light source located outside the arena. Further, the angular difference in reward position approximated the displacement of the sun's azimuth that would occur during the same time period. The experimental birds quickly learned the task, demonstrating the apparent ease with which birds can adopt an artificial light source to discriminate among alternative spatial responses at different times of the day. However, a novel midday probe session following successful learning revealed that the light source was interpreted as a stable landmark and not as a surrogate sun that would support compass orientation. Probe sessions following a phase shift of the light-dark cycle revealed that the mechanism employed to make the temporal discrimination was prevailingly based on an endogenous circadian rhythm and not an interval timing mechanism.
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Nguyen, N. H., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Imitation of a two-action sequence by pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(3), 514–518.
Abstract: Developmental psychologists have described imitation as a process that suggests perspective-taking abilities. However, imitative behavior has been found in animals, which are generally not considered capable of taking the perspective of another. Previous studies with birds have demonstrated the imitation of a single response (sometimes referred to as action-level imitation). In the present experiment, we examined the extent to which pigeons would imitate an unfamiliar sequence of two behaviors (sometimes referred to as program-level imitation). Our results indicate that, although there are individual differences, pigeons show a significant tendency to match a demonstrated sequence of behavior involving, first, a response to a treadle (pecking at it or stepping on it) and, second, pushing aside a screen that blocks access to food (a left-vs.-right push).
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Nallan, G. B., Pace, G. M., McCoy, D. F., & Zentall, T. R. (1983). The role of elicited responding in the feature-positive effect. Am J Psychol, 96(3), 377–390.
Abstract: Hearst and Jenkins proposed in 1974 that elicited responding accounts for the feature-positive effect. To test this position, pigeons were exposed to a feature-positive or feature-negative discrimination between successively presented displays--one consisted of a red and a green response key and the other consisted of two green response keys. There were four main conditions: 5-5 (5-sec trials, 5-sec intertrial intervals), 5-30, 30-30, and 30-180. Conditions 5-30 and 30-180 should produce the largest amount of elicited responding, and therefore the largest feature-positive effects. A response-independent bird was yoked to each response-dependent bird to allow direct assessment of the amount of elicited responding generated by each condition. Contrary to the predictions by Hearst and Jenkins's theory, response-dependent birds showed large feature-positive effects in each condition. The largest feature-positive effect was obtained in condition 5-5. Response-independent birds produced similar results, but manifested low response rates.
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Nallan, G. B., Pace, G. M., McCoy, D. F., & Zentall, T. R. (1979). Temporal parameters of the feature positive effect. Am J Psychol, 92(4), 703–710.
Abstract: Trial duration and intertrial interval duration were parametrically varied between groups of pigeons exposed to a discrimination involving the presence vs. the absence of a dot. Half the groups received the dot as the positive stimulus (feature positive groups) and half the groups received the dot as the negative stimulus (feature negative groups). Faster learning by the feature positive birds (feature positive effect) was found when the trial duration was short (5 sec) regardless of whether the intertrial interval was short (5 sec) or long (30 sec). No evidence for a feature positive effect was found when the trial duration was long (30 sec) regardless of the length of the intertrial interval (30 sec or 180 sec). The results suggest that short trial duration is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the feature positive effect, and neither intertrial interval nor trial duration/intertrial interval ratio are important for its occurrence. The suggestion that mechanisms underlying the feature positive effect and autoshaping might be similar was not supported by the present experiment since the trial duration/intertrial interval ration parameter appears to play an important role in autoshaping but not the feature positive effect.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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Lonon, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in simultaneous discriminations in humans. Am J Psychol, 112(1), 21–39.
Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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Kelly, D. M., & Spetch, M. L. (2001). Pigeons encode relative geometry. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(4), 417–422.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained to search for hidden food in a rectangular environment designed to eliminate any external cues. Following training, the authors administered unreinforced test trials in which the geometric properties of the apparatus were manipulated. During tests that preserved the relative geometry but altered the absolute geometry of the environment, the pigeons continued to choose the geometrically correct corners, indicating that they encoded the relative geometry of the enclosure. When tested in a square enclosure, which distorted both the absolute and relative geometry, the pigeons randomly chose among the 4 corners, indicating that their choices were not based on cues external to the apparatus. This study provides new insight into how metric properties of an environment are encoded by pigeons.
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