Abstract: The terms sociallearning and social influence have been used descriptively and theoretically to characterize a broad range of animal behavior from physical antipredatory adaptations such as eye spots, which are totally under genetic control, to the human capacity for the exaggeration of individual characteristics, known as caricature, which are largely under cognitive control. In the present review, the various forms of social influence and social learning are identified and distinghished from imitation, a term that generally has been reserved for behavioral matching that cannot be accounted for using simpler specifically predisposed, motivational, or learning mechanisms. It is suggested that much of the ambiguity in the literature concerning the various forms of social learning can be attributed to the distinction between the function of a behavior and the mechanisms responsible for its occurrence. Finally, the various mechanisms that have been proposed to account for imitative learning are presented and an attempt is made to evaluate them.

Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.