Abstract: In the normal chick, conspicuous visual stimuli induce targetting and pecking together, with vocalization. All three are abolished by lesion of the intercollicular area (ICo) or of connections passing through its medial margin. After such lesions, chicks also cease to treat significant visual stimuli as if they were startling and exciting, and may delay response as a result. However, they are still able to recognise, orient accurately to, and respond appropriately to, a variety of complex visual stimuli (e.g. food grains, copulation object). In addition, they are little affected by strange surroundings. Lesion evidence suggests the mammalian subcollicular area to have similar functions to the ICo and to be homologous with it. A route (present in bird), which is well-known in mammals for its association with threat, defense and escape evoked by strange and frightening objects (amygdala-diencephalic periventricular system-central mesencephalic grey, A-DPS-CMG) is stimuli via the 2 ICo (subcollicular area). Two different mechanisms may be involved caudal to the ICo. One consists of tectal afferents which might modulate the evocation of targetting, pecking and other responses via the tectum. The other is the predorsal system of tectal efferents which may mediate such responses. Classical syndromes of tameness and unresponsiveness produced by various interruptions of the A-DPS-CMG route may depend on interruption of connections to these midbrain mechanisms. Attack is depressed by ICo lesions as one aspect of reduced responsiveness to conspicuous and startling visual stimuli. Avoidance, which is apparently mediated by a separate system, much as in Anura, is facilitated.

Abstract: Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested using an expectancy violation procedure to assess whether they use an actor's gaze direction, signaled by congruent head and eye orientation, to predict subsequent behavior. The monkeys visually habituated to a repeated sequence in which the actor (a familiar human or a puppet) looked at an object and then picked it up, but they did not react strongly when the actor looked at an object but then picked up another object. Capuchin monkeys' responses in the puppet condition were slightly more suggestive of expectancy. There was no differential responding to congruent versus incongruent look-touch sequences when familiarization trials were omitted. The weak findings contrast with a strongly positive result previously reported for tamarin monkeys. Additional evidence is required before concluding that behavior prediction based on gaze cues typifies primates; other approaches for studying how they process attention cues are indicated.

Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.