Abstract: Wild baboons Papio cynocephalus ursinus, give tonal, harmonically rich vocalizations, termed grunts, in at least two distinct, behavioural contexts: when about to embark on a move across an open area ('move' grunts); and when approaching mothers and attempting to inspect or handle their young infants ('infant' grunts). Grunts in these two contexts elicit different responses from receivers and appear to be acoustically distinct (Owren et al. 1997 Journal of the Acoustical Society of America101 2951-2963). Differences in responses to grunts in the two contexts may, then, be due to acoustic differences, reflecting at least a rudimentary capacity for referential signalling. Alternatively, responses may differ simply due to differences in the contexts in which the grunts are being produced. We conducted playback experiments to test between these hypotheses. Experiments were designed to control systematically the effects of both context and acoustic features so as to evaluate the role of each in determining responses to grunts. In playback trials, subjects differentiated between putative move and infant grunts. Their responses based only on the acoustic features of grunts were functionally distinct and mirrored their behaviour to naturally occurring move and infant grunts. However, subjects' responses were in some cases also affected by the context in which grunts were presented, and by an interaction between the context and the acoustic features of the grunts. Furthermore, responses to grunts were affected by the relative rank difference between the caller and the subject. These results indicate that baboon grunts can function in rudimentary referential fashion, but that the context in which grunts are produced and the social identity of callers can also affect recipients' responses. Copyright 1999 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.

Abstract: Historically, a dichotomy has been drawn between the semantic communication of human language and the apparently emotional calls of animals. Current research paints a more complicated picture. Just as scientists have identified elements of human speech that reflect a speaker's emotions, field experiments have shown that the calls of many animals provide listeners with information about objects and events in the environment. Like human speech, therefore, animal vocalizations simultaneously provide others with information that is both semantic and emotional. In support of this conclusion, we review the results of field experiments on the natural vocalizations of African vervet monkeys, diana monkeys, baboons, and suricates (a South African mongoose). Vervet and diana monkeys give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to the presence of leopards, eagles, and snakes. Each alarm call type elicits a different, adaptive response from others nearby. Field experiments demonstrate that listeners compare these vocalizations not just according to their acoustic properties but also according to the information they convey. Like monkeys, suricates give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to different predators. Within each predator class, the calls also differ acoustically according to the signaler's perception of urgency. Like speech, therefore, suricate alarm calls convey both semantic and emotional information. The vocalizations of baboons, like those of many birds and mammals, are individually distinctive. As a result, when one baboon hears a sequence of calls exchanged between two or more individuals, the listener acquires information about social events in its group. Baboons, moreover, are skilled “eavesdroppers:” their response to different call sequences provides evidence of the sophisticated information they acquire from other individuals' vocalizations. Baboon males give loud “wahoo” calls during competitive displays. Like other vocalizations, these highly emotional calls provide listeners with information about the caller's dominance rank, age, and competitive ability. Although animal vocalizations, like human speech, simultaneously encode both semantic and emotional information, they differ from language in at least one fundamental respect. Although listeners acquire rich information from a caller's vocalization, callers do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it. Listeners acquire information as an inadvertent consequence of signaler behavior.

Abstract: Tests of self-awareness in nonhuman primates have to date been concerned almost entirely with the recognition of an animal's reflection in a mirror. By contrast, we know much less about non-human primates' perception of their place within a social network, or of their understanding of themselves as individuals with unique sets of social relationships. Here we review evidence that monkeys who fail the mirror test may nonetheless behave as if they recognize themselves as distinct individuals, each of whom occupies a unique place in society and has a specific set of relations with others. A free-ranging vervet monkey, baboon, or macaque recognizes other members of his group as individuals. He also recognizes matrilineal kin groups, linear dominance rank orders, and behaves as if he recognizes his own unique place within them. This sense of “social self” in monkeys, however, is markedly different from self-awareness in humans. Although monkeys may behave in ways that accurately place themselves within a social network, they are unaware of the knowledge that allows them to do so: they do not know what they know, cannot reflect on what they know, and cannot become the object of their own attention.