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Dugatkin, L., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection. Evol. Ecol., 5(3), 300–309.
Abstract: Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Bekoff, M. (2003). Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model. Behav. Process., 60(3), 209–214.
Abstract: Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
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Goodwin, D., McGreevy, P., Waran, N., & McLean, A. (2009). How equitation science can elucidate and refine horsemanship techniques. Special Issue: Equitation Science, 181(1), 5–11.
Abstract: The long-held belief that human dominance and equine submission are key to successful training and that the horse must be taught to [`]respect' the trainer infers that force is often used during training. Many horses respond by trialling unwelcome evasions, resistances and flight responses, which readily become established. When unable to cope with problem behaviours, some handlers in the past might have been encouraged to use harsh methods or devices while others may have called in a so-called [`]good horseman' or [`]horse whisperer' to remediate the horse. Frequently, the approaches such practitioners offer could not be applied by the horse's owner or trainer because of their lack of understanding or inability to apply the techniques. Often it seemed that these [`]horse-people' had magical ways with horses (e.g., they only had to whisper to them) that achieved impressive results although they had little motivation to divulge their techniques. As we begin to appreciate how to communicate with horses sensitively and consistently, misunderstandings and misinterpretations by horse and trainer should become less common. Recent studies have begun to reveal what comprises the simplest, most humane and most effective mechanisms in horse training and these advances are being matched by greater sharing of knowledge among practitioners. Indeed, various practitioners of what is referred to here as [`]natural horsemanship' now use techniques similar to the [`]whisperers' of old, but they are more open about their methods. Reputable horse trainers using natural horsemanship approaches are talented observers of horse behaviour and respond consistently and swiftly to the horse's subtle cues during training. For example, in the roundpen these trainers apply an aversive stimulus to prompt a flight response and then, when the horse slows down, moves toward them, or offers space-reducing affiliative signals, the trainer immediately modifies his/her agonistic signals, thus negatively reinforcing the desired response. Learning theory and equine ethology, the fundamentals of the emerging discipline of equitation science, can be used to explain almost all the behaviour modification that goes on in these contexts and in conventional horsemanship. By measuring and evaluating what works and what does not, equitation science has the potential to have a unifying effect on traditional practices and developing branches of equitation.
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Griffin, A. S. (2008). Socially acquired predator avoidance: Is it just classical conditioning? Special Issue:Brain Mechanisms, Cognition and Behaviour in Birds, 76(3), 264–271.
Abstract: Associative learning theories presume the existence of a general purpose learning process, the structure of which does not mirror the demands of any particular learning problem. In contrast, learning scientists working within an Evolutionary Biology tradition believe that learning processes have been shaped by ecological demands. One potential means of exploring how ecology may have modified properties of acquisition is to use associative learning theory as a framework within which to analyse a particular learning phenomenon. Recent work has used this approach to examine whether socially transmitted predator avoidance can be conceptualised as a classical conditioning process in which a novel predator stimulus acts as a conditioned stimulus (CS) and acquires control over an avoidance response after it has become associated with alarm signals of social companions, the unconditioned stimulus (US). I review here a series of studies examining the effect of CS/US presentation timing on the likelihood of acquisition. Results suggest that socially acquired predator avoidance may be less sensitive to forward relationships than traditional classical conditioning paradigms. I make the case that socially acquired predator avoidance is an exciting novel one-trial learning paradigm that could be studied along side fear conditioning. Comparisons between social and non-social learning of danger at both the behavioural and neural level may yield a better understanding of how ecology might shape properties and mechanisms of learning.
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Hasenjager, M. J., & Dugatkin, L. A. Social Network Analysis in Behavioral Ecology. Advances in the Study of Behavior. Academic Press.
Abstract: Abstract In recent years, behavioral ecologists have embraced social network analysis (SNA) in order to explore the structure of animal societies and the functional consequences of that structure. We provide a conceptual introduction to the field that focuses on historical developments, as well as on novel insights generated by recent work. First, we discuss major advances in the analysis of nonhuman societies, culminating in the use of SNA by behavioral ecologists. Next, we discuss how network-based approaches have enhanced our understanding of social structure and behavior over the past decade, focusing on: (1) information transmission, (2) collective behaviors, (3) animal personality, and (4) cooperation. These behaviors and phenomena possess several features—e.g., indirect effects, emergent properties—that network analysis is well equipped to handle. Finally, we highlight recent developments in SNA that are allowing behavioral ecologists to address increasingly sophisticated questions regarding the structure and function of animal sociality.
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Huber, L., & Gajdon, G. K. (2006). Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 295–305.
Abstract: The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.
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Itakura, S. (2004). Gaze Following and Joint Visual Attention in Nonhuman Animals. Jpn. Psychol. Res., 3. Retrieved June 2, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5584.2004.00253.x
Abstract: n this paper, studies of gaze-following and joint visual attention in nonhuman animals are reviewed from the theoretical perspective of Emery (2000). There are many studies of gaze-following and joint visual attention in nonhuman primates. The reports concern not only adult individuals but also the development of these abilities. Studies to date suggest that monkeys and apes are able to follow the gaze of others, but only apes can understand the seeing-knowing relationship with regards to conspecifics in competitive situations. Also, there have recently been some reports of ability to follow the gaze of humans in domestic animals, such as dogs or horses, interacting with humans. These domestic animals are considered to have acquired this ability during their long history of selective breeding by humans. However, we need to clarify social gaze parameters in various species to improve our knowledge of the evolution of how we process others gazing, attention, and mental states.
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