Dugatkin, L., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection. Evol. Ecol., 5(3), 300–309.
Abstract: Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy.
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Houston, A. I., & McNamara, J. M. (1988). Fighting for food: a dynamic version of the Hawk-Dove game. Evol. Ecol., 2(1), 51–64.
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Lusseau, D. (2007). Evidence for social role in a dolphin social network. Evol. Ecol., 21(3), 357–366.
Abstract: Abstract Social animals have to take into consideration the behaviour of conspecifics when making decisions to go by their daily lives. These decisions affect their fitness and there is therefore an evolutionary pressure to try making the right choices. In many instances individuals will make their own choices and the behaviour of the group will be a democratic integration of everyone’s decision. However, in some instances it can be advantageous to follow the choice of a few individuals in the group if they have more information regarding the situation that has arisen. Here I provide early evidence that decisions about shifts in activity states in a population of bottlenose dolphin follow such a decision-making process. This unshared consensus is mediated by a non-vocal signal, which can be communicated globally within the dolphin school. These signals are emitted by individuals that tend to have more information about the behaviour of potential competitors because of their position in the social network. I hypothesise that this decision-making process emerged from the social structure of the population and the need to maintain mixed-sex schools.
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Rubenstein, D. I., & Hack, M. A. (1992). Horse signals: The sounds and scents of fury. Evol. Ecol., 6(3), 254–260.
Abstract: During contests animals typically exchange information about fighting ability. Among feral horses these signals involve olfactory or acoustical elements and each type can effectively terminate contests before physical contact becomes necessary. Dung transplant experiments show that for stallions, irrespective of rank, olfactory signals such as dung sniffing encode information about familiarity suggesting that such signals can be used as signatures. As such they can provide indirect information about fighting ability as long as opponents associate identity with past performance. Play-back experiments, however, show that vocalizations, such as squeals, directly provide information about status regardless of stallion familiarity. Sonographs reveal that squeals of dominants are longer than those of subordinates and that only those of dominants have at their onset high-frequency components.
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