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Santos, L. R., Miller, C. T., & Hauser, M. D. (2003). Representing tools: how two non-human primate species distinguish between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 269–281.
Abstract: Few studies have examined whether non-human tool-users understand the properties that are relevant for a tool's function. We tested cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on an expectancy violation procedure designed to assess whether these species make distinctions between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool. Subjects watched an experimenter use a tool to push a grape down a ramp, and then were presented with different displays in which the features of the original tool (shape, color, orientation) were selectively varied. Results indicated that both species looked longer when a newly shaped stick acted on the grape than when a newly colored stick performed the same action, suggesting that both species perceive shape as a more salient transformation than color. In contrast, tamarins, but not rhesus, attended to changes in the tool's orientation. We propose that some non-human primates begin with a predisposition to attend to a tool's shape and, with sufficient experience, develop a more sophisticated understanding of the features that are functionally relevant to tools.
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Toro, J. M., Trobalon, J. B., & Sebastian-Galles, N. (2003). The use of prosodic cues in language discrimination tasks by rats. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 131–136.
Abstract: Recent research with cotton-top tamarin monkeys has revealed language discrimination abilities similar to those found in human infants, demonstrating that these perceptual abilities are not unique to humans but are also present in non-human primates. Specifically, tamarins could discriminate forward but not backward sentences of Dutch from Japanese, using both natural and synthesized utterances. The present study was designed as a conceptual replication of the work on tamarins. Results show that rats trained in a discrimination learning task readily discriminate forward, but not backward sentences of Dutch from Japanese; the results are particularly robust for synthetic utterances, a pattern that shows greater parallels with newborns than with tamarins. Our results extend the claims made in the research with tamarins that the capacity to discriminate languages from different rhythmic classes depends on general perceptual abilities that evolved at least as far back as the rodents.
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Stoet, G., & Snyder, L. H. (2003). Task preparation in macaque monkeys ( Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 121–130.
Abstract: We investigated whether macaque monkeys possess the ability to prepare abstract tasks in advance. We trained two monkeys to use different stimulus-response (S-R) mappings. On each trial, monkeys were first informed with a visual cue which of two S-R mapping to use. Following a delay, a visual target was presented to which they would respond with a left or right button-press. We manipulated delay time between cue and target and found that performance was faster and more accurate with longer delays, suggesting that monkeys used the delay time to prepare each task in advance.
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Fairhurst, S., Gallistel, C. R., & Gibbon, J. (2003). Temporal landmarks: proximity prevails. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 113–120.
Abstract: Subjects in conditioning experiments time their conditioned responses relative to the onsets of the conditioned stimuli (CSs). These onsets are temporal landmarks, by reference to which subjects may estimate the location of the unconditioned stimulus (US) in time. In a serial compound conditioning paradigm, a long duration CS comes on first, followed later by a second shorter CS, creating both a long-range and a short-range predictor of the US. We ask whether displacing the short-range predictor relative to the long-range predictor causes subjects to strike a compromise between the different temporal locations predicted by the two CSs. In three experiments with pigeons, we varied the training conditions so as to favor or militate against this outcome. However, in all conditions, there was no compromise; after the onset of the displaced short-range CS, the timing of conditioned responding was governed by it alone. This result contrasts with the compromises that are seen when the feeding time predicted by a CS is put in conflict with the time predicted by the circadian clock, and with the similar compromises sometimes seen when a nearby spatial landmark is displaced relative to a larger spatial context.
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Neff, B. D., & Sherman, P. W. (2003). Nestling recognition via direct cues by parental male bluegill sunfish ( Lepomis macrochirus). Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 87–92.
Abstract: Parental care can be costly to a parent in terms of both time and energy invested in the young. In species with cuckoldry or brood parasitism not all of the young under a parent's care are necessarily offspring. In such cases, distinguishing between kin and non-kin, and investing only in the former (nepotism), can be advantageous. Bluegill sunfish ( Lepomis macrochirus) are characterized by paternal care and cuckoldry, and care-providing males appear to show nepotistic behaviours. Here, we investigated nestling recognition in bluegill, determining whether parental males can differentiate between young from their own nest (familiar and related) and young from non-neighbouring nests (unfamiliar and unrelated) using (1) visual and chemical cues, and (2) chemical cues only. In the first experiment, wild-caught parental males were presented with samples of eggs or fry (newly hatched eggs) collected from their own nest or a foreign nest and placed on opposite sides of an aquarium. The time these parental males spent associating with each sample, and their “pecking” behaviours (indicating cannibalism), were recorded. Parental males showed no preference between eggs from their own nest and eggs from a non-neighbouring nest, but they preferred to associate with fry from their own nest over foreign fry. There also was a positive relationship between male body size and the time spent associated with fry from their own nest. Parental males pecked at foreign fry more than 5 times as often as fry from their own nest, though this difference was not statistically significant. In the second experiment, fry that were collected from the nest of a wild-caught parental male or a non-neighbouring nest were placed in different containers and the water from each was dripped into opposite ends of an aquarium. The time the male spent on each side was recorded. In this case, parental males spent more time near the source of water conditioned by unrelated fry, but there was a positive relationship between male condition (fat reserves) and the time he spent near the source of water conditioned by fry from his own nest. Results confirm that chemicals cue nestling recognition by parental male bluegill.
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Vonk, J. (2003). Gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orangutan ( Pongo abelii) understanding of first- and second-order relations. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 77–86.
Abstract: Four orangutans and one gorilla matched images in a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task based on the relationship between items depicted in those images, thus demonstrating understanding of both first- and second-order relations. Subjects matched items on the basis of identity, color, or shape (first-order relations, experiment 1) or same shape, same color between items (second-order relations, experiment 2). Four of the five subjects performed above chance on the second-order relations DMTS task within the first block of five sessions. High levels of performance on this task did not result from reliance on perceptual feature matching and thus indicate the capability for abstract relational concepts in two species of great ape.
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Hauber, M. E., & Sherman, P. W. (2003). Designing and interpreting experimental tests of self-referent phenotype matching. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 69–71.
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van der Willigen, R. F., Frost, B. J., & Wagner, H. (2003). How owls structure visual information. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 39–55.
Abstract: Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.
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Neiworth, J. J., Steinmark, E., Basile, B. M., Wonders, R., Steely, F., & DeHart, C. (2003). A test of object permanence in a new-world monkey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 27–37.
Abstract: Cotton top tamarins were tested in visible and invisible displacement tasks in a method similar to that used elsewhere to test squirrel monkeys and orangutans. All subjects performed at levels significantly above chance on visible ( n=8) and invisible ( n=7) displacements, wherein the tasks included tests of the perseverance error, tests of memory in double and triple displacements, and “catch” trials that tested for the use of the experimenter's hand as a cue for the correct cup. Performance on all nine tasks was significantly higher than chance level selection of cups, and tasks using visible displacements generated more accurate performance than tasks using invisible displacements. Performance was not accounted for by a practice effect based on exposure to successive tasks. Results suggest that tamarins possess stage 6 object permanence capabilities, and that in a situation involving brief exposure to tasks and foraging opportunities, tracking objects' movements and responding more flexibly are abilities expressed readily by the tamarins.
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Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
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