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Mitman, G. (1990). Dominance, leadership, and aggression: animal behavior studies during the Second World War. J Hist Behav Sci, 26(1), 3–16.
Abstract: During the decade surrounding the Second World War, an extensive literature on the biological and psychological basis of aggression surfaced in America, a literature that in general emphasized the significance of learning and environment in the origins of aggressive behavior. Focusing on the animal behavior research of Warder Clyde Allee and John Paul Scott, this paper examines the complex interplay among conceptual, institutional, and societal forces that created and shaped a discourse on the subjects of aggression, dominance, and leadership within the context of World War II. The distinctions made between sexual and social dominance during this period, distinctions accentuated by the threat of totalitarianism abroad, and the varying ways that interpretations of behavior could be negotiated attests to the multiplicity of interactions that influence the development of scientific research.
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Levin, L. E., & Grillet, M. E. (1988). [Diversified leadership: a social solution of problems in schools of fish]. Acta Cient Venez, 39(2), 175–180.
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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Individual relationships within a unit. Contrib Primatol, 16, 93–124.
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Dunbar, R. I., & Dunbar, E. P. (1976). Contrasts in social structure among black-and-white colobus monkey groups. Anim. Behav., 24(1), 84–92.
Abstract: Three types of Colobus guereza groups may be distinguished on the bases of size and composition, namely small one-male groups, large, one-male groups and multi-male groups. The social structure of each type of group is described in terms of the distribution of non-agonistic interactions, the frequency and distribution of agonistic behaviour and the organization of the roles of vigilance, territorial defence and leadership. A number of differences are found between the group types which appear to be related to the differences in group size and composition. It is suggested that these group types represent stages in the life-cycle of colobus groups, and that such an interpretation may help to resolve some of the conflicting reports in the literature.
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Hrdy, S. B. (1974). Male-male competition and infanticide among the langurs (Presbytis entellus) of Abu, Rajasthan. Folia Primatol (Basel), 22(1), 19–58.
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Meese, G. B., & Ewbank, R. (1973). Exploratory behaviour and leadership in the domesticated pig. Br. Vet. J., 129(3), 251–259.
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Saayman, G. S. (1971). Behaviour of the adult males in a troop of free-ranging Chacma baboons (Papio ursinus). Folia Primatol (Basel), 15(1), 36–57.
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Packer, C., & Heinsohn, R. (1996). Response:Lioness leadership. Science, 271(5253), 1215–1216.
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Gary C. Jahn, & Craig Packer, R. H. (1996). Lioness leadership. Science, 271(5253), 1216–1219.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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