Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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Davis, S. L., & Cheeke, P. R. (1998). Do domestic animals have minds and the ability to think? A provisional sample of opinions on the question. J. Anim Sci., 76(8), 2072–2079.
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Schiffman, S. S. (1998). Livestock odors: implications for human health and well-being. J. Anim Sci., 76(5), 1343–1355.
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Cox, G., & Ashford, T. (1998). Riddle Me This: The Craft and Concept of Animal Mind. Science Technology Human Values, 23(4), 425–438.
Abstract: This article examines the relations between methods used in both animal work and study and concepts of animal mind. By “animal work” the authors mean humans and animals working together, and by “animal study” they mean the discipline of ethology, especially the emerging area of cognitive ethology. Within these areas the wide range of conceptions of animal mind includes varying emphases on intelligence, forms of rationality and language, cognition, consciousness, and intentionality. The authors' central concern is to elucidate the vocabulary and the concepts which seem necessary to establishing successful working relationships with sheepdogs and gundogs. Their argument moves toward an emphasis on the appreciation of particular intentional states and recognizes that they invariably deploy elements of a moral vocabulary in achieving creative teamwork performances with dogs and other animals. The article concludes by consid enng the relevance of accounts of work with animals for associated considerations of intentionality.
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Visalberghi E, & Tomasello M. (1998). Primate causal understanding in the physical and psychological domains. Behav. Process., 42, 189.
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Westergaard, G. C., Liv, C., Chavanne, T. J., & Suomi, S. J. (1998). Token-mediated tool-use by a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 101–106.
Abstract: This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in experiments 2-5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes.
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Call, J., Hare, B. A., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 89–99.
Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.
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Rasa, O. A. E. (1998). To stay or to leave? Decision rules for partner species relocation in two symbiotic pairs of desert beetles. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 47–54.
Abstract: Four nocturnal Kalahari desert tenebrionid beetles live in closely associated species pairs. The larger member of each pair, Parastizopus and Gonopus, are the primary burrowers while their smaller associates, Eremostibes and Herpiscius, inhabit the burrows with them and feed on detritus the larger beetles carry in. During summer drought, the two large species have different emergence times, surface activity patterns (vagilities) and different probabilities that burrows will be reoccupied before sunrise or remain empty for longer periods. Because their partners leave the burrows, the smaller species must make a decision either to stay in the expectation of a burrow being reinhabited, or leave and locate a new partner. The vagility and burrow fidelity of the associating species were studied using marked individuals in free-living populations. Field inclusion/exclusion experiments to test what influences the decision process showed that neither continual partner presence nor food induced the smaller beetles to remain. Different percentages, depending on species, left overnight. For both associates, these proportions corresponded exactly to the probability that the burrow would not be inhabited by their partner species the next day. Neither species predicted the probability of burrow reoccupation after a short vacancy and adopted a “waiting” strategy.
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Santi, A., Stanford, L., & Symons, J. (1998). An analysis of confusion errors in many-to-one matching with temporal and nontemporal samples. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 37–46.
Abstract: In experiment 1, pigeons were trained to match temporal (2, 8, and 10 s of houselight) and location (feeder light, left key, center key illumination) samples to color comparison stimuli. Red choices were correct following the 2-s and feeder light, orange choices were correct following the 8-s and center key, and green choices were correct following the 10-s and left key. Samples that were harder to discriminate (8- vs 10-s, and left vs center key) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easier to discriminate (2- vs 8-s, and feeder light vs left key) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate(red vs orange). The pattern of errors for temporal and location samples indicated that these samples were not represented by a common code even though they were associated with the same comparison stimuli. In experiment 2, the same pigeons were trained with visual samples in which samples that were hard to discriminate (triangle vs circle) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easy to discriminate(plus vs triangle) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate (red vs orange). Following acquisition of the visual discrimination, the temporal samples were re-introduced and many-to-one training was continued. During delay testing, the pattern of errors for temporal and visual samples was equivalent and consistent with the hypothesis that visual samples were being coded in terms of the duration appropriate for the temporal sample with which it shared a common comparison response. Data from no-sample test sessions ruled out a simple response bias explanation of the data. The properties of common codes for temporal and nontemporal events can be somewhat flexible and more complicated than previously envisaged.
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