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Treichler, F. R., & Van Tilburg, D. (2002). Premise-pair training for valid tests of serial list organization in macaques. Anim. Cogn., 5(2), 97–105.
Abstract: This study evaluated the role of several different training procedures on (1) efficiency of acquisition and (2) organizational characteristics of memory for lists that could be serially ordered. Five macaque monkeys were trained via two-choice object discriminations in a formboard apparatus on several five-item-series tasks that provided different levels of intrasession conditionality. Although ease of acquisition differed for subsets of the constituent pairs, concurrent inclusion of the four premise pairs that defined a list required equivalent amounts of training on every task. All training procedures yielded similar retention-test performances and showed common organizational properties (on both error and latency measures) consistent with the view that lists were retained as internally represented ordered series. Test outcomes emphasized the need for integrated exposition of all concurrent conditional relationships to allow appropriate tests of serial organization. However, if given such training, the monkeys revealed integrated serial memory even though they had never seen many of the possible novel combinations of list items. In overview, their performances offered further definition of the procedures required for valid assessment of inferential properties in comparative cognition.
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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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Washburn, D. A., Smith, J. D., & Shields, W. E. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 185–189.
Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
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Boysen, S. T., Bernston, G. G., Hannan, M. B., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996). Quantity-based interference and symbolic representations in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(1), 76–86.
Abstract: Five chimpanzees with training in counting and numerical skills selected between 2 arrays of different amounts of candy or 2 Arabic numerals. A reversed reinforcement contingency was in effect, in which the selected array was removed and the subject received the nonselected candies (or the number of candies represented by the nonselected Arabic numeral). Animals were unable to maximize reward by selecting the smaller array when candies were used as array elements. When Arabic numerals were substituted for the candy arrays, all animals showed an immediate shift to a more optimal response strategy of selecting the smaller numeral, thereby receiving the larger reward. Results suggest that a response disposition to the high-incentive candy stimuli introduced a powerful interference effect on performance, which was effectively overridden by the use of symbolic representations.
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Poti, P. (2005). Chimpanzees' constructional praxis (Pan paniscus, P. troglodytes). Primates, 46(2), 103–113.
Abstract: This study investigated chimpanzees' spontaneous spatial constructions with objects and especially their ability to repeat inter-object spatial relations, which is basic to understanding spatial relations at a higher level than perception or recognition. Subjects were six chimpanzees-four chimpanzees and two bonobos-aged 6-21 years, all raised in a human environment from an early age. Only minor species differences, but considerable individual differences were found. The effect of different object samples was assessed through a comparison with a previous study. A common overall chimpanzee pattern was also found. Chimpanzees repeated different types of inter-object spatial relations such as insertion (I), or vertical (V), or next-to (H) relations. However chimpanzees repeated I or V relations with more advanced procedures than when repeating H relations. Moreover, chimpanzees never repeated combined HV relations. Compared with children, chimpanzees showed a specific difficulty in repeating H relations. Repeating H relations is crucial for representing and understanding multiple reciprocal spatial relations between detached elements and for coordinating independent positions in space. Therefore, the chimpanzees' difficulty indicates a fundamental difference in constructive space in comparison to humans. The findings are discussed in relation to issues of spatial cognition and tool use.
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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in primates. Am. J. Primatol., 55(2), 71–85.
Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.
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Hirata, S. (2007). A note on the responses of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to live self-images on television monitors. Behav. Process., 75(1), 85–90.
Abstract: The majority of studies on self-recognition in animals have been conducted using a mirror as the test device; little is known, however, about the responses of non-human primates toward their own images in media other than mirrors. This study provides preliminary data on the reactions of 10 chimpanzees to live self-images projected on two television monitors, each connected to a different video camera. Chimpanzees could see live images of their own faces, which were approximately life-sized, on one monitor. On the other monitor, they could see live images of their whole body, which were approximately one-fifth life-size, viewed diagonally from behind. In addition, several objects were introduced into the test situation. Out of 10 chimpanzees tested, 2 individuals performed self-exploratory behaviors while watching their own images on the monitors. One of these two chimpanzees successively picked up two of the provided objects in front of a monitor, and watched the images of these objects on the monitor. The results indicate that these chimpanzees were able to immediately recognize live images of themselves or objects on the monitors, even though several features of these images differed from those of their previous experience with mirrors.
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Pepperberg, I. M., & Brezinsky, M. V. (1991). Acquisition of a relative class concept by an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus): discriminations based on relative size. J Comp Psychol, 105(3), 286–294.
Abstract: We report that an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus), Alex, responds to stimuli on a relative basis. Previous laboratory studies with artificial stimuli (such as pure tones) suggest that birds make relational responses as a secondary strategy, only after they have acquired information about the absolute values of the stimuli. Alex, however, after learning to respond to a small set of exemplars on the basis of relative size, transferred this behavior to novel situations that did not provide specific information about the absolute values of the stimuli. He responded to vocal questions about which was the larger or smaller exemplar by vocally labeling its color or material, and he responded “none” if the exemplars did not differ in size. His overall accuracy was 78.7%.
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