Abstract: Summary Four geldings and four mares of primarily Thoroughbred and Quarter Horse breeding were used in simultaneous 4x4 Latin square experiments to test the effects of dietary cation-anion balance (DCAB), defined as meq ((Na+K)-C1)/kg diet dry matter, on blood pH, blood gases, acid-base status and plasma glucose in horses at rest and following anaerobic exercise. Four diets, consisting of a base concentrate of corn, soybean meal and cottonseed hulls fed in a 60:40 ratio with Bermudagrass hay, were formulated to provide a DCAB of 5 (L=Low), 107 (ML=Medium Low), 201 (MH=Medium High) and 327 (H=High) meq ((Na+K)-C1)/kg diet dry matter. Calcium chloride and ammonium chloride were added to treatment L and ML and sodium bicarbonate and potassium citrate were added to treatment H to achieve the desired cation-anion balance. Treatment MH was not supplemented and served as the control treatment. Prior to the experiment, horses performed six weeks of long, slow, distance (LSD) work. During the experimental periods, horses were subjected to an exercise regimen alternating LSD with an interval training protocol 6 days/week. Venous blood pH, pCO2 and bicarbonate levels were significantly lower in horses at rest consuming diet L versus diets MH and H. Blood pH and acid-base parameters decreased with decreasing DCAB. There were no significant differences in blood pH or acid-base parameters between treatments, after anaerobic exercise. Plasma glucose concentrations for treatment L were significantly lower than treatment H at 10, 20, and 30 minutes post-exercise. These data suggest that DCAB has significant effect on acid-base status and indicate that horses consuming diets with low DCAB may experience a metabolic acidosis.

Abstract: The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.

Abstract: Existing models suggest that reciprocity is unlikely to evolve in large groups as a result of natural selection. In these models, reciprocators punish noncooperation by with-holding future cooperation, and thus also penalize other cooperators in the group. Here, we analyze a model in which the response is some form of punishment that is directed solely at noncooperators. We refer to such alternative forms of punishment as retribution. We show that cooperation enforced by retribution can lead to the evolution of cooperation in two qualitatively different ways. (1) If benefits of cooperation to an individual are greater than the costs to a single individual of coercing the other n − 1 individuals to cooperate, then strategies which cooperate and punish noncooperators, strategies which cooperate only if punished, and, sometimes, strategies which cooperate but do not punish will coexist in the long run. (2) If the costs of being punished are large enough, moralistic strategies which cooperate, punish noncooperators, and punish those who do not punish noncooperators can be evolutionarily stable. We also show, however, that moralistic strategies can cause any individually costly behavior to be evolutionarily stable, whether or not it creates a group benefit.