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Hostetter, A. B., Russell, J. L., Freeman, H., & Hopkins, W. D. (2007). Now you see me, now you don't: evidence that chimpanzees understand the role of the eyes in attention. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 55–62.
Abstract: Chimpanzees appear to understand something about the attentional states of others; in the present experiment, we investigated whether they understand that the attentional state of a human is based on eye gaze. In all, 116 adult chimpanzees were offered food by an experimenter who engaged in one of the four experimental manipulations: eyes closed, eyes open, hand over eyes, and hand over mouth. The communicative behavior of the chimpanzees was observed. More visible behaviors were produced when the experimenter's eyes were visible than when the experimenter's eyes were not visible. More vocalizations were produced when the experimenter's eyes were closed than when they were open, but there were no differences in other attention getting behaviors. There was no effect of age or rearing history. The results suggest that chimpanzees use the presence of the eyes as a cue that their visual gestures will be effective.
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Sturz, B. R., Bodily, K. D., & Katz, J. S. (2006). Evidence against integration of spatial maps in humans. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 207–217.
Abstract: A dynamic 3-D virtual environment was constructed for humans as an open-field analogue of Blaisdell and Cook's (2005) pigeon foraging task to determine if humans, like pigeons, were capable of integrating separate spatial maps. Participants used keyboard keys and a mouse to search for a hidden goal in a 4x4 grid of raised cups. During Phase 1 training, a goal was consistently located between two landmarks (Map 1: blue T and red L). During Phase 2 training, a goal was consistently located down and left of a single landmark (Map 2: blue T). Transfer trials were then conducted in which participants were required to make choices in the presence of the red L alone. Cup choices during transfer assessed participants' strategies: association (from Map 1), generalization (from Map 2), or integration (combining Map 1 and 2). During transfer, cup choices increased to a location which suggested an integration strategy and was consistent with results obtained with pigeons. However, additional analyses of the human data suggested participants initially used a generalization strategy followed by a progressive shift in search behavior away from the red L. This shift in search behavior during transfer was responsible for the changes in cup choices across transfer trials and was confirmed by a control condition. These new analyses offer an alternative explanation to the spatial integration account proposed for pigeons.
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Virányi, Z., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). A nonverbal test of knowledge attribution: a comparative study on dogs and children. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 13–26.
Abstract: The sensitivity of eleven pet dogs and eleven 2.5-year-old children to others' past perceptual access was tested for object-specificity in a playful, nonverbal task in which a human Helper's knowledge state regarding the whereabouts of a hidden toy and a stick (a tool necessary for getting the out-of-reach toy) was systematically manipulated. In the four experimental conditions the Helper either participated or was absent during hiding of the toy and the stick and therefore she knew the place(s) of (1) both the toy and the stick, (2) only the toy, (3) only the stick or (4) neither of them. The subjects observed the hiding processes, but they could not reach the objects, so they had to involve the Helper to retrieve the toy. The dogs were more inclined to signal the place of the toy in each condition and indicated the location of the stick only sporadically. However the children signalled both the location of the toy and that of the stick in those situations when the Helper had similar knowledge regarding the whereabouts of them (i.e. knew or ignored both of them), and in those conditions in which the Helper was ignorant of the whereabouts of only one object the children indicated the place of this object more often than that of the known one. At the same time however, both dogs and children signalled the place of the toy more frequently if the Helper had been absent during toy-hiding compared to those conditions when she had participated in the hiding. Although this behaviour appears to correspond with the Helper's knowledge state, even the subtle distinction made by the children can be interpreted without a casual understanding of knowledge-formation in others.
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Riedel, J., Buttelmann, D., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 27–35.
Abstract: Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.
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Russell, J. L., Braccini, S., Buehler, N., Kachin, M. J., Schapiro, S. J., & Hopkins, W. D. (2005). Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) intentional communication is not contingent upon food. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 263–272.
Abstract: Studies of great apes have revealed that they use manual gestures and other signals to communicate about distal objects. There is also evidence that chimpanzees modify the types of communicative signals they use depending on the attentional state of a human communicative partner. The majority of previous studies have involved chimpanzees requesting food items from a human experimenter. Here, these same communicative behaviors are reported in chimpanzees requesting a tool from a human observer. In this study, captive chimpanzees were found to gesture, vocalize, and display more often when the experimenter had a tool than when she did not. It was also found that chimpanzees responded differentially based on the attentional state of a human experimenter, and when given the wrong tool persisted in their communicative efforts. Implications for the referential and intentional nature of chimpanzee communicative signaling are discussed.
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Call, J., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn., 8(3), 151–163.
Abstract: There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.
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Nielsen, M., Collier-Baker, E., Davis, J. M., & Suddendorf, T. (2005). Imitation recognition in a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 31–36.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.
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Bovet, D., Vauclair, J., & Blaye, A. (2005). Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 53–59.
Abstract: Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon children's prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2004). The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 213–215.
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Munoz-Sanz, A. (2006). [Christopher Columbus flu. A hypothesis for an ecological catastrophe]. Enferm Infecc Microbiol Clin, 24(5), 326–334.
Abstract: When Christopher Columbus and his men embarked on the second Colombian expedition to the New World (1493), the crew suffered from fever, respiratory symptoms and malaise. It is generally accepted that the disease was influenza. Pigs, horses and hens acquired in Gomera (Canary Islands) traveled in the same ship. The pigs may well have been the origin of the flu and the intermediary hosts for genetic recombination of other viral subtypes. The Caribbean archipelago had a large population of birds, the natural reservoir of the avian influenza virus. In this ecological scenario there was a concurrence of several biological elements that had never before coexisted in the New World: pigs, horses, the influenza virus and humans. We propose that birds are likely to have played an important role in the epidemiology of the flu occurring on the second Colombian trip, which caused a fatal demographic catastrophe, with an estimated mortality of 90% among the natives.
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