Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.

Abstract: The majority of studies on self-recognition in animals have been conducted using a mirror as the test device; little is known, however, about the responses of non-human primates toward their own images in media other than mirrors. This study provides preliminary data on the reactions of 10 chimpanzees to live self-images projected on two television monitors, each connected to a different video camera. Chimpanzees could see live images of their own faces, which were approximately life-sized, on one monitor. On the other monitor, they could see live images of their whole body, which were approximately one-fifth life-size, viewed diagonally from behind. In addition, several objects were introduced into the test situation. Out of 10 chimpanzees tested, 2 individuals performed self-exploratory behaviors while watching their own images on the monitors. One of these two chimpanzees successively picked up two of the provided objects in front of a monitor, and watched the images of these objects on the monitor. The results indicate that these chimpanzees were able to immediately recognize live images of themselves or objects on the monitors, even though several features of these images differed from those of their previous experience with mirrors.

Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.

Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.

Abstract: I examine leadership in Wolf (Canis lupus) packs based on published observations and data gathered during summers from 1986 to 1998 studying a free-ranging pack of Wolves on Ellesmere Island that were habituated to my presence. The breeding male tended to initiate activities associated with foraging and travel, and the breeding female to initiate, and predominate in, pup care and protection. However, there was considerable overlap and interaction during these activities such that leadership could be considered a joint function. In packs with multiple breeders, quantitative information about leadership is needed.