Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.

Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.

Abstract: In several species, the ability to locate a disappearing object is an adaptive component of predatory and social behaviour. In domestic dogs, spatial memory for hidden objects is primarily based on an egocentric frame of reference. We investigated the geometric components of egocentric spatial information used by domestic dogs to locate an object they saw move and disappear. In experiment 1, the distance and the direction between the position of the animal and the hiding location were put in conflict. Results showed that the dogs primarily used the directional information between their own spatial coordinates and the target position. In experiment 2, the accuracy of the dogs in finding a hidden object by using directional information was estimated by manipulating the angular deviation between adjacent hiding locations and the position of the animal. Four angular deviations were tested: 5, 7.5, 10 and 15 degrees . Results showed that the performance of the dogs decreased as a function of the angular deviations but it clearly remained well above chance, revealing that the representation of the dogs for direction is precise. In the discussion, we examine how and why domestic dogs determine the direction in which they saw an object disappear.