Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.

Abstract: We present an experiment showing that New Caledonian crows are able to choose tools of the appropriate size for a novel task, without trial-and-error learning. This species is almost unique amongst all animal species (together with a few primates) in the degree of use and manufacture of polymorphic tools in the wild. However, until now, the flexibility of their tool use has not been tested. Flexibility, including the ability to select an appropriate tool for a task, is considered to be a hallmark of complex cognitive adaptations for tool use. In experiment 1, we tested the ability of two captive birds (one male, one female), to select a stick (from a range of lengths provided) matching the distance to food placed in a horizontal transparent pipe. Both birds chose tools matching the distance to their target significantly more often than would be expected by chance. In experiment 2, we used a similar task, but with the tools placed out of sight of the food pipe, such that the birds had to remember the distance of the food before selecting a tool. The task was completed only by the male, who chose a tool of sufficient length significantly more often than chance but did not show a preference for a matching length.

Abstract: Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.

Abstract: Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.