Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.

Abstract: An overview of mechanistic and functional accounts of stimulus generalisation is given. Mechanistic accounts rely on the process of spreading activation across units representing stimuli. Different models implement the spread in different ways, ranging from diffusion to connectionist networks. A functional account proposed by Shepard analyses the probabilistic structure of the world for invariants. A universal law based on one such invariant claims that under a suitable scaling of the stimulus dimension, generalisation gradients should be approximately exponential in shape. Data from both vertebrates and invertebrates so far uphold Shepard's law. Some data on spatial generalisation in honeybees are presented to illustrate how Shepard's law can be used to determine the metric for combining discrepancies in different stimulus dimensions. The phenomenon of peak shift is discussed. Comments on mechanistic and functional approaches to generalisation are given.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: We investigated the potential relationships between foraging strategies and relative brain and brain region volumes in predatory (animal-eating) echolocating bats. The species we considered represent the ancestral state for the order and approximately 70% of living bat species. The two dominant foraging strategies used by echolocating predatory bats are substrate-gleaning (taking prey from surfaces) and aerial hawking (taking airborne prey). We used species-specific behavioral, morphological, and ecological data to classify each of 59 predatory species as one of the following: (1) ground gleaning, (2) behaviorally flexible (i.e., known to both glean and hawk prey), (3) clutter tolerant aerial hawking, or (4) open-space aerial hawking. In analyses using both species level data and phylogenetically independent contrasts, relative brain size was larger in behaviorally flexible species. Further, relative neocortex volume was significantly reduced in bats that aerially hawk prey primarily in open spaces. Conversely, our foraging behavior index did not account for variability in hippocampus and inferior colliculus volume and we discuss these results in the context of past research.

Abstract: Socio-ecological explanations for intra- and interspecific variation in the social and spatial organization of animals predominate in the scientific literature. The socio-ecological model, developed first for the Bovidae and Cervidae, is commonly applied more widely to other groups including the Equidae. Intraspecific comparisons are particularly valuable because they allow the role of environment and demography on social and spatial organization to be understood while controlling for phylogeny or morphology which confound interspecific comparisons. Feral horse (Equus caballus Linnaeus 1758) populations with different demography inhabit a range of environments throughout the world. I use 56 reports to obtain 23 measures or characteristics of the behaviour and the social and spatial organization of 19 feral horse populations in which the environment, demography, management, research effort and sample size are also described. Comparison shows that different populations had remarkably similar social and spatial organization and that group sizes and composition, and home range sizes varied as much within as between populations. I assess the few exceptions to uniformity and conclude that they are due to the attributes of the studies themselves, particularly to poor definition of terms and inadequate empiricism, rather than to the environment or demography per se. Interspecific comparisons show that equid species adhere to their different social and spatial organizations despite similarities in their environments and even when species are sympatric. Furthermore, equid male territoriality has been ill-defined in previous studies, observations presented as evidence of territoriality are also found in non-territorial equids, and populations of supposedly territorial species demonstrate female defence polygyny. Thus, territoriality may not be a useful categorization in the Equidae. Moreover, although equid socio-ecologists have relied on the socio-ecological model derived from the extremely diverse Bovidae and Cervidae for explanations of variation in equine society, the homomorphic, but large and polygynous, and monogeneric Equidae do not support previous socio-ecological explanations for relationships between body size, mating system and sexual dimorphism in ungulates. Consequently, in spite of the efforts of numerous authors during the past two decades, functional explanations of apparent differences in feral horse and equid social and spatial organization and behaviour based on assumptions of their current utility in the environmental or demographic context remain unconvincing. Nevertheless, differences in social cohesion between species that are insensitive to intra- and interspecific variation in habitat and predation pressure warrant explanation. Thus, I propose alternative avenues of inquiry including testing for species-specific differences in inter-individual aggression and investigating the role of phylogenetic constraints in equine society. The Equidae are evidence of the relative importance of phylogeny and biological structure, and unimportance of the present-day environment, in animal behaviour and social and spatial organization.