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Fulhorst, C. F., Hardy, J. L., Eldridge, B. F., Chiles, R. E., & Reeves, W. C. (1996). Ecology of Jamestown Canyon virus (Bunyaviridae: California serogroup) in coastal California. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 55(2), 185–189.
Abstract: This paper reports the first isolation of Jamestown Canyon (JC) virus from coastal California and the results of tests for antibody to JC virus in mammals living in coastal California. The virus isolation was made from a pool of 50 Aedes dorsalis females collected as adults from Morro Bay, San Luis Obispo County, California. The virus isolate was identified by two-way plaque reduction-serum dilution neutralization tests done in Vero cell cultures. Sera from the mammals were tested for antibody to JC virus by a plaque-reduction serum dilution neutralization method. A high prevalence of JC virus-specific antibody was found in horses and cattle sampled from Morro Bay. This finding is additional evidence for the presence of a virus antigenically identical or closely related to JC virus in Morro Bay and indicates that the vectors of the virus in Morro Bay feed on large mammals. A high prevalence of virus-specific antibody was also found in horses sampled from Marin and San Diego counties. This finding suggests that viruses antigenically identical or closely related to JC virus are geographically widespread in coastal California.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Caldwell, C. A., & Whiten, A. (2002). Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: is a comparative psychology of social learning possible? Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 193–208.
Abstract: Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the “phylogenetic”, “animal model”, and “adaptational”. We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these – survey reviews of published studies – we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single “gold standard” task.
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Goto, K., Wills, A. J., & Lea, S. E. G. (2004). Global-feature classification can be acquired more rapidly than local-feature classification in both humans and pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 109–113.
Abstract: When humans process visual stimuli, global information often takes precedence over local information. In contrast, some recent studies have pointed to a local precedence effect in both pigeons and nonhuman primates. In the experiment reported here, we compared the speed of acquisition of two different categorizations of the same four geometric figures. One categorization was on the basis of a local feature, the other on the basis of a readily apparent global feature. For both humans and pigeons, the global-feature categorization was acquired more rapidly. This result reinforces the conclusion that local information does not always take precedence over global information in nonhuman animals.
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Apfelbach, R., Blanchard, C. D., Blanchard, R. J., Hayes, R. A., & McGregor, I. S. (2005). The effects of predator odors in mammalian prey species: A review of field and laboratory studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(8), 1123–1144.
Abstract: Prey species show specific adaptations that allow recognition, avoidance and defense against predators. For many mammalian species this includes sensitivity towards predator-derived odors. The typical sources of such odors include predator skin and fur, urine, feces and anal gland secretions. Avoidance of predator odors has been observed in many mammalian prey species including rats, mice, voles, deer, rabbits, gophers, hedgehogs, possums and sheep. Field and laboratory studies show that predator odors have distinctive behavioral effects which include (1) inhibition of activity, (2) suppression of non-defensive behaviors such as foraging, feeding and grooming, and (3) shifts to habitats or secure locations where such odors are not present. The repellent effect of predator odors in the field may sometimes be of practical use in the protection of crops and natural resources, although not all attempts at this have been successful. The failure of some studies to obtain repellent effects with predator odors may relate to (1) mismatches between the predator odors and prey species employed, (2) strain and individual differences in sensitivity to predator odors, and (3) the use of predator odors that have low efficacy. In this regard, a small number of recent studies have suggested that skin and fur-derived predator odors may have a more profound lasting effect on prey species than those derived from urine or feces. Predator odors can have powerful effects on the endocrine system including a suppression of testosterone and increased levels of stress hormones such as corticosterone and ACTH. Inhibitory effects of predator odors on reproductive behavior have been demonstrated, and these are particularly prevalent in female rodent species. Pregnant female rodents exposed to predator odors may give birth to smaller litters while exposure to predator odors during early life can hinder normal development. Recent research is starting to uncover the neural circuitry activated by predator odors, leading to hypotheses about how such activation leads to observable effects on reproduction, foraging and feeding. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Arnold, K., & Zuberbuhler, K. (2006). Language evolution: semantic combinations in primate calls. Nature, 441(7091), 303.
Abstract: Syntax sets human language apart from other natural communication systems, although its evolutionary origins are obscure. Here we show that free-ranging putty-nosed monkeys combine two vocalizations into different call sequences that are linked to specific external events, such as the presence of a predator and the imminent movement of the group. Our findings indicate that non-human primates can combine calls into higher-order sequences that have a particular meaning.
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Goto, K., Lea, S. E. G., & Dittrich, W. H. (2002). Discrimination of intentional and random motion paths by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 119–127.
Abstract: Twelve pigeons ( Columba livia) were trained on a go/no-go schedule to discriminate between two kinds of movement patterns of dots, which to human observers appear to be “intentional” and “non-intentional” movements. In experiment 1, the intentional motion stimulus contained one dot (a “wolf”) that moved systematically towards another dot as though stalking it, and three distractors (“sheep”). The non-intentional motion stimulus consisted of four distractors but no stalker. Birds showed some improvement of discrimination as the sessions progressed, but high levels of discrimination were not reached. In experiment 2, the same birds were tested with different stimuli. The same parameters were used but the number of intentionally moving dots in the intentional motion stimulus was altered, so that three wolves stalked one sheep. Despite the enhanced difference of movement patterns, the birds did not show any further improvement in discrimination. However, birds for which the non-intentional stimulus was associated with reward showed a decline in discrimination. These results indicated that pigeons can discriminate between stimuli that do and do not contain an element that human observer see as moving intentionally. However, as no feature-positive effect was found in experiment 1, it is assumed that pigeons did not perceive or discriminate these stimuli on the basis that the intentional stimuli contained a feature that the non-intentional stimuli lacked, though the convergence seen in experiment 2 may have been an effective feature for the pigeons. Pigeons seem to be able to recognise some form of multiple simultaneously goal-directed motions, compared to random motions, as a distinctive feature, but do not seem to use simple “intentional” motion paths of two geometrical figures, embedded in random motions, as a feature whose presence or absence differentiates motion displays.
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Osthaus, B., Lea, S. E. G., & Slater, A. M. (2005). Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) fail to show understanding of means-end connections in a string-pulling task. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 37–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) were tested in four experiments for their understanding of means-end connections. In each of the experiments, the dogs attempted to retrieve a food treat that could be seen behind a barrier and which was connected, via string, to a within-reach wooden block. In the experiments, either one or two strings were present, but the treat was attached only to one string. Successful retrieval of the treat required the animals to pull the appropriate string (either by pawing or by grasping the wooden block in their jaws) until the treat emerged from under the barrier. The results showed that the dogs were successful if the treat was in a perpendicular line to the barrier, i.e. straight ahead, but not when the string was at an angle: in the latter condition, the typical response was a proximity error in that the dogs pawed or mouthed at a location closest in line to the treat. When two strings that crossed were present, the dogs tended to pull on the wrong string. The combined results from the experiments show that, although dogs can learn to pull on a string to obtain food, they do not spontaneously understand means-end connections involving strings.
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Goodwin, D., McGreevy, P. D., Heleski, C., Randle, H., & Waran, N. (2008). Equitation science: The application of science in equitation. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 11(3), 185–190.
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