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Singer, R. A., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2006). Use of a single-code/default strategy by pigeons to acquire duration sample discriminations. Learn Behav, 34(4), 340–347.
Abstract: Past evidence that pigeons may adopt a single-code/default strategy to solve duration sample discriminations may be attributable to the similarity between the intertrial interval (ITI) and the retention interval. The present experiments tested whether pigeons would adopt a single-code/default strategy when possible ITI-retention-interval ambiguity was eliminated and sample salience was increased. Previous studies of duration sample discriminations that have purported to show evidence for the use of a single-code/default coding strategy have used durations of 0, 2, and 10 sec (Zentall, Klein, and Singer, 2004). However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the use of a 0-sec sample may produce an artifact resulting in inadvertent present/absent sample matching. In Experiment 2, when pigeons were trained with three nonzero duration samples (2, 8, and 32 sec), clear evidence for the use of a single-code/default strategy was found.
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Blokland, A. (1998). Reaction time responding in rats. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 22(6), 847–864.
Abstract: The use of reaction time has a great tradition in the field of human information processing research. In animal research the use of reaction time test paradigms is mainly limited to two research fields: the role of the striatum in movement initiation; and aging. It was discussed that reaction time responding can be regarded as “single behavior”, this term was used to indicate that only one behavioral category is measured, allowing a better analysis of brain-behavior relationships. Reaction time studies investigating the role of the striatum in motor functions revealed that the initiation of a behavioral response is dependent on the interaction of different neurotransmitters (viz. dopamine, glutamate, GABA). Studies in which lesions were made in different brain structures suggested that motor initiation is dependent on defined brain structures (e.g. medialldorsal striatum, prefrontal cortex). It was concluded that the use of reaction time measures can indeed be a powerful tool in studying brain-behavior relationships. However, there are some methodological constraints with respect to the assessment of reaction time in rats, as was tried to exemplify by the experiments described in the present paper. On the one hand one should try to control for behavioral characteristics of rats that may affect the validity of the parameter reaction time. On the other hand, the mean value of reaction time should be in the range of what has been reported in man. Although these criteria were not always met in several studies, it was concluded that reaction time can be validly assessed in rats. Finally, it was discussed that the use of reaction time may go beyond studies that investigate the role of the basal ganglia in motor output. Since response latency is a direct measure of information processing this parameter may provide insight into basic elements of cognition. Based on the significance of reaction times in human studies the use of this dependent variable in rats may provide a fruitful approach in studying brain-behavior relationships in cognitive functions.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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Houpt, K. A., Thornton, S. N., & Allen, W. R. (1989). Vasopressin in dehydrated and rehydrated ponies. Physiol. Behav., 45(3), 659–661.
Abstract: Six pony mares deprived of water for 24 hours showed significant increases in plasma vasopressin (2.8 pg/ml) and osmolality (9 mosmol/kg). When water was made available the ponies drank rapidly (5 of 6 drank to satiety within 90 seconds) and corrected their fluid deficits precisely. Vasopressin did not return to predehydration levels until osmolality did after 15 minutes of access to water. The horse differs from rodents and humans, but is similar to pigs in that vasopressin levels do not fall before osmolality returns to normal. Oropharyngeal factors, therefore, may not be as important in vasopressin release in horses as in other species.
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Fairhurst, S., Gallistel, C. R., & Gibbon, J. (2003). Temporal landmarks: proximity prevails. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 113–120.
Abstract: Subjects in conditioning experiments time their conditioned responses relative to the onsets of the conditioned stimuli (CSs). These onsets are temporal landmarks, by reference to which subjects may estimate the location of the unconditioned stimulus (US) in time. In a serial compound conditioning paradigm, a long duration CS comes on first, followed later by a second shorter CS, creating both a long-range and a short-range predictor of the US. We ask whether displacing the short-range predictor relative to the long-range predictor causes subjects to strike a compromise between the different temporal locations predicted by the two CSs. In three experiments with pigeons, we varied the training conditions so as to favor or militate against this outcome. However, in all conditions, there was no compromise; after the onset of the displaced short-range CS, the timing of conditioned responding was governed by it alone. This result contrasts with the compromises that are seen when the feeding time predicted by a CS is put in conflict with the time predicted by the circadian clock, and with the similar compromises sometimes seen when a nearby spatial landmark is displaced relative to a larger spatial context.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Choice based on exclusion in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(4), 959–964.
Abstract: When humans acquire a conditional discrimination and are given a novel-sample-comparison choice, they often reject a comparison known to be associated with a different sample and choose the alternative comparison by default (or by exclusion). In Experiment 1, we found that if, following matching training, we replaced both of the samples, acquisition took five times longer than if we replaced only one of the samples. Apparently, the opportunity to reject one of the comparisons facilitated the association of the other sample with the remaining comparison. In Experiment 2, we first trained pigeons to treat two samples differently (to associate Sample A with Comparison 1 and Sample B with Comparison 2) and then trained them to associate one of those samples with a new comparison (e.g., Sample A with Comparison 3) and to associate a novel sample (Sample C) with a different, new comparison (Comparison 4). When Sample B then replaced Sample C, the pigeons showed a significant tendency to choose Comparison 4 over Comparison 3. Thus, when given the opportunity, pigeons will choose by exclusion.
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Lonon, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in simultaneous discriminations in humans. Am J Psychol, 112(1), 21–39.
Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.
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