|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1986). The recognition of social alliances among vervet monkeys. Anim. Behav., 34, 1722–1731.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1989). Reconciliation and redirected aggression in vervet monkeys, Behaviour. Behaviour, 110, 258–275.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2000). Social Awareness in Monkeys. Amer. Zool., 40(6), 902–909.
Abstract: Tests of self-awareness in nonhuman primates have to date been concerned almost entirely with the recognition of an animal's reflection in a mirror. By contrast, we know much less about non-human primates' perception of their place within a social network, or of their understanding of themselves as individuals with unique sets of social relationships. Here we review evidence that monkeys who fail the mirror test may nonetheless behave as if they recognize themselves as distinct individuals, each of whom occupies a unique place in society and has a specific set of relations with others. A free-ranging vervet monkey, baboon, or macaque recognizes other members of his group as individuals. He also recognizes matrilineal kin groups, linear dominance rank orders, and behaves as if he recognizes his own unique place within them. This sense of “social self” in monkeys, however, is markedly different from self-awareness in humans. Although monkeys may behave in ways that accurately place themselves within a social network, they are unaware of the knowledge that allows them to do so: they do not know what they know, cannot reflect on what they know, and cannot become the object of their own attention.
|
Kitchen, D., Bergman, T., Cheney, D., Nicholson, J., & Seyfarth, R. (2010). Comparing responses of four ungulate species to playbacks of baboon alarm calls. Anim. Cogn., 13(6), 861–870.
Abstract: A growing body of evidence suggests that a wide range of animals can recognize and respond appropriately to calls produced by other species. Social learning has been implicated as a possible mechanism by which heterospecific call recognition might develop. To examine whether familiarity and/or shared vulnerability with the calling species might influence the ability of sympatric species to distinguish heterospecific alarm calls, we tested whether four ungulate species (impala: Aepyceros melampus; tsessebe: Damaliscus lunatus; zebra: Equus burchelli; wildebeest: Connochaetes taurinus) could distinguish baboon (Papio hamadryas ursinus) alarm calls from other loud baboon calls produced during intra-specific aggressive interactions (‘contest’ calls). Overall, subjects’ responses were stronger following playback of alarm calls than contest calls. Of the species tested, impala showed the strongest responses and the greatest difference in composite response scores, suggesting they were best able to differentiate call types. Compared with the other ungulate species, impala are the most frequent associates of baboons. Moreover, like baboons, they are susceptible to both lion and leopard attacks, whereas leopards rarely take the larger ungulates. Although it seems possible that high rates of association and/or shared vulnerability may influence impala’s greater ability to distinguish among baboon call types, our results point to a stronger influence of familiarity. Ours is the first study to compare such abilities among several community members with variable natural histories, and we discuss future experiments that would more systematically examine development of these skills in young ungulates.
|
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1988). Do monkeys understand their realtions? In R. Byrne, & A. Whiten (Eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2015). Social cognition. Animal Behaviour, 103, 191–202.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
|
Owren, M. J., Dieter, J. A., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1993). Vocalizations of rhesus (Macaca mulatta) and Japanese (M. fuscata) macaques cross-fostered between species show evidence of only limited modification. Dev Psychobiol, 26(7), 389–406.
Abstract: Two rhesus and two Japanese macaque infants were cross-fostered between species in order to study the effects of auditory experience on vocal development. Both the cross-fostered and normally raised control subjects were observed over the first 2 years of life and their vocalizations were tape-recorded. We classified 8053 calls by ear, placed each call in one of six acoustic categories, and calculated the rates at which different call-types were used in different social contexts. Species differences were found in the use of “coo” and “gruff” vocalizations among control subjects. Japanese macaques invariably produced coos almost exclusively. In contrast, rhesus macaques produced a mixture of coos and gruffs and showed considerable interindividual variation in the relative use of one call type or the other. Cross-fostered Japanese macaques adhered to their species-typical behavior, rarely using gruffs. Cross-fostered rhesus subjects also exhibited species-typical behavior in many contexts, but in some situations produced coos and gruffs at rates that were intermediate between those shown by normally raised animals of the two species. This outcome suggests that environmentally mediated modification of vocal behavior may have occurred, but that the resulting changes were quite limited.
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
|
Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., & Silk, J. B. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: evidence for causal reasoning? J Comp Psychol, 109(2), 134–141.
Abstract: Baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) understanding of cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions was examined through use of a playback experiment. Under natural conditions, dominant female baboons often grunt to more subordinate mothers when interacting with their infants. Mothers occasionally respond to these grunts by uttering submissive fear barks. Subjects were played causally inconsistent call sequences in which a lower ranking female apparently grunted to a higher ranking female, and the higher ranking female apparently responded with fear barks. As a control, subjects heard a sequence made causally consistent by the inclusion of grunts from a 3rd female that was dominant to both of the others. Subjects responded significantly more strongly to the causally inconsistent sequences, suggesting that they recognized the factors that cause 1 individual to give submissive vocalizations to another.
|
