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Sukhomlinov, B. F., Korobov, V. N., Gonchar, M. V., Datsiuk, L. A., & Korzhev, V. A. (1987). [Comparative analysis of the peroxidase activity of myoglobins in mammals]. Zh Evol Biokhim Fiziol, 23(1), 37–41.
Abstract: Studies have been made on the peroxidase activity of metmyoglobins in animals from various ecological groups--the horse Equus caballus, cattle Bos taurus, beaver Castor fiber, otter Lutra lutra, mink Mustela vison and dog Canis familiaris. It was found that the level of this activity in diving animals depends on the duration of their diving, whereas in terrestrial species--on the strength of muscular contraction.
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Rumiantsev, S. N. (1973). [Biological function of Clostridium tetani toxin (ecological and evolutionary aspects)]. Zh Evol Biokhim Fiziol, 9(5), 474–480.
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Kozarovitskii, L. B. (1988). [Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals]. Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki, (3), 42–45.
Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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