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Henry, S., Fureix, C., Rowberry, R., Bateson, M., & Hausberger, M. (2017). Do horses with poor welfare show 'pessimistic' cognitive biases? Sci. Nat., 104(1), 8.
Abstract: This field study tested the hypothesis that domestic horses living under putatively challenging-to-welfare conditions (for example involving social, spatial, feeding constraints) would present signs of poor welfare and co-occurring pessimistic judgement biases. Our subjects were 34 horses who had been housed for over 3 years in either restricted riding school situations (e.g. kept in single boxes, with limited roughage, ridden by inexperienced riders; N = 25) or under more naturalistic conditions (e.g. access to free-range, kept in stable social groups, leisure riding; N = 9). The horses' welfare was assessed by recording health-related, behavioural and postural indicators. Additionally, after learning a location task to discriminate a bucket containing either edible food ('positive' location) or unpalatable food ('negative' location), the horses were presented with a bucket located near the positive position, near the negative position and halfway between the positive and negative positions to assess their judgement biases. The riding school horses displayed the highest levels of behavioural and health-related problems and a pessimistic judgment bias, whereas the horses living under more naturalistic conditions displayed indications of good welfare and an optimistic bias. Moreover, pessimistic bias data strongly correlated with poor welfare data. This suggests that a lowered mood impacts a non-human species' perception of its environment and highlights cognitive biases as an appropriate tool to assess the impact of chronic living conditions on horse welfare.
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Grosenick, L., Clement, T. S., & Fernald, R. D. (2007). Fish can infer social rank by observation alone. Nature, 445(7126), 429–432.
Abstract: Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
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Marean, C. W., & Gifford-Gonzalez, D. (1991). Late Quaternary extinct ungulates of East Africa and palaeoenvironmental implications. Nature, 350(6317), 418–420.
Abstract: UNGULATE communities of two East African savannas, the Serengeti and Athi-Kapiti Plains, are dominated by wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) supplemented by zebra (Equus burchelli), topi (Damaliscus lunatus), hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphus), buffalo (Syncerus caffer) eland (Taurotragus oryx) and gazelles (Gazella grand and G. thomsoni)1-3. Before this research, little was known of East African large mammal communities in the Late Pleistocene and early to middle Holocene. We document an extinct impala-sized alcelaphine antelope that is numerically dominant in Late Pleistocene archaeofaunal assemblages from the Athi-Kapiti Plains. The extinct giant buffalo Pelorovis antiquus is present, and a number of arid-adapted regionally extinct species are common. The small alcelaphine is rare in northern Tanzania, but regionally extinct arid-adapted species are present in Late Pleistocene deposits. These data indicate that as recently as 12,000 years ago, the large mammal community structure of East African savannas was very different and dry grasslands and arid-adapted ungulates expanded at least as far south as northern Tanzania during the Last Glacial Maximum.
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Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat Rev Neurosci, 4(3), 165–178.
Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
Keywords: Cognition; Emotions; Humans; Models, Psychological; *Social Behavior
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Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nat Rev Neurosci, 2(9), 661–670.
Abstract: What are the neural bases of action understanding? Although this capacity could merely involve visual analysis of the action, it has been argued that we actually map this visual information onto its motor representation in our nervous system. Here we discuss evidence for the existence of a system, the ‘mirror system’, that seems to serve this mapping function in primates and humans, and explore its implications for the understanding and imitation of action.
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