Abstract: Increasing evidence for behavioral differences between populations of primates has created a resurgence of interest in examining mechanisms of information transfer between individuals. The authors examined the social transmission of information in 15 captive orangutans (Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus) using a simulated food-processing task. Experimental subjects were shown 1 of 2 methods for removing a suite of defenses on an “artificial fruit.” Control subjects were given no prior exposure before interacting with the fruit. Observing a model provided a functional advantage in the task, as significantly more experimental than control subjects opened the fruit. Within the experimental groups, the authors found a trend toward differences in the actual behaviors used to remove 1 of the defenses. Results support observations from the wild implying horizontal transfer of information in orangutans and show that a number of social learning processes are likely to be involved in the transfer of knowledge in this species.

Abstract: It is now well established that domestic animals construct responses to their environment that depend on experience and on integration of several features of the environment, including social partners. This ability to be aware of the environment is not fully developed at birth but improves and varies through the animal's life. This topic is discussed on the basis of social processes in sheep and cattle. Social relationships of an animal with its conspecifics develop with age; they do not merely depend on pre-programmed behaviours but rely at least in part on learning of characteristics of the partners. Soon after birth, a strong preferential bond establishes with the dam then to a lesser extent, the young associates to other members of the flock, especially other young. The attractiveness of the group varies later in life due to external events or to physiological state: the abrupt separation from the dam at artificial weaning strengthens bonds between peers, whereas around parturition, females are less disturbed by isolation from the group. More recently, the awareness of social partners has been described in non-social contexts: the animal modifies its responses to events according to the presence of partners, and also to their emotional state and behaviour. The effects of partners seem to depend on their relationship with the animal and also on the social motivation of that animal, which both vary during its life. We recommend study of the ontogeny of awareness using the model of social influences.

Abstract: Like other corvids, food-storing ravens protect their caches from being pilfered by conspecifics by means of aggression and by re-caching. In the wild and in captivity, potential pilferers rarely approach caches until the storers have left the cache vicinity. When storers are experimentally prevented from leaving, pilferers first search at places other than the cache sites. These behaviours raise the possibility that ravens are capable of withholding intentions and providing false information to avoid provoking the storers' aggression for cache protection. Alternatively, birds may refrain from pilfering to avoid conflicts with dominants. Here we examined whether ravens adjust their pilfer tactics according to social context and type of competitors. We allowed birds that had witnessed a conspecific making caches to pilfer those caches either in private, together with the storer, or together with a conspecific bystander that had not created the caches (non-storer) but had seen them being made. Compared to in-private trials, ravens delayed approaching the caches only in the presence of storers. Furthermore, they quickly engaged in searching away from the caches when together with dominant storers but directly approached the caches when together with dominant non-storers. These findings demonstrate that ravens selectively alter their pilfer behaviour with those individuals that are likely to defend the caches (storers) and support the interpretation that they are deceptively manipulating the others' behaviour.

Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.

Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.