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Fischer, J., & Hammerschmidt, K. (2001). Functional referents and acoustic similarity revisited: the case of Barbary macaque alarm calls. Anim. Cogn., 4(1), 29–35.
Abstract: Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) utter “shrill barks” in response to disturbances in their surroundings. In some cases, the majority of group members react by running away or climbing up a tree. In many other instances, however, group members show no overt reaction to these calls. We conducted a series of playback experiments to identify the factors underlying subjects' responses. We presented calls given in response to dogs that had elicited escape responses and calls that had failed to do so. We also presented calls given in response to snakes and to the observer approaching the sleeping-trees at night. An acoustic analysis of the calls presented in the playback experiments (electronic supplementary material, audioclip S1) revealed significant differences among calls given in response to dogs, the observer approaching at night, and snakes. However, the analysis did not detect any differences between calls given in response to dogs that were related to whether or not they had elicited escape responses in the first place. Correspondingly, after playback of calls given in response to dogs, we observed no difference in subjects' responses in relation to whether or not the calls had initially elicited escape responses. Subjects showed startle or escape responses significantly more often after playbacks of calls given in response to dogs than after calls given in response to observers. Playbacks of calls given in response to snakes failed to elicit specific responses such as standing bipedally or scanning the grass. Although these findings may imply that responses depend on the external referent, they also indicate that there is no clear-cut relationship between the information available to the listeners and their subsequent responses. This insight forces us to extend current approaches to identifying the meaning of animal signals.
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Goddard, P. J., Summers, R. W., Macdonald, A. J., Murray, C., & Fawcett, A. R. (2001). Behavioural responses of red deer to fences of five different designs. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 73(4), 289–298.
Abstract: Capercaillie, a large species of grouse, are sometimes killed when they fly into high-tensile deer fences. A fence design which is lower or has a less rigid top section than conventional designs would reduce bird deaths, but such fences would still have to be deer-proof. The short-term behavioural responses of farmed red deer (Cervus elaphus) to fences of five designs, including four that were designed to be less damaging to capercaillie, were measured. Five deer were located on one side of a fence with a larger group (20 animals), from which they had been recently separated, on the other. The efficacy of fences in preventing deer from the small group from rejoining the larger group was also recorded. In addition to a conventional deer fence (C) the four new designs were, an inverted “L” shape (L), a fence with offset electric wire (E), a double fence (D) and a fence with four webbing tapes above (W). Four replicate groups of deer were each tested for 3 days with each fence design. Deer paced the test fence line relatively frequently (a proportion of 0.09 scan observations overall) but significantly less when deer were separated by fences E or C compared to L, W or D (overall difference between fence types, P<0.001). Deer separated by fence E spent significantly more time pacing perimeter fences than deer separated by fences of other types (overall difference between fence types, P<0.01) but deer separated by fence C maintained a low level of fence pacing overall. Analysis of behaviour patterns across the first day and the 3 days of exposure suggested that the novelty of the test fences, rather than the designs per se, influenced the behaviour of the deer. Over the course of the study, no deer crossed either C or L. Three deer crossed E and two deer crossed both W and D. On this basis, field testing, particularly of fence L, would be a useful next step.
Keywords: Red deer; Fence efficiency; Grazing behaviour
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Call, J., & Carpenter, M. (2001). Do apes and children know what they have seen? Anim. Cogn., 3(4), 207–220.
Abstract: Chimpanzees and young children understand much about what other individuals have and have not seen. This study investigates what they understand about their own visual perception. Chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old children were presented with a finding game in which food or stickers were hidden in one of two or three tubes. We varied whether subjects saw the baiting of the tubes, whether subjects could see through the tubes, and whether there was a delay between baiting and presentation of the tubes to subjects. We measured not only whether subjects chose the correct tube but also, more importantly, whether they spontaneously looked into one or more of the tubes before choosing one. Most apes and children appropriately looked into the tubes before choosing one more often when they had not seen the baiting than when they had seen the baiting. In general, they used efficient search strategies more often than insufficient or excessive ones. Implications of subjects' search patterns for their understanding of seeing and knowing in the self are discussed.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2001). Animal cognition and animal behaviour. Anim. Behav., 61(2), 277–286.
Abstract: Cognitive processes such as perception, learning, memory and decision making play an important role in mate choice, foraging and many other behaviours. In this review, I summarize a few key ideas about animal cognition developed in a recent book (Shettleworth 1998, Cognition, Evolution and Behaviour) and briefly review some areas in which interdisciplinary research on animal cognition is currently proving especially productive. Cognition, broadly defined, includes all ways in which animals take in information through the senses, process, retain and decide to act on it. Studying animal cognition does not entail any particular position on whether or to what degree animals are conscious. Neither does it entail rejecting behaviourism in that one of the greatest challenges in studing animal cognition is to formulate clear behavioural criteria for inferring specific mental processes. Tests of whether or not apparently goal-directed behaviour is controlled by a representation of its goal, episodic-like memory in birds, and deceptive behaviour in monkeys provide examples. Functional modelling has been integrated with analyses of cognitive mechanisms in a number of areas, including studies of communication, models of how predator learning and attention affect the evolution of conspicuous and cryptic prey, tests of the relationship betweeen ecological demands on spatial cognition and brain evolution, and in research on social learning. Rather than a `new field' of cognitive ecology, such interdisciplinary research on animal cognition exemplifies a revival of interest in proximate mechanisms of behaviour.
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Wynne C. D. L. (2001). Animal Cognition: The Mental Lives of Animals. Palgrave.
Abstract: Covering a wide range of key topics, from reasoning and communication to sensation and complex problem-solving, this engagingly-written text presents a comprehensive survey of contemporary research on animal cognition. Written for anyone with an interest in animal cognition, but without a background in animal behaviour, it endeavours to explain what makes animals tick.
With numerous illustrations and including exciting recent studies from many little-studied species (such as the weakly electric African fish), this text is ideal for psychology students who are interested in how much of our human cognition is shared by other species, for students of biology who want to know how complex animal behaviour can get, and for all those with an interest in the animal mind. |
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Weiss, D. J., Kralik, J. D., & Hauser, M. D. (2001). Face processing in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Anim. Cogn., 3(4), 191–205.
Abstract: Current research on face processing in primates has focused on a few species, mostly macaques and chimpanzees; to date, only one New World monkey, the squirrel monkey, has been tested. We explored face processing, and the inversion effect in particular, in a New World primate species, the cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus oedipus). In phase 1 of our study, we trained subjects to discriminate between two faces and two scrambled faces; we then presented the tamarins with a series of novel probes in order to determine the features underlying classification. Results showed that the tamarins relied on the external contour of the face for discrimination more than the internal features and their configuration. Statistical analyses revealed no differences in accuracy or response times to upright versus inverted stimuli, and thus no inversion effect. In phase 2, we provided subjects with additional training on the face versus scrambled face discrimination task in order to focus their attention on the configuration of the internal features. Accuracy data revealed individual differences in how tamarins classified these stimuli, even though each subject was trained in the same way. In phase 3, we tested for generalization to a new set of face stimuli, as well as for the capacity to show an inversion effect. For one subject who attended to the configuration of internal features, we found significant evidence of generalization, but no evidence for an inversion effect.
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Macphail, E. M., & Boldhuis, J. J. (2001). The evolution of intelligence: adaptive specializations versusgeneral process. Biological Reviews, 76(3), 341–364.
Abstract: Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
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Slater, P., Rosenblatt, J., Snowdon, C., & Roper, T. (2001). ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR, 31 (Vol. 31). ACADEMIC PRESS.
Abstract: Description
The aim of Advances in the Study of Behavior remains as it has been since the series began: to serve the increasing number of scientists who are engaged in the study of animal behavior by presenting their theoretical ideas and research to their colleagues and to those in neighboring fields. We hope that the series will continue its “contribution to the development of the field”, as its intended role was phrased in the Preface to the first volume in 1965. Since that time, traditional areas of animal behavior have achieved new vigor by the links they have formed with related fields and by the closer relationship that now exists between those studying animal and human subjects. Advances in the Study of Behavior, Volume 31 continues to serve scientists across a wide spectrum of disciplines. Focusing on new theories and research developments with respect to behavioral ecology, evolutionary biology, and comparative psychology, these volumes foster cooperation and communications in these dense fields. Audience Experimental psychologists studying animal behavior, comparative psychologists, ethologists, evolutionary biologists, and ichthyologists. Contents Contributors. Preface.M.L. East and H. Hofer, Conflict and Co-operation in a Female Dominated Society: A Re-assessment of the “Hyper-aggressive” Image of Spotted Hyenas.C. ten Cate, H. Slabbekoorn, and M.R. Ballintijn, Bird Song and Male-male Competition: Causes and Consequences of Vocal Variability in the Collared Dove (Streptopelia Decaocto).R.W. Byrne, Imitation of Novel Complex Actions: What Does the Evidence from Animals Mean?L.J. Rogers, Lateralization in Vertebrates: Its Early Evolution, General Pattern and Development.S.H. Hulse, Auditory Scene Analysis in Animal Communication.P.K. Stoddard, Electric Signals: Predation, Sex, and Environmental Constraints.T. Aubin and P. Jouventin, How to Vocally Identify Kin in a Crowd: The Penguin Model. Index. Contents of Previous Volumes. |
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Griffiths, D. P., & Clayton, N. S. (2001). Testing episodic memory in animals: A new approach. Physiol. Behav., 73(5), 755–762.
Abstract: Episodic memory involves the encoding and storage of memories concerned with unique personal experiences and their subsequent recall, and it has long been the subject of intensive investigation in humans. According to Tulving's classical definition, episodic memory “receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events and temporal-spatial relations among these events.” Thus, episodic memory provides information about the `what' and `when' of events (`temporally dated experiences') and about `where' they happened (`temporal-spatial relations'). The storage and subsequent recall of this episodic information was thought to be beyond the memory capabilities of nonhuman animals. Although there are many laboratory procedures for investigating memory for discrete past episodes, until recently there were no previous studies that fully satisfied the criteria of Tulving's definition: they can all be explained in much simpler terms than episodic memory. However, current studies of memory for cache sites in food-storing jays provide an ethologically valid model for testing episodic-like memory in animals, thereby bridging the gap between human and animal studies memory. There is now a pressing need to adapt these experimental tests of episodic memory for other animals. Given the potential power of transgenic and knock-out procedures for investigating the genetic and molecular bases of learning and memory in laboratory rodents, not to mention the wealth of knowledge about the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of the rodent hippocampus (a brain area heavily implicated in episodic memory), an obvious next step is to develop a rodent model of episodic-like memory based on the food-storing bird paradigm. The development of a rodent model system could make an important contribution to our understanding of the neural, molecular, and behavioral mechanisms of mammalian episodic memory.
Keywords: Episodic memory; Food-caching; Animal models
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Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in primates. Am. J. Primatol., 55(2), 71–85.
Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.
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