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Brannon, E. M., & Terrace, H. S. (2000). Representation of the numerosities 1-9 by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 26(1), 31–49.
Abstract: Three rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to respond to exemplars of 1, 2, 3, and 4 in an ascending, descending, or a nonmonotonic numerical order (1-->2-->3-->4, 4-->3-->2--1, 3-->1-->4-->2). The monkeys were then tested on their ability to order pairs of the novel numerosities 5-9. In Experiment 1, all 3 monkeys ordered novel exemplars of the numerosities 1-4 in ascending or descending order. The attempt to train a nonmonotonic order (3-->1-->4-->2) failed. In Experiment 2A, the 2 monkeys who learned the ascending numerical rule ordered pairs of the novel numerosities 5-9 on unreinforced trials. The monkey who learned the descending numerical rule failed to extrapolate the descending rule to new numerosities. In Experiment 2B all 3 monkeys ordered novel exemplars of pairs of the numerosities 5-9. Accuracy and latency of responding revealed distance and magnitude effects analogous to previous findings with human participants (R. S. Moyer & T. K. Landaeur, 1967). Collectively these studies show that monkeys represent the numerosities 1-9 on at least an ordinal scale.
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McLean, A. N. (2004). Short-term spatial memory in the domestic horse. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 85(1-2), 93–105.
Abstract: This study investigates the ability of horses to recall a feeding event in a two-point choice apparatus. Twelve horses were individually tested whereby they were maintained immobile in a test arena and visually and aurally experienced the delivery of food into one of two feed goals. The horses were then released to make their choice in two experimental contexts: immediate release after experiencing the delivery of food, and release 10 s after food delivery. Each horse performed 40 immediate-release (IR) trials, followed by forty 10-s release trials over a 3-day period. In addition, the same horses were tested 3 months later in the spring with the same number and sequence of trials. Results were analysed by log-linear analysis of frequencies. Results showed that while horses were able to achieve the correct feed goal choice in the immediate-release trials, they were unsuccessful with the 10-s release trials. This suggests that there are limitations in recall abilities in horses, in that they may not possess a prospective type of memory. There are welfare and training implications in these findings concerning the effects of overestimating the mental abilities of horses during training and the effects of delays in reinforcements.
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Call, J. (2006). Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 393–403.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.
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Nielsen, M., Collier-Baker, E., Davis, J. M., & Suddendorf, T. (2005). Imitation recognition in a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 31–36.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.
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Poti, P. (2005). Chimpanzees' constructional praxis (Pan paniscus, P. troglodytes). Primates, 46(2), 103–113.
Abstract: This study investigated chimpanzees' spontaneous spatial constructions with objects and especially their ability to repeat inter-object spatial relations, which is basic to understanding spatial relations at a higher level than perception or recognition. Subjects were six chimpanzees-four chimpanzees and two bonobos-aged 6-21 years, all raised in a human environment from an early age. Only minor species differences, but considerable individual differences were found. The effect of different object samples was assessed through a comparison with a previous study. A common overall chimpanzee pattern was also found. Chimpanzees repeated different types of inter-object spatial relations such as insertion (I), or vertical (V), or next-to (H) relations. However chimpanzees repeated I or V relations with more advanced procedures than when repeating H relations. Moreover, chimpanzees never repeated combined HV relations. Compared with children, chimpanzees showed a specific difficulty in repeating H relations. Repeating H relations is crucial for representing and understanding multiple reciprocal spatial relations between detached elements and for coordinating independent positions in space. Therefore, the chimpanzees' difficulty indicates a fundamental difference in constructive space in comparison to humans. The findings are discussed in relation to issues of spatial cognition and tool use.
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Paukner, A., Anderson, J. R., & Fujita, K. (2006). Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition? Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 110–117.
Abstract: This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.
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Lampe, J. F., & Andre, J. (2012). Cross-modal recognition of human individuals in domestic horses (Equus caballus). Animal Cognition, 15(4), 623–630.
Abstract: This study has shown that domestic horses are capable of cross-modal recognition of familiar humans. It was demonstrated that horses are able to discriminate between the voices of a familiar and an unfamiliar human without seeing or smelling them at the same moment. Conversely, they were able to discriminate the same persons when only exposed to their visual and olfactory cues, without being stimulated by their voices. A cross-modal expectancy violation setup was employed; subjects were exposed both to trials with incongruent auditory and visual/olfactory identity cues and trials with congruent cues. It was found that subjects responded more quickly, longer and more often in incongruent trials, exhibiting heightened interest in unmatched cues of identity. This suggests that the equine brain is able to integrate multisensory identity cues from a familiar human into a person representation that allows the brain, when deprived of one or two senses, to maintain recognition of this person.
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Hayashi, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 225–233.
Abstract: This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object-object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object-object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8-11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old). Second, object-object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object-object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.
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Cooper, J. J., Ashton, C., Bishop, S., West, R., Mills, D. S., & Young, R. J. (2003). Clever hounds: social cognition in the domestic dog (Canis familiaris). Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 81(3), 229–244.
Abstract: This paper reviews the reasons why domestic dogs make good models to investigate cognitive processes related to social living and describes experimental approaches that can be adopted to investigate such processes in dogs. Domestic dogs are suitable models for investigating social cognition skills for three broad reasons. First, dogs originated from wolves, social animals that engage in a number of co-operative behaviours, such as hunting and that may have evolved cognitive abilities that help them predict and interpret the actions of other animals. Second, during domestication dogs are likely to have been selected for mental adaptations for their roles in human society such as herding or companionship. Third, domestic dogs live in a human world and “enculturation” may facilitate the development of relevant mental skills in dogs. Studies of social cognition in animals commonly use experimental paradigms originally developed for pre-verbal human infants. Preferential gaze, for example, can be used as a measure of attention or “surprise” in studies using expectancy violation. This approach has been used to demonstrate simple numerical competence in dogs. Dogs also readily use both conspecific and human social signals (e.g. looking or pointing) as information sources to locate hidden rewards such as food or favourite toys. Such abilities make dogs particularly good models for investigating perspective-taking tasks, where animals are required to discriminate between apparently knowledgeable and apparently ignorant informants.
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Griffin, D. R. (1998). From cognition to consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 3–16.
Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.
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