| Records |
| Author |
von Borstel, U.U.K.; Duncan, I.J.H.; Lundin, M.C.; Keeling, L.J. |
| Title |
Fear reactions in trained and untrained horses from dressage and show-jumping breeding lines |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2010 |
Publication |
Applied Animal Behaviour Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. |
| Volume |
125 |
Issue |
3–4 |
Pages |
124-131 |
| Keywords |
Horse; Fear; Habituation; Riding; Training; Genetic selection |
Abstract  |
Horses’ fear reactions are hazardous to both horses and human beings, but it is not clear whether fear is influenced more by training or by other factors such as genetics. The following study was designed to detect differences between young, untrained (U) and older, well-trained (T) horses of dressage (D), show-jumping (J), and mixed (M) genetic lines with regard to intensity of reaction and ease of habituation to a frightening stimulus. In five consecutive trials, 90 horses were exposed to a standardized fear-eliciting stimulus where intensity and duration of the reactions were recorded. Repeated measures analysis showed that flight reactions by J were less intense (p < 0.05) than those by D or M regardless of training status or age. Habituation to the stimulus over time was not significantly (p > 0.1) different between the disciplines, as indicated by similar slopes for all measurements, but reaction vigour declined faster for T than for U. These findings indicate that there may be a genetic basis for less strong, though not shorter-lasting, fear reactions in J compared to D or M lines of horses. Research including the estimation of genetic correlations between traits related to fearfulness and to performance would be required to verify this assumption. |
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0168-1591 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5643 |
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| Author |
Warneken, F.; Tomasello, M. |
| Title |
Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2006 |
Publication |
Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
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| Volume |
311 |
Issue |
5765 |
Pages |
1301-1303 |
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| Abstract |
Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviors (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals in a variety of different situations. This requires both an understanding of others' goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills and motivations in three young chimpanzees. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5607 |
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| Author |
Dusek, J.A.; Eichenbaum, H. |
| Title |
The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus relations |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1997 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
| Volume |
94 |
Issue |
13 |
Pages |
7109-7114 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Attention; Discrimination (Psychology)/physiology; Hippocampus/anatomy & histology/*physiology; Male; Memory/*physiology; Rats |
| Abstract |
Human declarative memory involves a systematic organization of information that supports generalizations and inferences from acquired knowledge. This kind of memory depends on the hippocampal region in humans, but the extent to which animals also have declarative memory, and whether inferential expression of memory depends on the hippocampus in animals, remains a major challenge in cognitive neuroscience. To examine these issues, we used a test of transitive inference pioneered by Piaget to assess capacities for systematic organization of knowledge and logical inference in children. In our adaptation of the test, rats were trained on a set of four overlapping odor discrimination problems that could be encoded either separately or as a single representation of orderly relations among the odor stimuli. Normal rats learned the problems and demonstrated the relational memory organization through appropriate transitive inferences about items not presented together during training. By contrast, after disconnection of the hippocampus from either its cortical or subcortical pathway, rats succeeded in acquiring the separate discrimination problems but did not demonstrate transitive inference, indicating that they had failed to develop or could not inferentially express the orderly organization of the stimulus elements. These findings strongly support the view that the hippocampus mediates a general declarative memory capacity in animals, as it does in humans. |
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Department of Psychology, Boston University, 64 Cummington Street, Boston, MA 02215, USA |
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English |
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0027-8424 |
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| Notes |
PMID:9192700 |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
607 |
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| Author |
Wood, J.N.; Glynn, D.D.; Phillips, B.C.; Hauser, M.D. |
| Title |
The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
317 |
Issue |
5843 |
Pages |
1402-1405 |
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| Abstract |
Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4241 |
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| Author |
Wood, J.N.; Glynn, D.D.; Phillips, B.C.; Hauser, M.D. |
| Title |
online material |
Type |
Miscellaneous |
| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
317 |
Issue |
5843 |
Pages |
1402-1405 |
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| Abstract |
Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago. |
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| Notes |
10.1126/science.1144663 |
Approved |
no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4242 |
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| Author |
Hampton, R.R. |
| Title |
Rhesus monkeys know when they remember |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2001 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
| Volume |
98 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
5359-5362 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Food Preferences/psychology; Macaca mulatta/*physiology/*psychology; Male; Memory/*physiology; Probability; Psychological Tests; Reproducibility of Results; Sensitivity and Specificity |
| Abstract |
Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten. |
| Address |
Section on the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Building 49, Room 1B-80, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA. robert@ln.nimh.nih.gov |
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0027-8424 |
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PMID:11274360 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2824 |
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| Author |
Herrmann, E.; Call, J.; Hernandez-Lloreda, M.V.; Hare, B.; Tomasello, M. |
| Title |
online material |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
317 |
Issue |
5843 |
Pages |
1360-1366 |
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| Abstract |
Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4244 |
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| Author |
Herrmann, E.; Call, J.; Hernandez-Lloreda, M.V.; Hare, B.; Tomasello, M. |
| Title |
Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
317 |
Issue |
5843 |
Pages |
1360-1366 |
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| Abstract |
Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world. |
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10.1126/science.1146282 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4245 |
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| Author |
Bergman, T.J.; Beehner, J.C.; Cheney, D.L.; Seyfarth, R.M. |
| Title |
Hierarchical classification by rank and kinship in baboons |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Science (New York, N.Y.) |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
302 |
Issue |
5648 |
Pages |
1234-1236 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Animals, Wild; Botswana; *Cognition; Family; Female; *Hierarchy, Social; Language; *Papio/psychology; Social Dominance; Vocalization, Animal |
| Abstract |
Humans routinely classify others according to both their individual attributes, such as social status or wealth, and membership in higher order groups, such as families or castes. They also recognize that people's individual attributes may be influenced and regulated by their group affiliations. It is not known whether such rule-governed, hierarchical classifications are specific to humans or might also occur in nonlinguistic species. Here we show that baboons recognize that a dominance hierarchy can be subdivided into family groups. In playback experiments, baboons respond more strongly to call sequences mimicking dominance rank reversals between families than within families, indicating that they classify others simultaneously according to both individual rank and kinship. The selective pressures imposed by complex societies may therefore have favored cognitive skills that constitute an evolutionary precursor to some components of human cognition. |
| Address |
Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. thore@sas.upenn.edu |
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1095-9203 |
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| Notes |
PMID:14615544 |
Approved |
no |
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refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
689 |
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| Author |
Piggins, D.; Phillips, C.J.C. |
| Title |
Awareness in domesticated animals--concepts and definitions |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Applied Animal Behaviour Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. |
| Volume |
57 |
Issue |
3-4 |
Pages |
181-200 |
| Keywords |
Complex mind; Awareness; Humans; Domesticated animals; Conscious state |
| Abstract |
Humans will probably never experience the awareness of another species, but adopting a broad concept of awareness leads to the conclusion that other species have some awareness. The existence of a more complex mind in humans, compared with other species, leads some to suggest that awareness only exists in humans. We postulate that humans possess a significantly increased level of awareness, facilitated in particular by the acquisition of language, but that generally animals possess a level of awareness that is appropriate to their needs. Categories of awareness can be devised by identifying levels, such as are used in the identification of the conscious state in humans, or by ranking states of awareness in order of complexity. A scheme is proposed that combines these two approaches, which is considered suitable for use with domesticated animals. The advantages of identifying awareness as being sensation-, perception- or cognition-based are discussed, as well as the possibility of a scheme based on the degree and site of CNS processing. Finally, the acquisition of awareness by learning and inheritance is considered, and it is argued that in variable environments, animals will evolve increased awareness, whereas in very stable environments the energetic cost of awareness will encourage the evolution of less aware animals. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4308 |
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