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Goto, K., Lea, S. E. G., & Dittrich, W. H. (2002). Discrimination of intentional and random motion paths by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 119–127.
Abstract: Twelve pigeons ( Columba livia) were trained on a go/no-go schedule to discriminate between two kinds of movement patterns of dots, which to human observers appear to be “intentional” and “non-intentional” movements. In experiment 1, the intentional motion stimulus contained one dot (a “wolf”) that moved systematically towards another dot as though stalking it, and three distractors (“sheep”). The non-intentional motion stimulus consisted of four distractors but no stalker. Birds showed some improvement of discrimination as the sessions progressed, but high levels of discrimination were not reached. In experiment 2, the same birds were tested with different stimuli. The same parameters were used but the number of intentionally moving dots in the intentional motion stimulus was altered, so that three wolves stalked one sheep. Despite the enhanced difference of movement patterns, the birds did not show any further improvement in discrimination. However, birds for which the non-intentional stimulus was associated with reward showed a decline in discrimination. These results indicated that pigeons can discriminate between stimuli that do and do not contain an element that human observer see as moving intentionally. However, as no feature-positive effect was found in experiment 1, it is assumed that pigeons did not perceive or discriminate these stimuli on the basis that the intentional stimuli contained a feature that the non-intentional stimuli lacked, though the convergence seen in experiment 2 may have been an effective feature for the pigeons. Pigeons seem to be able to recognise some form of multiple simultaneously goal-directed motions, compared to random motions, as a distinctive feature, but do not seem to use simple “intentional” motion paths of two geometrical figures, embedded in random motions, as a feature whose presence or absence differentiates motion displays.
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Grosenick, L., Clement, T. S., & Fernald, R. D. (2007). Fish can infer social rank by observation alone. Nature, 445(7126), 429–432.
Abstract: Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
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McKinley, S., & Young, R. J. (2003). The efficacy of the model-rival method when compared with operant conditioning for training domestic dogs to perform a retrieval-selection task. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 81(4), 357–365.
Abstract: Traditionally, dogs have been trained by operant conditioning techniques; that is, dogs make a desired behavioural response and this response is reinforced by a reward such as food. This type of training is very effective in training dogs to perform basic obedience behaviours (e.g. `stay'). However, dogs are social animals and should be predisposed to learn from social stimuli. In the present study, we used a modified version of the model-rival technique that has been extensively used in experiments investigating the cognitive ability of parrots. In this technique, social stimuli are used to create in the animal an interest in the object without the use of food or other rewards. Therefore, the animal learns the name of the object (intrinsic reward) and not that the object's name means food. In this experiment we compared the learning ability of nine pet dogs to solve the same retrieval-selection task having been previously trained using operant conditioning or model-rival techniques. The retrieval-selection task was the dogs had to correctly select the commanded object to bring to the experimenter from a group of three similar objects. The results show no difference in the speeds with which the dogs solved the test--demonstrating the efficacy of the model-rival method. This is the first time that the effectiveness of the model-rival technique has been experimentally demonstrated with dogs. Furthermore, we believe that the methodology reported in this paper has applications in dog training and in experiments into dog cognition.
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Zentall, T. R. (2002). A cognitive behaviorist approach to the study of animal behavior. J Gen Psychol, 129(4), 328–363.
Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.
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Matsushima, T., Izawa, E. - I., Aoki, N., & Yanagihara, S. (2003). The mind through chick eyes: memory, cognition and anticipation. Zoolog Sci, 20(4), 395–408.
Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”
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Werner, C. W., Tiemann, I., Cnotka, J., & Rehkamper, G. (2005). Do chickens (Gallus gallus f. domestica) decompose visual figures? Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 129–140.
Abstract: To investigate whether learning to discriminate between visual compound stimuli depends on decomposing them into constituting features, hens were first trained to discriminate four features (red, green, horizontal, vertical) from two dimensions (colour, line orientation). After acquisition, hens were trained with compound stimuli made up from these dimensions in two ways: a separable (line on a coloured background) stimulus and an integral one (coloured line). This compound training included a reversal of reinforcement of only one of the two dimensions (half-reversal). After having achieved the compound stimulus discrimination, a second dimensional training identical to the first was performed. Finally, in the second compound training the other dimension was reversed. Two major results were found: (1) an interaction between the dimension reversed and the type of compound stimulus: in compound training with colour reversal, separable compound stimuli were discriminated worse than integral compounds and vice versa in compound training with line orientation reversed. (2) Performance in the second compound training was worse than in the first one. The first result points to a similar mode of processing for separable and integral compounds, whereas the second result shows that the whole stimulus is psychologically superior to its constituting features. Experiment 2 repeated experiment 1 using line orientation stimuli of reversed line and background brightness. Nevertheless, the results were similar to experiment 1. Results are discussed in the framework of a configural exemplar theory of discrimination that assumes the representation of the whole stimulus situation combined with transfer based on a measure of overall similarity.
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Nakamura, K. (2001). Perseverative errors in object discrimination learning by aged Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(4), 345–353.
Abstract: To examine the nature of age-dependent cognitive decline, performance in terms of concurrent object discriminations was assessed in aged and nonaged Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata). Aged monkeys required more sessions and committed more errors than nonaged ones in the discriminations, even in simple object discriminations. Analyses of errors suggest that aged monkeys repeated the same errors and committed more errors when they chose a negative object at the 1st trial. A hypothesis analysis of behavior suggests that their incorrect choices were mainly due to object preference. Therefore, the impairment was probably caused by a failure to inhibit inappropriate responses. Together with previous neuropsychological findings, deficits of aged monkeys in the performance of object discriminations can be explained by dysfunction of the frontal cortex.
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Crowley, P. H., Provencher, L., Sloane, S., Dugatkin, L. A., Spohn, B., Rogers, L., et al. (1996). Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 49–66.
Abstract: To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated.
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Curtis, S. E., & Stricklin, W. R. (1991). The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5001–5007.
Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
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Bovet, D., Vauclair, J., & Blaye, A. (2005). Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 53–59.
Abstract: Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon children's prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.
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