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Hinson, R. E. (1982). Effects of UCS preexposure on excitatory and inhibitory rabbit eyelid conditioning: an associative effect of conditioned contextual stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 8(1), 49–61.
Abstract: Preconditioning experience with the unconditional stimulus (UCS) retards subsequent excitatory conditioning. Three experiments demonstrated that this UCS retardation effect is attenuated by associative manipulations of contextual stimuli of the UCS preexposure environment. The UCS retardation effect was reduced by (a) altering contextual stimuli between preexposure and conditioning (Experiment 1), (b) latently inhibiting contextual stimuli prior to UCS preexposure (Experiment 2), and (c) extinguishing contextual stimuli subsequent to UCS preexposure (Experiment 3). Although UCS preexposure retarded excitatory conditioning, the results of Experiment 4 demonstrated that UCS preexposure facilitated inhibitory conditioning. These results indicate that an association between contextual stimuli and the preexposed UCS contributes to the effects of preconditioning UCS experience on subsequent learning.
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Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
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Treichler, F. R., & Van Tilburg, D. (1996). Concurrent Conditional Discrimination Tests of Transitive Inference by Macaque Monkeys: List Linking. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(1), 105–117.
Abstract: Processing of serial information was assessed by training six macaques on a five-item list of objects arranged into the four conditional pairs, A-B+, B-C+, C-D+, and D-E+. An analogous list (F through J) was similarly trained. Subsequently, both lists were linked by training on E-F+, a pair that provided adjacent elements from each list. Then, all unique and trained object pairs from both lists were presented as a test. Results indicated that the objects were retained as a single, linearly organized list with choice accuracy directly related to interitem distance between paired objects. A second experiment explored the consequences of incidence of conflicting information on list organization. In both experiments, selections depended on representational processes and supported the view that monkeys and pigeons retain serial lists in qualitatively different ways.
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Shettleworth, S. J., & Sutton, J. E. (2005). Multiple systems for spatial learning: dead reckoning and beacon homing in rats. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(2), 125–141.
Abstract: Rats homed with food in a large lighted arena. Without visual cues, they used dead reckoning. When a beacon indicated the home, rats could also use the beacon. Homing did not differ in 2 groups of rats, 1 provided with the beacon and 1 without it; tests without the beacon gave no evidence that beacon learning overshadowed dead reckoning (Experiment 1). When the beacon was at the home for 1 group and in random locations for another, there was again no evidence of cue competition (Experiment 2). Dead reckoning experience did not block acquisition of beacon homing (Experiment 3). Beacon learning and dead reckoning do not compete for predictive value but acquire information in parallel and are used hierarchically.
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Crystal, J. D. (1999). Systematic nonlinearities in the perception of temporal intervals. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 25(1), 3–17.
Abstract: Rats judged time intervals in a choice procedure in which accuracy was maintained at approximately 75% correct. Sensitivity to time (d') was approximately constant for short durations 2.0-32.0 s with 1.0- or 2.0-s spacing between intervals (n = 5 in each group, Experiment 1), 2.0-50.0 s with 2.0-s spacing (n = 2, Experiment 1), and 0.1-2.0 s with 0.1- or 0.2-s spacing (n = 6 in each group, Experiment 2). However, systematic departures from average sensitivity were observed, with local maxima in sensitivity at approximately 0.3, 1.2, 10.0, 24.0, and 36.0 s. Such systematic departures from an approximately constant d' are predicted by a connectionist theory of time with multiple oscillators and may require a modification of the linear timing hypothesis of scalar timing theory.
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Washburn, D. A., Smith, J. D., & Shields, W. E. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 185–189.
Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
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Zentall, T. R., Klein, E. D., & Singer, R. A. (2004). Evidence for detection of one duration sample and default responding to other duration samples by pigeons may result from an artifact of retention-test ambiguity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(2), 129–134.
Abstract: S. C. Gaitan and J. T. Wixted (2000) proposed that when pigeons are trained on a conditional discrimination to associate 1 duration sample with 1 comparison and 2 other duration samples with a 2nd comparison, they detect only the single duration, and on trials involving either of the 2 other duration samples, they respond to the other comparison by default. In 2 experiments, the authors show instead that pigeons lend to treat the retention intervals (such as those used by Gaitan and Wixted) as intertrial intervals, and thus, they tend to treat all trials with a delay as 0-s sample trials. The authors tested this hypothesis by showing that divergent retention functions do not appear when the retention interval is discriminably different from the intertrial interval.
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Vlamings, P. H. J. M., Uher, J., & Call, J. (2006). How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: the effects of food quantity and food visibility. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 60–70.
Abstract: S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible.
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Skov-Rackette, S. I., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2005). What do rats learn about the geometry of object arrays? Tests with exploratory behavior. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(2), 142–154.
Abstract: Six experiments using habituation of exploratory behavior tested whether disoriented rats foraging in a large arena encode the shapes of arrays of objects. Rats did not respond to changes in position of a single object, but they responded to a change in object color and to a change in position of 1 object in a square array, as in previous research (e.g., C. Thinus-Blanc et al., 1987). Rats also responded to an expansion of a square array, suggesting that they encoded sets of interobject distances rather than overall shape. In Experiments 4-6, rats did not respond to changes in sense of a triangular array that maintained interobject distances and angles. Shapes of object arrays are encoded differently from shapes of enclosures.
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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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