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Pepperberg, I. M. (2004). “Insightful” string-pulling in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) is affected by vocal competence. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 263–266.
Abstract: Four Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) were tested on their ability to obtain an item suspended from a string such that mutiple, repeated, coordinated beak-foot actions were required for success (e.g., Heinrich 1995). Those birds with little training in referential English requests (e.g. “I want X”) succeeded, whereas birds who could request the suspended item failed to obtain the object but engaged in repeated requesting.
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Merchant, H., Fortes, A. F., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2004). Short-term memory effects on the representation of two-dimensional space in the rhesus monkey. Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 133–143.
Abstract: Human subjects represent the location of a point in 2D space using two independent dimensions (x-y in Euclidean or radius-angle in polar space), and encode location in memory along these dimensions using two levels of representation: a fine-grain value and a category. Here we determined whether monkeys possessed the ability to represent location with these two levels of coding. A rhesus monkey was trained to reproduce the location of a dot in a circle by pointing, after a delay period, on the location where a dot was presented. Five different delay periods (0.5-5 s) were used. The results showed that the monkey used a polar coordinate system to represent the fine-grain spatial coding, where the radius and angle of the dots were encoded independently. The variability of the spatial response and reaction time increased with longer delays. Furthermore, the animal was able to form a categorical representation of space that was delay-dependent. The responses avoided the circumference and the center of the circle, defining a categorical radial prototype around one third of the total radial length. This radial category was observed only at delay durations of 3-5 s. Finally, the monkey also formed angular categories with prototypes at the obliques of the quadrants of the circle, avoiding the horizontal and vertical axes. However, these prototypes were only observed at the 5-s delay and on dots lying on the circumference. These results indicate that monkeys may possess spatial cognitive abilities similar to humans.
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Hampton, R. R., Zivin, A., & Murray, E. A. (2004). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 239–246.
Abstract: Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.
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Urcuioli, P. J., DeMarse, T. B., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Transfer across delayed discriminations: II. Differences in the substitutability of initial versus test stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 24(1), 47–59.
Abstract: In 2 experiments, pigeons were trained on, and then transferred to, delayed simple discriminations in which the initial stimuli signalled reinforcement versus extinction following a retention interval. Experiment 1 showed that discriminative responding on the retention test transferred to novel test stimuli that had appeared in another delayed simple discrimination but not to stimuli having the same reinforcement history off-baseline. By contrast, Experiment 2 showed that performances transferred to novel initial stimuli whether they had been trained on-baseline or off-baseline. These results suggest that the test stimuli in delayed simple discriminations acquire control over responding only in the memory task itself. On the other hand, control by the initial stimuli, if coded as outcome expectancies, does not require such task-specific training.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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Kuroshima, H., Fujita, K., Adachi, I., Iwata, K., & Fuyuki, A. (2003). A Capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 283–291.
Abstract: In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a “knower” who inspected a box for food, and a “guesser” who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.
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Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., Sherburne, L. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Simultaneous discrimination learning in pigeons: value of S- affects the relative value of its associated S+. Q J Exp Psychol B, 51(4), 363–378.
Abstract: In a simple simultaneous discrimination involving a positive stimulus (S+) and a negative stimulus (S-), it has been hypothesized that positive value can transfer from the S+ to the S- (thus increasing the relative value of the S-) and also that negative value can transfer from the S- to the S+ (thus diminishing the relative value of the S+; Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991). Evidence for positive value transfer has been reported in pigeons (e.g. Zentall & Sherburne, 1994). The purpose of the present experiments was to determine, in a simultaneous discrimination, whether the S- diminishes the value of the S+ or the S- is contrasted with the S+ (thus enhancing the value of the S+). In two experiments, we found evidence for contrast, rather than value transfer, attributable to simultaneous discrimination training. Thus, not only does the S+ appear to enhance the value of the S-, but the S- appears to enhance rather than reduce the value of the S+.
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Zentall, T. R., & Clement, T. S. (2002). Memory mechanisms in pigeons: evidence of base-rate neglect. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 111–115.
Abstract: In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Zentall, T. R., Roper, K. L., & Sherburne, L. M. (1995). Most directed forgetting in pigeons can be attributed to the absence of reinforcement on forget trials during training or to other procedural artifacts. J Exp Anal Behav, 63(2), 127–137.
Abstract: In research on directed forgetting in pigeons using delayed matching procedures, remember cues, presented in the delay interval between sample and comparisons, have been followed by comparisons (i.e., a memory test), whereas forget cues have been followed by one of a number of different sample-independent events. The source of directed forgetting in delayed matching to sample in pigeons was examined in a 2 x 2 design by independently manipulating whether or not forget-cue trials in training ended with reinforcement and whether or not forget-cue trials in training included a simultaneous discrimination (involving stimuli other than those used in the matching task). Results were consistent with the hypothesis that reinforced responding following forget cues is sufficient to eliminate performance deficits on forget-cue probe trials. Only when reinforcement was omitted on forget-cue trials in training (whether a discrimination was required or not) was there a decrement in accuracy on forget-cue probe trials. When reinforcement is present, however, the pattern of responding established during and following a forget cue in training may also play a role in the directed forgetting effect. These findings support the view that much of the evidence for directed forgetting using matching procedures may result from motivational and behavioral artifacts rather than the loss of memory.
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