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Heck H,. (1976). Die Erhaltung des Pzewalskipferdes.
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Hubbard Re, H. R. (1976). Diets of wild horses, cattles and mule deer in the Piceance Basin, Colorado. J Range Mgmt 29, , 389–392.
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Keiper, R. (1976). Social organization of feral ponies. Proc Pennsyl Acad Sci, 50, 69–70.
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Ödberg Fo,. (1976). A study on eliminative and grazing behaviour – the use of the field by captive horses. Equine Vet J, 8, 147–149.
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McGregor, P. K., & Dabelsteen, T. (1976). Communication Networks. In D. E. Kroodsma, & E. H. Miller (Eds.), Ecology and evolution of acoustic communication in birds (pp. 409–425). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Clabby, J. (1976). The Natural History of the Horse. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company.
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Joubert, E., & Louw, G. N. (1976). Preliminary observations on the digestive and renal efficiency of Hartmann's zebra Equus zebra hartmannae. Madoqua, 10, 119–121.
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Schaller, G. B.:. (1976). The Serengeti Lion: A Study of Predator-Prey Relations (Wildlife Behavior and Ecology series). Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
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Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson, & R. A. Hinde (Eds.), Growing Points in Ethology (pp. 303–317). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Smith, J. M., & Parker, G. A. (1976). The logic of asymmetric contests. Anim. Behav., 24(1), 159–175.
Abstract: A theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioural strategies in contest situations. It is assumed that behaviour will evolve so as to maximize individual fitness. If so, a population will evolve an [`]evolutionarily stable strategy', or ESS, which can be defined as a strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, no [`]mutant' strategy can do better. A number of simple models of contest situations are analysed from this point of view. It is concluded that in [`]symmetric' contests the ESS is likely to be a [`]mixed' strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable. Most real contests are probably asymmetric, either in pay-off to the contestants, or in size or weapons, or in some [`]uncorrelated' fashion; i.e. in a fashion which does not substantially bias either the pay-offs or the likely outcome of an escalated contest. An example of an uncorrelated asymmetry is that between the [`]discoverer' of a resource and a [`]late-comer'. It is shown that the ESS in asymmetric contests will usually be to permit the asymmetric cue to settle the contest without escalation. Escalated contests will, however, occur if information to the contestants about the asymmetry is imperfect.
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