Abstract: Songbirds can learn both to produce and to discriminate between different classes of acoustic stimuli. Varying levels of auditory discrimination may improve the fitness of individuals in certain ecological and social contexts and, thus, selection is expected to mold the cognitive abilities of different species according to the potential benefits of acoustic processing. Although fine-scale auditory discrimination of conspecific songs and calls has been frequently reported for brood parasitic brown-headed cowbirds ( Molothrus ater), it remains unclear why and how they perceive differently the songs of their many host species. Using habituation-dishabituation paradigms and measuring behavioral and physiological (heart-rate) responses, we found that captive female cowbirds consistently discriminated between songs of two host species, the song sparrow ( Melospiza melodia) and the red-winged blackbird ( Agelaius phoeniceus). Playback experiments with stimuli composed of con-specific followed by heterospecific vocalizations in the field also demonstrated discrimination between these heterospecific songs even though cowbirds were not attracted to playbacks of either host species' songs alone. Our results do not directly support a nest-searching function of heterospecific song discrimination by cowbirds and are most consistent with a function of the parasites' avoidance of attacks by their aggressive hosts. These data demonstrate discrimination between heterospecific vocalizations by brown-headed cowbirds and add a novel dimension to the already expansive auditory perceptual abilities of brood parasitic species and other songbirds.

Abstract: Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the “phylogenetic”, “animal model”, and “adaptational”. We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these – survey reviews of published studies – we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single “gold standard” task.

Abstract: Summary A wonderfully lucid framework for the ways to understand animal behaviour is that represented by the four [`]whys' proposed by Tinbergen (1963). For much of the past three decades, however, these four avenues have been pursued more or less in parallel. Functional questions, for example, have been addressed by behavioural ecologists, mechanistic questions by psychologists and ethologists, ontogenetic questions by developmental biologists and neuroscientists and phylogenetic questions by evolutionary biologists. More recently, the value of integration between these differing views has become apparent. In this brief review, we concentrate especially on current attempts to integrate mechanistic and functional approaches. Most of our understanding of learning and memory in animals comes from the psychological literature, which tends to use only rats or pigeons, and more occasionally primates, as subjects. The underlying psychological assumption is of general processes that are similar across species and contexts rather than a range of specific abilities. However, this does not seem to be entirely true as several learned behaviours have been described that are specific to particular species or contexts. The first conspicuous exception to the generalist assumption was the demonstration of long delay taste aversion learning in rats (Garcia et al., 1955), in which it was shown that a stimulus need not be temporally contiguous with a response for the animal to make an association between food and illness. Subsequently, a number of other examples, such as imprinting and song learning in birds (e.g., Bolhuis and Honey, 1998; Catchpole and Slater, 1995; Horn, 1998), have been thoroughly researched. Even in these cases, however, it has been typical for only a few species to be studied (domestic chicks provide the [`]model' imprinting species and canaries and zebra finches the song learning [`]models'). As a result, a great deal is understood about the neural underpinnings and development of the behaviour, but substantially less is understood about interspecific variation and whether variation in behaviour is correlated with variation in neural processing (see review by Tramontin and Brenowitz, 2000 but see ten Cate and Vos, 1999).

Abstract: Summary Underlying the various behaviors that are classified as imitation, there may be several distinct mechanisms, differing in adaptive function, cognitive basis, and computational power. Experiments reporting “true motor imitation” in animals do not as yet give evidence of production learning by imitation; instead, contextual imitation can explain their data, and this can be explained by a simple mechanism (response facilitation) which matches known neural findings. When imitation serves a function in social mimicry, which applies to a wide range of phenomena from neonatal imitation in humans and great apes to pair-bonding in some bird species, the fidelity of the behavioral match is crucial. Learning of novel behavior can potentially be achieved by matching the outcome of a model's action, and it is argued that vocal imitation by birds is a clear example of this method (which is sometimes called emulation). Alternatively, the behavior itself may be perceived in terms of actions that the observer can perform, and thus it may be copied. If the imitation is linear and stringlike (action level), following the surface form rather than the underlying plan, then its utility for learning new instrumental methods is limited. However, the underlying plan of hierarchically organized behavior is visible in output behavior, in subtle but detectable ways, and imitation could instead be based on this organization (program level), extracted automatically by string parsing. Currently, the most likely candidates for such capacities are all great apes. It is argued that this ability to perceive the underlying plan of action, in addition to allowing highly flexible imitation of novel instrumental methods, may have resulted in the competence to understand the intentions (theory of mind) of others.

Abstract: The ability of four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to recognize the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were trained to follow a suggestion about the location of hidden food provided by a trainer who knew where the food was (the knower) in preference to a trainer who did not (the guesser). The experimenter baited one of three opaque containers behind a cardboard screen so that the subjects could not see which of the containers hid the reward. In experiment 1, the knower appeared first in front of the apparatus and looked into each container; next, the guesser appeared but did not look into any containers. Then the knower touched the correct cup while the guesser touched one of the three randomly. The capuchin monkeys gradually learned to reach toward the cup that the knower suggested. In experiment 2, the subjects adapted to a novel variant of the task, in which the guesser touched but did not look into any of the containers. In experiment 3, the monkeys adapted again when the knower and the guesser appeared in a random order. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys can learn to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.