Abstract: The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888)

Abstract: The idea that consistencies in behavior exist over time and across situations underlies human personality research. Although several studies have examined personality in nonhuman primates, there are very few data showing the predictive power of personality factors. The goal of the present study was to determine whether personality dimensions, identified in adult male rhesus monkeys living in half-acre cages, predicted behavior in situations different from the one from which the dimensions were originally derived and at time points of up to 4.5 years after the original assessments. Four personality dimensions (Sociability, Confidence, Excitability, and Equability) were identified using psychometric procedures and were correlated with behaviors recorded in several situations: the animals' natal groups, during tests of behavioral responsiveness while in individual cages, in small stable and unstable social groups, while viewing stimulus videotapes, and during stable social dyads. Results indicated substantial predictability. Sociability reflected a greater tendency to engage in affiliative interactions. Confidence correlated with more aggressive behaviors and with behaviors that suggest less attractiveness. Animals high in Excitability were somewhat inconsistent in their social behavior, perhaps reflecting hyper-responsiveness to novel circumstances and thwarted opportunities for escape. Equability appeared to be related to a less aggressive, more passive, style of interaction. Excitability and Equability appear to reflect more stylistic components of social behavior, whereas Sociability and Confidence may be more content-based dimensions. Sociability was strongly related to size of kin network in the animals' natal groups, suggesting an important role for ontogeny in this dimension. These data suggest that a limited number of personality dimensions exist in adult male rhesus macaques, and that these dimensions have predictive power that is both long-term and cross situational.

Abstract: The likelihood of reconciliation (defined as preferential peaceful contact among former opponents following conflicts) has been predicted to vary positively with relationship value and compatibility, and negatively with relationship security. Long-term data on wild white-faced capuchins (Cebus capucinus) indicate that dyads consisting of an adult female and an alpha male have high value and compatibility, but low security. Two studies of C. capucinus postconflict (PC) behavior were carried out at Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve, Costa Rica. One study consisted of 30-min PC and matched control (MC) follows. The second study extracted PC and MC periods from long follows, yielding PC/MC periods averaging 105 min. In study 2, but not study 1, significantly more PC/MC pairs were attracted (former opponents affiliated with each other sooner in the PC period than in the MC period) than were dispersed (former opponents affiliated with each other sooner in the MC period than in the PC period). Reconciliation in study 2 could not be explained as a by-product of former opponents' tendency to seek affiliative contact with conspecifics generally, or of the spatial proximity of opponents following conflicts. Attempted reconciliation was less likely to be followed by renewed aggression when reconciliation attempts were delayed following conflicts. The data were insufficient for a formal test of differences in conciliatory tendency (the difference between the number of attracted and dispersed PC/MC pairs, divided by the total number of pairs) among dyad types to be conducted.

Abstract: The neurobiology of stress and the neurobiology of social behavior are deeply intertwined. The social environment interacts with stress on almost every front: social interactions can be potent stressors; they can buffer the response to an external stressor; and social behavior often changes in response to stressful life experience. This review explores mechanistic and behavioral links between stress, anxiety, resilience, and social behavior in rodents, with particular attention to different social contexts. We consider variation between several different rodent species and make connections to research on humans and non-human primates.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.