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Beckers, T., Miller, R. R., De Houwer, J., & Urushihara, K. (2006). Reasoning rats: forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference. J Exp Psychol Gen, 135(1), 92–102.
Abstract: Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.
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Cavoto, K. K., & Cook, R. G. (2001). Cognitive precedence for local information in hierarchical stimulus processing by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(1), 3–16.
Abstract: Four experiments investigated the processing of hierarchical stimuli by pigeons. Using a 4 alternative divided-attention task, 4 pigeons were food-reinforced for accurately identifying letters arranged as either hierarchical global- or local-relevant stimuli or as size-matched filled stimuli. Experiment 1 found that task acquisition was faster with local-relevant than global-relevant stimuli. This difference was not due to letter size. Experiment 2 demonstrated successful transfer to a novel irrelevant letter configuration. Experiments 3 and 4 tested pigeons' responses to conflict probe stimuli composed of equally discriminable relevant letters at each level. These tests revealed that all of the pigeons showed a cognitive precedence for local information early in processing, with the pigeons using different cues to initiate the processing of global information. This local advantage contrasts with previously reported results for humans and pigeons but is similar to that reported for nonhuman primates. Alternatives attempting to reconcile these contrasting comparative results are considered.
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Wasserman, E. A., Gagliardi, J. L., Cook, B. R., Kirkpatrick-Steger, K., Astley, S. L., & Biederman, I. (1996). The pigeon's recognition of drawings of depth-rotated stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(2), 205–221.
Abstract: Four experiments used a four-choice discrimination learning paradigm to explore the pigeon's recognition of line drawings of four objects (an airplane, a chair, a desk lamp, and a flashlight) that were rotated in depth. The pigeons reliably generalized discriminative responding to pictorial stimuli over all untrained depth rotations, despite the bird's having been trained at only a single depth orientation. These generalization gradients closely resembled those found in prior research that used other stimulus dimensions. Increasing the number of different vantage points in the training set from one to three broadened the range of generalized testing performance, with wider spacing of the training orientations more effectively broadening generalized responding. Template and geon theories of visual recognition are applied to these empirical results.
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Vonk, J. (2003). Gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orangutan ( Pongo abelii) understanding of first- and second-order relations. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 77–86.
Abstract: Four orangutans and one gorilla matched images in a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task based on the relationship between items depicted in those images, thus demonstrating understanding of both first- and second-order relations. Subjects matched items on the basis of identity, color, or shape (first-order relations, experiment 1) or same shape, same color between items (second-order relations, experiment 2). Four of the five subjects performed above chance on the second-order relations DMTS task within the first block of five sessions. High levels of performance on this task did not result from reliance on perceptual feature matching and thus indicate the capability for abstract relational concepts in two species of great ape.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Beck, B. B. (1982). Chimpocentrism: Bias in cognitive ethology. Journal of Human Evolution, 11(1), 3–17.
Abstract: Herring gulls drop hard-shelled mollusks and hermit crab-inhabited molluskan prey in order to break the shells and gain access to the edible interior. A field study of predatory shell dropping on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, U.S.A. showed that the gulls usually drop the same shell repeatedly, orient directly to dropping sites that are invisible from the point at which the mollusks are captured, drop preferentially on hard surfaces, adjust dropping heights to suit the area and elasticity of the substrate, orient directly into the wind while dropping, sever the large defensive cheliped of hermit crabs before consumption, and rinse prey that is difficult to swallow. Proficiency in prey dropping is acquired through dropping objects in play, trial-and-error learning, and perhaps, observation learning.
Observable attributes of predatory shell-dropping support inferences that the gulls are capable of extended concentration, purposefulness, mental representation of spatially and temporally displaced environmental features, cognitive mapping, cognitive modeling, selectivity, and strategy formation. Identical cognitive processes have been inferred to underlie the most sophisticated forms of chimpanzee tool-use.
Advanced cognitive capacities are not restricted to chimpanzees and other pongids, and are not associated uniquely with tool use. The chimpocentric bias should be abandoned, and reconstructions of the evolution of intelligence should be modified accordingly.
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Proops, L., McComb, K., & Reby, D. (2008). Cross-modal individual vocal recognition in the domestic horse. In IESM 2008.
Abstract: Horses fulfill many of the criteria for a species in which it would be adaptive to be capable of individual recognition: they are highly social, form strong and long lasting bonds, their affiliations are rarely kin based, they have a fission-fusion social structure and they possess inter and intra-group dominance hierarchies.
We used a novel cross-modal, expectancy violation paradigm to provide the first systematic evidence that a non-human animal – the domestic horse- is capable of cross modal recognition. We believe this paradigm could provide an ideal way to study individual recognition across a wide range of species.
For full published details see: Proops L, McComb K, Reby D (2009) Cross-modal individual recognition in domestic horses (Equus caballus). Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 106: 947-951.
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Burla, J. - B., Siegwart, J., & Nawroth, C. (2018). Human Demonstration Does Not Facilitate the Performance of Horses (Equus caballus) in a Spatial Problem-Solving Task. Animal, 8(6), 96.
Abstract: Horses’ ability to adapt to new environments and to acquire new information plays an important role in handling and training. Social learning in particular would be very adaptive for horses as it enables them to flexibly adjust to new environments. In the context of horse handling, social learning from humans has been rarely investigated but could help to facilitate management practices. We assessed the impact of human demonstration on the spatial problem-solving abilities of horses during a detour task. In this task, a bucket with a food reward was placed behind a double-detour barrier and 16 horses were allocated to two test groups of 8 horses each. One group received a human demonstration of how to solve the spatial task while the other group received no demonstration. We found that horses did not solve the detour task more often or faster with human demonstration. However, both test groups improved rapidly over trials. Our results suggest that horses prefer to use individual rather than social information when solving a spatial problem-solving task
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Merchant, H., Fortes, A. F., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2004). Short-term memory effects on the representation of two-dimensional space in the rhesus monkey. Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 133–143.
Abstract: Human subjects represent the location of a point in 2D space using two independent dimensions (x-y in Euclidean or radius-angle in polar space), and encode location in memory along these dimensions using two levels of representation: a fine-grain value and a category. Here we determined whether monkeys possessed the ability to represent location with these two levels of coding. A rhesus monkey was trained to reproduce the location of a dot in a circle by pointing, after a delay period, on the location where a dot was presented. Five different delay periods (0.5-5 s) were used. The results showed that the monkey used a polar coordinate system to represent the fine-grain spatial coding, where the radius and angle of the dots were encoded independently. The variability of the spatial response and reaction time increased with longer delays. Furthermore, the animal was able to form a categorical representation of space that was delay-dependent. The responses avoided the circumference and the center of the circle, defining a categorical radial prototype around one third of the total radial length. This radial category was observed only at delay durations of 3-5 s. Finally, the monkey also formed angular categories with prototypes at the obliques of the quadrants of the circle, avoiding the horizontal and vertical axes. However, these prototypes were only observed at the 5-s delay and on dots lying on the circumference. These results indicate that monkeys may possess spatial cognitive abilities similar to humans.
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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