Abstract: Reciprocity and other social interaction patterns can be studied at two levels, within pairs (i.e. dyadic level) and among pairs (i.e. at group level). In this paper advantages of the latter approach are emphasized. However, an analysis at group level implies the correlation of interaction matrices and because such data are statistically dependent, the significance of a correlation has to be calculated in a special way

Abstract: The dynamic behavior of small herds is investigated by means of simulations of two-dimensional discrete-stochastic models. An individual-based approach is used to relate collective behavior to individual decisions. In our model, the motion of an individual in a herd is assumed to be the combined result of both density-independent and density-dependent decisions, in the latter case based on the influence of surrounding neighbors; assumed decision rules are hierarchical, balancing short range repulsion against long-range attraction. The probability of fragmentation of the model herd depends on parameter values. We explore the variety and characteristics of spatial patterns that develop during migration, for herds that are homogeneous and heterogeneous regarding intrinsic walking speeds. Group integrity can be maintained even in mixed populations, but fragmentation results for these more easily than for a homogeneous herd. Observations of natural populations suggest that animals move away from individuals that intrude too closely into their environment, but are attracted to individuals at a distance. Between these extremes, there appears to be a neutral zone, within which other individuals engender no response. We explore the importance of this neutral zone, and offer evolutionary interpretations. In particular, the neutral zone, if not too large, permits the individual to remain in contact with the herd, while reducing the frequency with which acceleration or deceleration must be undertaken. This offers obvious energetic benefits.

Abstract: The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behaviour is for assessment of relative RHP (resource holding power) of the combatants. Outcomes of aggressive disputes should be decided by each individual's fitness budget available for expenditure during a fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative strategies (“assessments”) will be determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This “loser” should retreat (before escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants to be equal, there are many instances of fitness pay-off imbalances between holder and attacker which should weight the dispute outcome in favour of one or other opponent by allowing it a greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favours the holder; the attacker therefore needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. This is not invariably the case, and much observed data fits the predictions of this sort of model. If assessments are perfect and budget expenditure rates exactly predictable, then there would never seem to be any case for escalation. Escalation can be explained in terms of injury inflictions (expenditures) occurring as discrete events; i.e. as “bouts” won or lost during fighting. Assessment can give only a probabilistic prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple model is developed to investigate escalation situations. Each combatant assesses relative RHP; this correlates with an absolute probability of winning the next bout (cabs). The stake played for is infliction of loss of RHP and is determined by the fitness budgets of the opponents. (Each individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponent.) This defines a critical probability of winning (ccrit) for each combatant, above which escalation is the favourable strategy (cabs > ccrit) and below which withdrawal is favourable (cabs < ccrit). Escalation should occur only where cabs-ccrit is positive for both combatants. This model gives predictions compatible with the observations, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour. Withdrawal tendency will be increased by low searching costs. Escalations should be restricted to closely matched RHP opponents if RHP disparity is the major imbalance. Outside the “escalation range” of a given individual, the higher RHP individual wins and the lower one loses (i.e. it should withdraw after conventional display). RHP disparity and holder: attacker imbalance should both interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative importances will depend on species and situation. In some instances selection may favour immediate withdrawal from an occupied territory even without assessment of RHP.

Abstract: This paper presents an antithesis to the view that gregarious behaviour is evolved through benefits to the population or species. Following Galton (1871) and Williams (1964) gregarious behaviour is considered as a form of cover-seeking in which each animal tries to reduce its chance of being caught by a predator.
It is easy to see how pruning of marginal individuals can maintain centripetal instincts in already gregarious species; some evidence that marginal pruning actually occurs is summarized. Besides this, simply defined models are used to show that even in non-gregarious species selection is likely to favour individuals who stay close to others.
Although not universal or unipotent, cover-seeking is a widespread and important element in animal aggregation, as the literature shows. Neglect of the idea has probably followed from a general disbelief that evolution can be dysgenic for a species. Nevertheless, selection theory provides no support for such disbelief in the case of species with outbreeding or unsubdivided populations.
The model for two dimensions involves a complex problem in geometrical probability which has relevance also in metallurgy and communication science. Some empirical data on this, gathered from random number plots, is presented as of possible heuristic value.

Abstract: We present a two-dimensional individual-based model of aggregation behaviour in animals by introducing the concept of a “limited domain of danger”, which represents either a limited detection range or a limited attack range of predators. The limited domain of danger provides a suitable framework for the analysis of individual movement rules under real-life conditions because it takes into account the predator's prey detection and capture abilities. For the first time, a single geometrical construct can be used to analyse the predation risk of both peripheral and central individuals in a group. Furthermore, our model provides a conceptual framework that can be equally applied to aggregation behaviour and refuge use and thus presents a conceptual advance on current theory that treats these antipredator behaviours separately. An analysis of individual movement rules using limited domains of danger showed that the time minimization strategy outcompetes the nearest neighbour strategy proposed by Hamilton's (J. Theor. Biol. 31 (1971) 295) selfish herd model, whereas a random strategy confers no benefit and can even be disadvantageous. The superior performance of the time minimization strategy highlights the importance of taking biological constraints, such as an animal's orientation relative to its neighbours, into account when searching for efficient movement rules underlying the aggregation process.