Abstract: Under the assumption that selection favors minimization of costly errors, erroneous choice may be common when its fitness cost is low. According to an adaptive-choice model, this cost depends on the rate at which an animal encounters the choice: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing a less valuable option. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. A previous experiment supported this prediction: gray jays, Perisoreus canadensis, were more error prone when subjected to shorter delays to access to food rewards. This pattern, though, is also predicted by an attentional-constraints model. Because the subjects were able to inspect the rewards during delays, their improved performance when subjected to longer delays could have been a byproduct of the experimentally prolonged opportunity for information processing. To evaluate this possibility, a follow-up experiment manipulated both delay to access and whether rewards could be inspected during delays. Depriving jays of the opportunity to inspect rewards (using opaque lids) induced only a small, nonsignificant increase in error rate. This effect was independent of length of delay and so the jays' improved performance when subjected to longer delays was not simply a byproduct of prolonged information processing. More definitively, even when the jays were prevented from inspecting rewards during delays, their performance improved when subjected to longer delays. The findings are thus consistent with the adaptive-choice model.

Abstract: Two measures are reported of the nature or quality of a mother-offspring (MO) relationship during development using brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) as models. One is a qualitative classification of MO relationships as secure, resistant, or avoidant attachments. The other is an empirical ratio of relative affiliation to agonism called the MO relationship quality, or MORQ, Index. The two methods tapped similar relationship features so relationships high or low of a median split of MORQ values were heuristically labeled secure (n = 22) or insecure (n = 16), respectively. A comparison revealed extensive behavioral differences between secure and insecure MO relationships and suggested MORQ provided an objective, continuous measure of attachment security.

Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.

Abstract: This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.